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ABSTRACT 
 
This study looks at some factors influencing mutual fund performance. Fund 
management location, family status and asset allocation and timing ability are 
examined. Using monthly returns on 4545 funds from Morningstar from January 1970 
to June 2010, the study examines whether location influences the return a fund 
generates. It is found that U.S. managed funds outperform European managed funds, 
regardless of market invested in. This can be seen in terms of higher mean alpha, and 
statistically significant outperformance. A comparison is also carried out between the 
performance of family funds and non-family funds. Using the recursive portfolio 
technique and Rhodes utility based measure of persistence, the persistence of funds that 
are in a family are compared to those that do not belong to a family. A second 
hypothesis is also examined here, analyzing whether fund managers make their risk 
decision to influence performance for the second part of the year based on their 
performance in the first part of the year. It can be concluded that family status, family 
size or market does not affect persistence in performance. The study found that family 
rank has an impact on the risk adjustment behaviour of fund managers. The fact that the 
coefficient is negative suggests that managers are not behaving strategically. When 
markets are examined individually, fund managers within families compete in the U.S. 
and behave strategically in Europe. Finally, using asset allocation data on balanced 
funds, the study examines the skill of balanced fund managers to time particular asset 
classes. It is found that there is little timing ability present, across all markets and 
models.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Over €16.3 trillion in total net assets are currently managed by the U.S. and European 
mutual fund industry. (EFAMA, June 2010). A vast portion of this amount is actively 
managed by money managers who rely on superior stock selection skills and market 
timing ability to outperform passive strategies. This study contributes to the discussion 
in three existing areas of existing literature on mutual fund performance. Many studies 
have been carried out to evaluate fund performance (Sharpe (1964), Jensen (1968), 
Fama and French (1993), Wermers (2000), Cuthbertson, Nitzsche and O’Sullivan 
(2008)) but very little research has been carried out in the area of comparing fund 
performance on the basis of fund location or family status. This thesis examines 
whether these characteristics influences the return a fund generates. There are numerous 
studies at an individual country level but comparing management location remains a 
much under-researched area. According to Nanda, Wang and Zheng (2004), over 80% 
of U.S. mutual funds belong to a family. Since family membership is so prevalent, it is 
interesting that more research has not been carried out on family status and associated 
performance. 
 
Much of the literature has focused on single asset class mutual funds so remarkably 
little is known about the investment performance of multiple-asset-class portfolios. The 
performance, asset allocation skills and timing ability of balanced funds as a sector has 
received scant attention. It seems odd that asset allocation, seemingly the most 
important determinant of performance, has not been the focus of more research, 
especially since it has been claimed that ‘asset allocation policy explains more than 90 
percent of performance’ Brinson, Hood, and Beebower (1986).  
 
The first contribution of this study involves evaluating fund performance on the basis of 
fund location. Chapter 3 examines whether location influences the return a fund 
generates. It is hypothesized that local funds will perform better relative to foreign funds 
because the local fund managers may have an informational advantage over managers 
based overseas. As discussed in Shukla and van Inwegen (1995), informational 
advantages possessed by funds managed locally include local knowledge and contacts, 
company visits, time zone advantages and connections and relationships with market 
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participants such as brokers, investment bankers etc ‘to accord them preferential 
treatment in terms of research, execution of trades, and access to initial public offerings 
(IPOs)’. This hypothesis will be tested by analyzing the performance of funds in two 
regions, U.S. and Europe and using a number of different techniques namely alpha 
performance models, persistence and market timing models, and returns based style 
analysis. Two main comparisons are examined. The first comparison is a ‘management 
location’ comparison, where funds are managed from different locations but where the 
securities are from the same market. The second comparison is the ‘market’ comparison 
where funds are managed in the same location but invest in different markets.  
 
Chapter 4 presents the second contribution of the study. A comparison is performed 
between the performance of family funds and non-family funds. It is suggested by 
Guedj and Papastaikoudi (2005) that funds within a family are more likely to have 
persistent performance than those not in families, given the strategy of the family to 
promote only a few of their funds. The main rational behind this strategy is the convex 
performance-flow relationship. If more persistence is detected within a family than 
outside, it is evidence that families are actively intervening in their funds’ performance. 
It is also expected that larger families would be more capable of affecting the 
performance of their funds, and thus display more persistence than small families. 
Using the recursive portfolio technique and Rhodes (2000) utility based measure of 
persistence, the persistence of funds that are in a family are compared to those that do 
not belong to a family. A second hypothesis is also examined here, analyzing whether 
fund managers make their risk decision to influence performance for the second part of 
the year based on their performance in the first part of the year. The Risk Adjusted 
Ratio as well as a derivative of Kempf and Ruenzi’s (2008) risk adjustment strategy 
model is used to test this hypothesis.  
 
Finally the third contribution looks at the ability of fund managers to make strategic 
asset allocation decisions. Chapter 5 examines the skill of balanced fund managers to 
time particular asset classes. The asset classes studied are equity, bond, cash and ‘other’ 
allocations.  It is assumed that by claiming to actively manage the fund, the fund 
manager is able to time each asset class. Two different timing techniques are employed 
to analyse the performance of multi-asset class funds: one using returns data to test for 
absolute and relative timing ability and one using actual asset allocation data. Three 
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markets are examined - the U.S., U.K. and Canada. Absolute timing is the timing of 
each asset class and relative timing is the timing of one asset class relative to another.  
 
The dataset used for the locational and family analysis spans a much longer and more 
recent time period and is a much larger sample than has been considered before. 
Monthly fund returns from Morningstar are used from January 1970 to June 2010, for 
funds managed in the U.S. and Europe. There are 4545 funds in total, including 714 
foreign funds. A unique feature of this study is the fact that each fund in the analysis is 
individually checked to see where it was actually managed rather than where it was 
domiciled. This detailed examination by fund was deemed vital as a large number of 
funds were not managed where they were domiciled.  There are 666 families in the 
dataset with the number of funds per family ranging from 2 to 141. There are also 498 
funds that are classified as being single funds, that is funds not in a family group. The 
balanced fund dataset contains 714 balanced funds spanning the period January 2000 to 
December 2010.  
 
The findings of this study make important contributions to the academic literature in 
terms of implications for investors and for fund management companies. From an 
investor point of view, it is essential for them to know whether it is necessary to choose 
a U.S. based fund if they want to invest in U.S. equities, or whether an overseas 
manager of U.S. equities would suffice. If one set of funds is found to be superior to 
another, economic questions will be raised about the efficient assimilations of 
information into the market between the two regions. Findings in support of abnormal 
performance and market timing ability, however small, is evidence of a breach of 
market efficiency. Evidence of losing funds with consistent bad performance would 
suggest investor inertia – investors seem to be happy investing in losing funds.  
 
Also, should an investor invest within a family of funds or choose a stand-alone fund? If 
there is no apparent advantage to an investor in investing in a fund belonging to a 
family in terms of performance and persistence, the question is raised why the popular 
‘brand name’ funds (generally part of a family) attract more cash inflows than the 
smaller, less popular funds. Finally, one of the main reasons investors choose balanced 
funds is because they are accessing a source of diversification across asset classes. As 
above, it is assumed that by claiming to actively manage the fund, the fund manager is 
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able to time each asset class. If managers are not able to do this, balanced funds must be 
questioned as a deserving source of investment - or at the very least, managers should 
not charge active management fees.  
 
For the fund manager, a finding in support of poor performance should have 
repercussions on fees charged. The fees charged by fund managers have often been 
criticized as being extremely high, thus making the profession a very lucrative one for 
the funds. Whilst these high fees can be justified when the fund is outperforming a 
relevant benchmark, it is when the fund underperforms that causes so much 
controversy. Generally speaking, fund managers get fees based on a percentage of 
assets, and bonuses for beating benchmarks such as the S&P 500 and above-average 
performance compared to their peer group. The fees charged can range from 0.5% up to 
4%, but on average are somewhere between 1.5-2%. So, do fund managers deserve the 
fees they charge?  
 
There are important implications from a fund management company point of view as 
well. It would be very useful to ascertain whether it is necessary to set up an overseas 
office, or whether foreign assets can be successfully managed at home. Also a finding 
that fund managers within a family compete for resources in terms of performance 
could have negative implications for the family. Kempf and Ruenzi (2008) discuss how 
‘tournament behaviour of fund managers leads to suboptimal portfolios’. 
 
There are policy implications too. One of the motivations behind this study is the fact 
that this is a quite topical issue at the moment in light of the current ‘pensions crises’. If 
people are being encouraged to invest and save money, then are managed funds a 
deserving source for such investment? A finding in support of managerial skill 
inadequacy would suggest that people would be better off finding some other scheme in 
order to provide ample funds for their pension, for example, an index tracker fund, or 
perhaps less risky bonds. The issue of the ‘savings gap’ would also be very relevant 
here. The projected state pension model as well as increasing life expectancy will lead 
to a search for a source of funding to fill the gap.  
 
Also from a policy point of view, the issue of false or unethical advertising comes into 
question as well. Since there is limited regulation in the area at the moment, a fund 
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manager who produces a negative alpha could still claim to have been the top 
performing manager in their field - while this might have been true, it still does not 
mean that people would be better off investing in such a fund as opposed to an index 
tracker fund. The persistence of portfolios returns would be one of the most importance 
areas where regulation might be needed. Reasons for this include the fact that 
advertising rarely mentions risk adjustment, and the fact that funds will often state that 
they were the top performing fund over the last number of years, but this is meaningless 
if there is no persistence. 
 
To summarise, the contributions of this thesis are: 
• multiple techniques used to evaluate performance; 
• multiple market analysis; 
• each fund in the analysis individually checked to see where it was actually 
managed rather than where it was domiciled; 
• each fund in the analysis individually checked to ascertain family status; 
• many more ‘foreign’ funds than previously examined; 
• new techniques derived; 
• continuous and reliable data; 
• dataset spanning a much longer and more recent time period; and 
• a much larger sample than has been considered before. 
 
The structure of the thesis is as follows: Chapter 2 presents an overview of the general 
literature in the area of mutual fund performance in relation to performance 
measurement and persistence, market timing, skill versus luck and returns based style 
analysis.. The locational analysis is outlined in Chapter 3 and this is followed by the 
mutual fund family study presented in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 details the asset allocation 
analysis. Each of these three chapters contains a review of the specific literature in the 
topic area, a data section presenting detailed descriptive statistics and information on 
data sources, a methodology section setting out the theory and models used and a results 
and conclusion section.  Finally Chapter 6 outlines general conclusions. 
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Chapter 2: General Literature Review 
 
This chapter presents a review of the general literature in the area of mutual fund 
performance in relation to performance measurement and persistence, market timing, 
skill versus luck and returns based style analysis. The most important studies in each 
area are presented to give a good overall representation of the research done in the field, 
and the most significant findings. Each chapter also presents a more specific review of 
the literature most relevant for each topic.  
 
2.1 Performance Measurement and Persistence 
 
The topic of portfolio performance evaluation has been widely researched and 
developed in the past 50 years. The majority of research done in this area suggests that 
passively managed funds outperform actively managed ones. There is more evidence to 
support the underperformance of mutual funds as opposed to their superior 
performance. The majority of the studies done in the area have been on the U.S. and the 
U.K. There are numerous performance measurement models in existence and this 
section reviews some of the most important.  
 
The oldest and simplest is the Capital Assets Pricing Model, (CAPM) as developed by 
Sharpe (1964). The model is represented by the formula: 
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CAPM is a single factor risk model. It adjusts fund return for the level of market or 
systematic risk. Jensen (1968) devised the ‘alpha’ term which has come to be associated 
with CAPM: 
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The Treynor Ratio was developed by Treynor (1965) and it is a risk-adjusted measure 
of return based on systematic risk. It is calculated by: 
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flows.’ The question here is whether past performance has any predictive power about 
future performance. Persistence can be considered in two different ways - statistical 
predictability and economic predictability. A number of studies have shown the returns 
of the top and bottom performing funds generally persist. Numerous studies have been 
carried out using different data sets and time periods, so a summary is presented here. 
 
One of the earliest studies was done by Sharpe (1966) using his ratio. Ranking mutual 
funds according to their Sharpe ratio over two periods 1944-53 and 1954-63, he found a 
significant positive relationship between the two ranking periods. In several studies, 
Grinblatt and Titman (1989, 1992) studied equity funds for various periods and, using 
evaluation periods of five years, found partial persistence even after adjusting for 
survivorship bias. In their 1989 paper, they use quarterly U.S. mutual fund holdings data 
to measure performance over the period 1975 to 1984. They use the holdings to 
construct hypothetical fund returns. Jensen’s alpha was used to evaluate the portfolios. 
They found evidence that superior performance may exist. The risk adjusted gross 
returns of some funds were significantly positive.  
 
A 1995 study by Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers provided further evidence of 
performance persistence. This study analysed the extent to which mutual funds 
purchased stocks based on their past returns. They found 77% of the funds studied were 
“momentum investors”- investors who bought stocks that were past winners. On 
average, the funds that invested in momentum realized significantly better performance 
than other funds.  
 
Grinblatt and Titman (1992) examine 279 mutual funds for persistence over the period 
1974 to 1984. An extension of Jensen’s alpha is used to measure performance and the 
persistence of this performance is examined using a three-step method. The ten-year 
sample of fund returns is split into two five-year sub periods. Next the abnormal returns 
of each fund are calculated for each sub period. Finally, they estimate the slope 
coefficient by regressing abnormal returns computed from the last five years of data on 
abnormal returns computed from the first five years of data. If the t-statistic of this slope 
coefficient is significant and positive, it is an indication that past performance can be 
used to predict future performance.  Their ‘persistence statistic indicates that mutual 
funds in the second five-year period are expected to realize a 0.28% greater abnormal 
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return in the second five years for every 1% abnormal return achieved in the first five 
years’ (Grinblatt and Titman 1992: 1980).  
 
Also looking at persistence or what they term ‘consistency in performance’, 
Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) look at the performance of 769 funds over the 
period 1983 to 1989. Their database has quarterly returns and also quarter holding 
information by stock for each fund, as well as information about fund characteristics 
and style.  They find that the funds in their database perform poorly relative to a passive 
investment strategy. For example they find that a typical fund performed 1.3 percent 
worse per year than the S&P 500.  They claim ‘pension fund equity managers seem to 
subtract rather than add value relative to the performance of the S&P 500 Index.’ When 
examining for consistency in performance, they find some consistency of performance 
that would ‘enable a firm to pick a better money manager on the basis of past 
performance, but even so it is not clear that this money manager would be able to beat 
the market.’  
 
Examining 165 U.S. equity mutual funds, Hendricks, Patel and Zeckhauser (1993) 
present one of the first studies to look at short run persistence. They use quarterly 
returns data over the period 1974 to 1988. They use a sporting analogy when they apply 
the term ‘hot hands’ to the finance world. They say that ‘funds delivering sustained 
short-run superior performance have "hot hands"’. They deem funds that show 
persistent poor performance to have ‘icy hands’. They find evidence to support funds 
with hot hands and icy hands in this sample. This effect lasts four quarters 
approximately. They also look at subsets of their sample to see if any particular style of 
fund displayed significant persistence and found ‘no-load growth-oriented mutual funds 
that performed well relative to their brethren in the most recent year continue to be 
superior performers in the near term (one to eight quarters)’ (Hendricks, Patel and 
Zeckhauser 1993: 122). 
 
Examining for both performance and performance persistence, Malkiel (1995) analyses 
the U.S. from 1971-1995 using a contingency table approach. He splits his sample into 
sub-periods and evidence of persistence during the 1970s but not during the 1980s. He 
confirms this finding at both the raw and risk adjusted return level. Lastly, he identifies 
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an investment strategy based on persistence that would yield an excess return in the 
1970s but not the 1980s.  
 
Brown and Goetzmann (1995) study the persistence of U.S. mutual funds over the 
period 1976 to 1988. They also study survivorship bias and analyse the factors 
contributing to the disappearance of funds. A probit analysis indicates that whilst size 
age and the fund’s expense ratio are important, poor performance impacts the 
probability of disappearance the most. They find evidence of relative risk-adjusted 
performance and they conclude that this is due mainly to funds that lag the S&P 500. 
They examine for persistence using a contingency table approach. In each period a fund 
is defined as either Winners or Losers depending on their performance. Looking at two 
consecutive periods, funds can be winners in both periods, (WW), a Winner in the first 
period and a Loser in the second period (WL), a Loser in the first period and a Winner 
in the second period (LW) or a Loser in both periods (LL). Persistence would be 
deemed to be present the WW or LL categories are high numbers of funds.   
 
They examine this persistence effect on a year by year basis and find that the ‘relative 
performance pattern depends upon the time period observed, and it is correlated across 
managers’ (Brown and Goetzmann 1995: 679). Similar to Malkiel (1995), Brown and 
Goetzmann find that persistence can be clustered in time for US mutual funds. Mutual 
funds exceeded the S&P 500 for the period 1977 through 1982, and then lagged over 
the period 1983 through 1988. They show that the persistence in their sample is robust 
to adjustments for risk. They suggest two possible reasons for persistence. First, since 
persistence is correlated across managers it is likely due to a common strategy that is 
not captured by standard models or risk adjustment procedures. Second, not all losing 
funds disappear. Since ‘the market fails to fully discipline underperformers, their 
presence in sample contributes to the pattern of relative persistence’ (Brown and 
Goetzmann 1995: 680). 
 
Also examining performance persistence, Elton, Gruber and Blake (1996) examine 188 
common stock funds from 1977 to the end of 1993. They find that high return can 
predict high return but find that this is a short-run phenomenon, reconfirming 
Hendricks, Patel and Zeckhauser (1993)’s ‘hot hands’ finding.  They use a standard 
performance methodology where the fund's risk-adjusted performance is based on alpha 
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from a four-index model, where the four factors are the excess return on the S&P 500 
Index, the difference in return between a small-cap and large-cap stock portfolio, the 
difference in return between a growth and value stock portfolio and the excess return on 
a bond index. To test for persistence and predictive ability they rank funds into 10 
deciles each year and observe how well the deciles perform in subsequent periods. They 
find that ‘past performance is predictive of future risk-adjusted performance in both the 
short run and longer run’. For example, they find a positive excess return of 0.9 basis 
points per month produced by the top decile by holding for three years. In summary 
they conclude that ‘when future performance is evaluated over 3-year periods, selection 
on prior 3-year alpha conveys no less, and perhaps more, information about future 
performance than selection using other time horizons. When future performance is 
evaluated over a 1-year period, selection of funds based on the prior year's data conveys 
much more information about performance than selection based on data from the prior 3 
years.’ 
 
In a much cited study, Carhart (1997) applies the recursive portfolio formation 
methodology to U.S. mutual fund returns for the period 1962-93. This tests for 
‘economic predictability’, as discussed in the literature review above. This technique 
involves forming equally weighted portfolios of funds based on the sorted fund returns 
over the previous time period. Each portfolio is then held for a time i.e. a year. The 
process is repeated recursively each year. This generates the holding period returns of 
the ranking period’s portfolios. Decile portfolios were then formed based on alphas in 
this study for 12 month formation and 4 month holding periods. If the alphas for the 
deciles are significant, it is evidence of performance persistence. The alphas from the 
four-factor model used are all negative and most are significant. Thus he concludes that 
there is no evidence of skilled fund managers. He also found evidence supporting 
under-performance persistence which he deemed to be the result of a combination of the 
two factors- momentum and fund expenses. He also applies a contingency table 
approach and found some weak evidence that top and bottom decile performance 
persists but this effect is short lived.  
 
Focusing on the performance of stocks within a fund, Chen, Jegadeesh and Wermers 
(2000) analyse performance on the basis of trading activity. They find a momentum 
effect, that is,   stocks currently held by winning funds have higher past returns than 
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stocks held by losing funds, by examining the past returns of the stock holdings of 
winning and losing funds. They examine three main issues. First they examine ‘whether 
the consensus opinion of the entire mutual fund industry about a stock represents 
superior information about the value of that stock.’  Secondly they study whether stock 
selection skill is related to stock characteristics or to frequency of trading. Finally they 
examine whether stock selection ability persists. They examine the U.S. mutual fund 
market over the period January 1975 to January 1995. They use their own measures of 
frequency of stock holding and stock trades and use CRSP’s definition of fund turnover. 
The formulas used are as follows: 
 
FracHoldingsi,t  = Number of shares Held i,t 
                                         Total Shares outstanding i, t                                                                              (7) 
 
Tradesi,t =  FracHoldingsi,t - FracHoldingsi,t-1                                                                                
(8) 
 
Turnoverk,t  =  min(Buysk,t, Sellsk,t) / TNA k,t                                                                                
(9) 
 
where number of shares heldi,t is the number of shares of stock i held at the end of 
quarter t by all mutual funds, total shares outstanding i,t, is the total number of stock i 
shares outstanding as of that date, Buysk,t (Sellsk,t) is the total value of stock purchases 
(sales) during year t by fund k, and TNAk,t is the average total net assets of fund k 
during year t.  
 
They find that market consensus on a fund does not equal superior performance. 
Looking at stock trades however, they discover that stocks recently bought have a 
significantly higher return than stocks recently sold regardless of stock size or style. 
They also find evidence that stock selection skill is related to both stock characteristics 
and frequency of trading. For example, growth-oriented funds and funds than trade 
more frequently exhibit better stock selection skills than income-oriented funds and 
funds trading less often. Finally, they find that ‘much of the observed persistence in 
fund performance is due to the momentum effect in stock returns’ (Chen, Jegadeesh and 
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Wermers 2000: 345). The evidence of persistence at the raw return level is more 
apparent among growth funds rather than income funds. 
 
Again examining the U.S. market, but this time over the period 1974-1994, Wermers 
(2000) constructs benchmark portfolios based on size, book-to-market equity and 
momentum characteristics of the underlying stock holdings of the funds. He can then 
calculate an investment style adjusted selectivity performance measure for each fund. 
He finds evidence of positive abnormal performance. He also considers net returns to 
investors and examines performance using the Carhart (1997) four-factor model. He 
finds evidence of underperformance by the average fund. He concludes that while 
positive abnormal performance is achievable, it is at the fund manager level. Once 
transaction costs and funds expenses have been taken into account, there is no abnormal 
performance at the investor level.  
 
Using daily returns of 230 mutual funds, Bollen and Busse (2005) look at two under 
researched areas. They examine short term persistence and also look at the persistence 
of market timing ability. They need to use daily returns as they focus on a short 
measurement period of three months. They claim ‘a short measurement horizon 
provides a more precise method of identifying top performers’. They use standard 
timing and persistence methodologies, for example the Treynor and Mazuy method. To 
measure persistence they rank funds every quarter by their risk adjusted return and then 
‘measure the risk-adjusted return of deciles of funds over the following three-month 
period’. They find evidence of persistence in the top decile. That is, they find a 
significant abnormal return of between 25 and 39 basis points, depending on whether 
the model is examining for market timing ability or stock selection skills. They also 
reconcile their results with Carhart (1997) by modifying their procedure to be more like 
his.  
 
Keswani and Stolin (2006) examine the influence of competition on investment 
performance persistence. They analyse the U.K. mutual fund industry with data 
spanning a ten year period from 1991 to 2001. They examine the fund sector level and 
are interested in how competition within the sector affects persistence of performance. 
They analyse competition within a section by looking at various factors, namely the 
number of funds in a sector, the proportion of mature funds and asset concentration. 
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They focus on relative persistence for a one year ranking and evaluation period, and use 
a contingency table approach. They find evidence that ‘persistence is higher in sectors 
where concentration of assets under management is higher’. They prove their original 
hypothesis that the level of competition in a sector influences the amount of persistence 
found.  
 
Finally, over the 1980-1989 period Fletcher (1997) uses a similar methodology to 
Quigley and Sinquefield (2000). When testing for persistence however, he uses an APT 
model instead of the traditional CAPM and derivatives. He breaks down his sample of 
101 funds into style categories, namely growth, income and general equity and 
evaluates each sample separately. He finds no abnormal performance evident in any of 
the categories and also finds that performance doesn’t persist. This lack of persistence in 
performance is evident at both sides of the performance scale – losing funds do not 
display persistent performance either and this is at odds with the results of Quigley and 
Sinquefield (2000) and Blake and Timmerman (1998).  
 
The European market has been much less researched with the major studies done at an 
individual country level. At a general European level, Otten and Bams (2002) examine 
506 funds from the 6 most important mutual fund countries over the period January 
1991 to December 1998. They examine for performance using the Carhart 4-factor 
model and also look for persistence. They find that European funds out-perform at an 
aggregate level and find strong evidence of persistence for U.K. funds.  However, the U. 
K. has been the main research focus. Leger (1997) examines 72 U.K. investment trusts 
between 1974 and 1993 using the CAPM model and Jensen’s alpha. He finds little 
evidence of statistically significant positive abnormal performance-any good 
performance he does find is in the first half of the sample up to 1984 but this 
subsequently disappears. He also examines for persistence and finds little proof of 
performance persistence. He also looks at market timing ability and finds negative and 
statistically significant market timing. 
 
Quigley and Sinquefield (2000) examine the U.K. market between 1978 and 1997. They 
look at 752 mutual funds and use the CAPM and the French three-factor model to 
evaluate performance.  They conclude that funds display poor average performance for 
both models examined with alpha results from the Fama and French model worse than 
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the CAPM.  They also examine for persistence in performance and find that while bad 
performance persists, there is no evidence of persistence in good performance. They 
also take a closer examination of the size effect by ranking funds according to the size 
risk factor and examining for a relationship between persistence and size. The 
persistence of poor performance and not good performance is reconfirmed irrespective 
of size.  
 
In contrast to the finding of Quigley and Sinquefield (2000), Blake and Timmerman 
(1998)   find evidence of persistence among the top performers. They again examine the 
U.K. mutual fund market from 1972 to 1995 and look at 2375 funds. Their sample is not 
restricted to funds investing in U.K. equity. Using regression and event study 
techniques, they find a risk-adjusted underperformance of U.K. equity funds of around 
1.8 percent per annum.  An interesting finding in this study is the evidence they show of 
persistence of performance for winning and losing funds. This finding of persistence 
was apparent in funds investing in growth stocks and smaller company stocks. A unique 
analysis they perform is the examination of funds' performance in the periods before 
their death and following their birth. They find evidence of ‘very significant 
underperformance in the period prior to termination. In comparison, the evidence on 
abnormal performance following birth is much weaker’ (Blake and Timmerman 1998: 
61). They also show the existence of a substantial survivor bias particularly for some 
international investment sectors.  
 
Rhodes (2000) devises a new method for testing for persistence. This method tracks the 
relative performance of funds over time, to a greater extent than other methods. Funds 
were ranked into quintiles each year based on fund return. Utility scores were then 
assigned based on the quintile. For example, quintile 5 (lowest performance) might be 
assigned a score of 2 while quintile 1 may be assigned a score of 10. The difference, in 
absolute performance, between each quintile each year is assumed to be the same. 
Higher relative performance increases utility but at a diminishing rate, possibly 
reflecting the increased risk associated with high relative performance. The average 
utility per fund over time was calculated. Average utility scores were adjusted to 
account for funds with different life spans. If this distribution of utility scores is 
normally distributed, then there is no evidence of persistence in performance.  
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Using this methodology, he examines U.K. equity funds between 1980 and 1998 and 
rejects the normality of the distribution of the utility scores at the 1% level. However, 
when he repeats the analysis for the post-1987 period, the distribution of utility scores is 
normal, indicting a lack of persistence for the more recent period. Thus Rhodes (2000) 
concludes that persistence is clustered in the early 1980s for UK trusts. 
 
Also looking at persistence in the U.K., Fletcher and Forbes (2002) use two reliable and 
pre-existing techniques. They use the contingency table approach of Brown and 
Goetzmann (1995) and the recursive portfolio approach of Carhart (1997). They 
examine 724 U.K. equity funds from January 1982 to December 1996 and are 
particularly interesting in examining whether any persistence effect found is robust to 
alternative performance measures. They also four different performance measures, 
namely cumulative excess return, market-adjusted returns, the unconditional Jensen 
(1968)’s alpha measure and Ferson and Schadt (1996)’s conditional Jensen’s alpha 
measure. They find evidence of persistence in the relative rankings of funds using 
excess returns, and this result is mainly robust to alternative performance measures. To 
quote the authors, ‘however, when performance is evaluated relative to the Carhart 
model, this persistence in performance is eliminated.’ 
 
In summary, while there is some evidence of abnormal performance present, there is 
less proof that this performance persists. Overall, research has proven that there are 
relatively few mutual funds which have produced positive alphas. Most studies are in 
agreement that any persistence which is present is at the negative end of the scale, that 
is poor performance persists. To quote Cuthbertson, Nitzsche and O’Sullivan (2008) 
results indicate ‘relatively weak short-term persistence among the past winners (which 
is strongest over horizons of one year or less) and longer horizon persistence (up to 3-5 
years) for past losers –for both US and UK studies’.  
 
2.2 Performance Measurement-unusual techniques 
 
In an unusual approach, Blake and Morey (2000) compare the predictive ability of 
Morningstar ratings to other more commonly used performance metrics. They try to 
predict both unadjusted and risk-adjusted returns. To justify their study, they discuss a 
study reported in The Wall Street Journal ‘which found that 97% of the money flowing 
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into no-load equity funds between January and August 1995 was invested into funds 
that were rated as five- or four-star funds by Morningstar, while funds with less than 
three stars suffered a net outflow of funds during the same period’ (Blake and Morey 
2000: 452). They examine domestic equity mutual funds over the period 1992-1997. 
They compare the Morningstar ratings to some commonly used performance metrics 
from the existing performance literature. They choose the Sharpe ratio, the mean 
monthly excess return, a modified version of Jensen's alpha, and a modified version of a 
four-index alpha. For robustness, they use two different techniques - dummy variable 
regression analysis and the Spearman-Rho rank correlation test. They find very slight 
difference in predictive power between the standard performance metrics and the 
Morningstar ratings, in favour of the Morningstar ratings. Predictive ability is poor for 
high performing funds. ‘There is some evidence that the Morningstar ratings predict the 
low-performing funds…..and the result is relatively robust over different samples, ages 
of funds, styles of funds, out-of-sample performance measures, and whether load or 
non-load adjusted returns are used for the out-of sample returns’ (Blake and Morey 
2000: 481).  
 
 
2.3 Conditional Performance Models and Trading Strategies 
 
 
So far, the models examined have assumed that the explanatory factors included are 
time invariant. Conditional performance models relax this assumption and try to control 
for the effect of public information. A fund whose performance is derived only out of 
public information should not be considered worthy of fees charged.   
 
In one of the earliest papers looking at conditional performance, Ferson and Schadt 
(1996) examine for timing ability which may be attributable to public information by 
specifying the portfolio beta to be a function of a set of relevant public information 
variables. They modify Jensen’s alpha and two market timing models to incorporate 
public information. They use a vector of instruments Zt to represent the information 
available at time t, so that the portfolio beta is now  
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where zt  is the vector of deviations of Zt from its unconditional mean and b0i may be 
interpreted as the unconditional mean of the conditional beta. Substituting this into the 
traditional CAPM model gives 
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performance is essentially neutral, as would be expected in an efficient market’ (Ferson 
and Warther 1996: 23). They get a similar finding when they examine conditional 
market timing models.  
 
2.4 Market Timing 
 
Several studies have been performed to test a fund manager’s ability to time the market. 
‘Market timing’ is concerned with increasing exposure to a market, via a change of beta, 
ahead of a risk in the market.  Treynor and Mazuy (1966) devised a means of testing for 
market timing ability.  The model used is basically an extension of the CAPM:  
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market timing ability and that ‘selectivity and timing performance are negatively 
correlated’.  
 
Daily market timing testing is the focus of Goetzmann, Ingersoll and Ivkovich (2000) 
study. They discuss how standard market timing tests use monthly data even though 
fund managers often make daily timing decisions. They reference a study by Chance 
and Hemler (1999) which ‘strongly reject the null hypothesis of no timing ability for a 
manager using daily data but find that all evidence of timing ability disappears when 
monthly data are used instead.’ They look at 558 funds and use four different models: 
the standard Henriksson-Merton model used with daily data, the Henriksson-Merton 
model adjusted for monthly data (with a correction for daily timing decisions), the 
Henriksson-Merton model based on the Fama and French three factor model used with 
daily data and this model adjusted for monthly data. The four tests present differing 
views of the mutual fund managers’ selection and timing ability. For example, the 
standard Henriksson-Merton model used with daily data shows that 2.9% of the 558 
fund managers display timing ability and 5.7% show security selection ability. In 
contrast, the adjusted Henriksson-Merton model shows that 0.4% of the 558 fund 
managers display timing ability and 10.8% show security selection ability. They 
conclude that while the adjusted test is not as powerful as the original Henriksson-
Merton model performed using daily returns, it has one big advantage, that is not 
requiring daily timing data.  
 
Jiang (2003) devised a non-parametric test for market timing.  Based on the CAPM, a 
fund manager with market timing ability would maintain a higher beta between period 2 
and 3 compared to period 1 and 2, if rm,1 < rm,2 < rm,3 for any triplet {rm,1, rm,2, rm,3}.  
This implies that when the triplets are ordered from the smallest excess market return to 
the largest value and the fund manager has market timing ability, one would expect that: 
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of far greater market timing ability compared to traditional returns based techniques 
when comparing results of the holdings-based measures to the returns-based measures. 
They also find that managers with market timing skills have high industry 
concentration, large fund size, and a high proportion of small-cap stocks.  
 
In order to measure portfolio performance, Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers 
(1997) use benchmarks based on the characteristics of stocks held. These benchmarks 
form the basis of their ‘Characteristic Timing’ and ‘Characteristic Selectivity’ measures. 
Characteristic Timing tests for timing ability of different investment styles, to determine 
whether portfolio managers can time their portfolio weightings on the chosen 
characteristics - size (market value of equity), book-to-market ratio, and momentum (the 
prior year return of the stock).  
The formula is: 
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‘Characteristic Timing’ and ‘Characteristic Selectivity’, added by fund managers is 
statistically significant, but not significantly greater than the difference between active 
and passive fund expenses. So, in other words, fund managers display ability but after 
fees, the clients do not benefit.  
 
2.5 Skill V. Luck 
 
The issue of ‘skill versus luck’ in portfolio management is however, a much newer and 
less researched topic. The two main methods of analysis include the bootstrapping 
technique and the use of random portfolios. This section presents a summary of the 
most noteworthy studies in the area.  
 
Testing the hypothesis of ‘performance versus luck’ Kosowski,  Timmermann, White 
and Wermers (2006) apply a new bootstrapping procedure to the monthly net returns of 
the universe of U.S. open-end, domestic equity funds between 1975 and 2002. They use 
a bootstrap approach because the cross-section of mutual fund alphas has a complex, 
non-normal distribution as well as non-normalities in individual fund alpha 
distributions. They discuss several reasons for this non-normality, with two such 
reasons being the heterogeneous risk-taking by funds, and the fact that individual stocks 
exhibit varying levels of time-series autocorrelation in returns. They apply several 
different flexible bootstrap procedures to a variety of unconditional and conditional 
factor models of performance. These include the simple one-factor model of Jensen 
(1968), the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993) and several models that 
include conditional factors based on the papers of Ferson and Schadt (1996) and 
Christopherson, Ferson, and Glassman (1998). The main model that they present is the 
Carhart (1997) four-factor regression model. Their results are consistent for all models 
tested.  
 
The authors generate a luck distribution using the bootstrapping procedure. The 
bootstrap procedure simulates returns under the null hypothesis of zero alpha. These 
simulated returns are then used to provide estimates of alpha due only to random 
sampling variation. The methodology used requires no restrictive assumptions regarding 
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the shape of the distribution, in particular normality. This is critical because of the 
reasons above, as well as the fact that the deviation from normality is found to be 
greatest among the top and bottom funds which could lead to incorrect inferences 
concerning the funds of greatest interest to investors. The authors then compare the 
actual alphas of the funds being tested to this distribution to see how each fund performs 
relative to luck. They find that the performance of the best managers cannot be 
explained solely by sampling variability, which they conclude is a finding in support of 
managerial skill instead of luck. They also uncover important differences between 
investment categories. They find that there is strong evidence of superior performance 
among growth-oriented funds, whereas there is no evidence of skill among managers of 
income-oriented funds.  
 
Cuthbertson, Nitzsche and O Sullivan (2008) use a similar bootstrapping procedure to 
that of Kosowski et al (2004) but they apply it to the U.K. unit fund market from the 
period April 1975 to December 2002. They concentrate on ‘individual’ funds. Their 
results are consistent with that of Kosowski et al. They find genuine stock picking 
ability for somewhere between 1 and 10 percent of top performing UK equity mutual 
funds, depending on the model used.  Their analysis strongly rejects the hypothesis that 
most poor performing funds are merely unlucky. Most of these funds demonstrate ‘bad 
skill’. Of the top 20 ranked funds in the positive tail of the performance distribution, 12 
funds exhibit levels of performance which cannot be attributable to ‘luck’ at 10% 
significance level. In the left tail of the performance distribution, the authors find that an 
economically significant negative abnormal performance cannot be attributed to bad 
luck but is due to ‘bad skill’.  
 
This study also examines different investment styles. Genuine stock picking ability is 
found in some of the top ranked equity income funds whereas such ability is generally 
not found among small stock funds and ‘all company’ funds. They also find that 
positive performance amongst onshore funds is due to genuine skill, whereas for 
offshore funds, positive performance is attributable to luck. 
 
Very few studies have been done on performance versus luck using randomly selected 
or simulated portfolios.  This is the method used here as it eliminates most of the 
problems associated with the measurement of performance relative to a benchmark and 
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peer group evaluation. Although Siegel (2003) focuses on the positive uses of 
benchmarks in research, he does present some criticisms of them. These include 
inclusion and deletion effects (which are types of transaction costs), high levels of 
turnover concentrated in a short time period, disagreement about how to classify stocks 
into styles, and the theory that out-performance could be a momentum effect. Surz 
(1998) outlines numerous disadvantages associated with peer group evaluation. These 
include classification biases arising when investment style classifications such as 
growth or value are too broadly defined and misrepresent the ‘true’ objective of the 
fund, composition bias where there are too few funds in certain classifications to 
implement a reliable peer group comparison and survivorship bias arises due to the 
attrition of funds in some classifications. 
 
Surz (1998) has been one of the main advocates for the use of “cyberclone peer groups”, 
a term he uses to describe random portfolios. In his research, he constructs portfolio 
opportunity distributions (PODs) to evaluate individual fund performance. Within the 
different investment style categories, and using a predetermined set of stocks, he 
constructs numerous ‘cyberclone peer groups’ and forms the PODs. Using these he can 
appraise actual fund performance. The three biases mentioned above that would have 
resulted from the use of benchmarks have been eliminated using this technique. 
 
Burns (2004) has been another advocate of the usefulness of the technique of simulated 
portfolio returns. He uses randomly selected generated portfolios to demonstrate the 
sensitivity of performance findings to the construction of benchmarks. He uses a dataset 
of the daily returns of a collection of 191 large-cap and small-cap US equities, for the 
period beginning January 1996 and ending September 2004. Using the predetermined 
set of stocks, and a number of constraints (such as no more than 100 names were in a 
portfolio and concerning weighting rules and exclusion of short-selling), Burns 
compares 1000 simulated portfolios to three alternative (but also randomly generated) 
benchmarks. Using information ratios, the study then evaluates the performance of the 
random portfolios against the three benchmarks. In each quarter, the author compares 
the out-performance of the random portfolios across the three benchmarks to reveal that 
performance is highly sensitive to even slight differences in benchmark returns. Burns 
shows that the more unequal the weights in the benchmark portfolio, the greater is the 
dispersion in over- and under-performance through time in the simulated portfolios.  
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Also making use of random portfolios, Kritzman and Page (2002, 2003) examine the 
relative importance of investment choices as determinants of fund returns. The 
categories they look at are: asset allocation, country allocation, global sector allocation, 
country sector allocation and security selection. The generally accepted premise is that 
asset allocation is the chief determinant of performance. Again using a bootstrap 
simulation procedure, Kritzman and Page construct random portfolios to examine the 
issue.  They examine each investment choice separately using simulated portfolios and 
comparing them to a control. The authors report that asset allocation produces the least 
dispersion around average performance while dispersion from security selection is 
substantially greater than for all other investment choices. Based on their empirical 
results, Kritzman and Page refute the accepted theory. The authors present evidence in 
support of security selection as the most important investment choice as a determinant 
of fund returns. In their 2002 paper, Kritzman and Page present a similar study with 
consistent results, again using a bootstrapping technique but concentrating on Austria, 
Germany, Japan, the UK and the US. Bridgeland (2001) performs a similar analysis to 
Kritzman and Page with consistent results. 
 
2.6 Returns Based Style Analysis 
 
Sharpe (1988, 1992) asserted that a funds asset allocation decisions accounts for almost 
all a fund’s performance. Returns based style analysis is a technique which breaks down 
a funds composition into its most dominant investment style or asset class. It establishes 
the exposure of a portfolio to variations in returns of major asset classes and thus 
provides a description of fund performance. Twelve different ‘asset classes’ are 
considered and benchmark indices are used as proxies; bills, intermediate-term 
government bonds, long-term government bonds, corporate bonds, mortgage related 
securities, large cap value stocks, large cap growth stocks, medium cap stocks, small 
cap stocks, non-U.S./European bonds, European/U.S. stocks, Japanese stocks. The study 
examines performance after adjusting for the funds’ style. It is a technique based on 
establishing the exposure of a portfolio to variations in returns of major asset classes 
and thus determining fund performance. Using this method, the only true managerial 
skill in adding value is through active management.  
28 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.7 Conclusions 
 
This chapter presented an overview of the most important literature in the area of 
mutual fund performance. In conclusion, while there is some evidence of abnormal 
performance present, there is less proof that this performance persists. Overall, research 
has proven that there are relatively few mutual funds which have produced positive 
alphas and this performance doesn’t persist. Studies show very little evidence of market 
timing ability. It is clear that research in the area has been quite clustered and focused 
predominantly on popular topics and large markets, particularly the U.S. An anomaly 
emerged in the fact that Europe remains quite under-researched, especially considering 
its size. There are huge economic and financial implications of not thoroughly 
researching a market as large as Europe (discussed in more detail in Chapter 4).  
 
Three areas with limited research to date have emerged from the literature review, and 
they form the basis of the analysis in this study. While many studies have been carried 
out to evaluate fund performance, the idea of comparing fund performance on the basis 
of fund location is a much less researched topic. Research in the area has generally 
focused on the U.S. fund industry, or at an individual country level within Europe. A 
comparison of management location will be the focus of Chapter 4. Chapter 5 examines 
mutual fund families. Virtually all research carried out to date on mutual fund families 
has been on U.S. families. This study also includes European funds and uses a much 
larger, longer and more recent dataset. Finally, it can be seen that analysis of balanced 
funds is extremely limited. Research has tended to focus on single asset class mutual 
funds so remarkably little is known about the investment performance of multiple-asset-
class portfolios. In particular, the ability of balanced fund managers to time particular 
asset classes has not been researched at all, and this is the focus of Chapter 6.  
 
This concludes the review of the literature in the area. Each chapter contains a more 
specific review of the literature in the subject area.  
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Chapter 3: Mutual Fund Performance and Location 
Although individual investors may lack foreign market investment savvy, mutual 
3.1 Introduction 
 
“Although individual investors may lack foreign market investment savvy, mutual funds 
investing in offshore markets offer investors a relatively easy means for increasing their 
international exposure.”  
.                                                                                                 Shukla and van Inwegen 
(1995) 
 
While many studies have been carried out to evaluate fund performance (Sharpe (1964), 
Jensen (1968), Fama and French (1993), Wermers (2000)), the idea of comparing fund 
performance on the basis of fund location is a much less researched topic.  Research in 
the area has generally focused on the U.S. fund industry, or at an individual country 
level in Europe. By June 2010 (the end period being examined in this study), the 
European mutual fund industry amounted to almost €7.5 trillion in total net assets. This 
is almost as large as the U.S. market at €8.8 trillion over the same period (EFAMA, 
2010).  There are numerous studies at an individual country level but comparing 
management location remains a much under-researched area.  
 
This study examines whether location influences the return a fund generates. It is 
hypothesized that local funds will perform better relative to foreign funds because the 
local fund managers may have an informational advantage over managers based 
overseas. As discussed in Shukla and van Inwegen (1995), informational advantages 
possessed by funds managed locally include local knowledge and contacts (i.e.‘foreign 
managers are geographically removed from the local market and are further from the 
gossip’), company visits, time zone advantages and connections and relationships with 
market participants such as brokers, investment bankers etc ‘to accord them preferential 
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treatment in terms of research, execution of trades, and access to initial public offerings 
(IPOs)’. 
 
This could have important implications for investors - it is essential for them to know 
whether it is necessary to choose a U.S. based fund if they want to invest in U.S.  
equities, or whether an overseas manager of U.S. equities would suffice. There are 
important implications from a fund management company point of view as well. It 
would be very useful to ascertain whether it is necessary to set up an overseas office, or 
whether foreign assets can be successfully managed at home. A finding that, for 
example, U.S. fund managers managing U.S. equities consistently outperform non-U.S. 
managers of U.S. equities would question whether there is a need to set up overseas 
offices.  
 
The location hypothesis will be tested by analyzing the performance of funds in two 
regions.  
Using a number of different techniques (alpha performance models, persistence and 
market timing models, and returns based style analysis, all discussed in the 
methodology section below). Two main comparisons are examined. The first 
comparison is a ‘management location’ comparison, where funds are managed from 
different locations but where the securities are from the same market. This is done for 
U.S. equity and European equity markets. In other words, local managers are compared 
to foreign managers of U.S. equities, where all returns are in USD and all benchmarks 
are U.S. market factors in USD. Then, local managers are compared to foreign 
managers investing in European equities, where all returns are in Euros and all 
benchmarks are European market factors denominated in Euros.  
 
The second comparison is the ‘market’ comparison where funds are managed in the 
same location but invest in different markets. Again this is performed for both U.S. and 
European equity funds. In other words, a comparison is made between U.S. based 
managers investing in local equity versus U.S. based managers investing in foreign 
(European) equities, where all returns are in USD and all benchmarks are U.S. market 
factors in USD. European based managers investing in local equity are also compared to 
European based managers investing in foreign (U.S.) equity, where all returns are in 
Euro and all benchmarks are European market factors in Euro.  
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As well as this unique ‘two-way’ analysis, a considerable strength of this study is the 
fact that each fund in the analysis was checked to see where it was actually managed 
rather than just where it was domiciled. A very large number of funds which were 
classified as ‘foreign’ at first glance, had to be deleted from the dataset because they 
were in fact managed in the market in which they were investing in. This means that the 
714 ‘foreign funds’ in this dataset are all managed abroad, which ensures that the 
comparison undertaken is meaningful. This is discussed in more detail in the Data 
section below.  
 
Another strength of this study is that the dataset used here spans a much longer and 
more recent time period and is a much larger sample than has been considered before. 
For example Otten and Bams (2007) present the most comprehensive dataset to 
compare location to date and they examine monthly returns data from January 1990 to 
December 2000, and only look at the U.S. market.  
 
To summarise, the contributions of this study are: 
• multiple techniques used to evaluate performance on the basis of location; 
• multiple market analysis; 
• each fund in the analysis individually checked to see where it was actually 
managed rather than where it was domiciled; 
• many more ‘foreign’ funds than previously examined; 
• dataset spanning a much longer and more recent time period; and 
• a much larger sample than has been considered before. 
 
3.2 Literature Review 
 
The question of whether a fund’s location influences its performance has received little 
attention in the literature, as is evident from the very few studies referenced here1. 
                                                 
1 There is an associated body of literature concerning mutual fund performance and home bias/geography 
-    Coval and Moskowitz (Journal of Finance, 1999, Journal of Political Economy, 2001) and Strong and 
Xu (Review of Economics and Statistics, 2003).  This study however, concentrates on direct comparisons 
of management location.  
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Informational advantages of local managers would suggest that these funds should 
outperform foreign funds. Some studies have been carried out on foreign based funds. 
Fletcher (1999) analyses the performance of UK mutual funds investing in U.S. 
equities. While he does not examine U.S. funds investing in U.S. equity, he does 
compare his findings to similar studies undertaken using U.S. fund data. He examines 
85 U.K. equity funds managed in the U.K. from January 1985 to December 1996.  He 
uses basic conditional and unconditional performance evaluation measures, and finds no 
evidence of significant abnormal returns.   
 
Research has also been carried out to perform a more direct comparison. Shukla and van 
Inwegen (1995) examine 108 U.S. funds and 18 UK funds, all investing in U.S. 
equities, for the period June 1981 to May 1993. They control for the effects of tax 
treatment, fund objectives, currency risk and investment style. They use the CAPM 
model and some of its associated performance measures including Sharpe, Treynor and 
Jensen’s alpha, and timing ability tests. They found that the average Sharpe index is 
0.13 for U.S. funds and 0.08 for U.K. funds and the average Treynor index is 0.006 for 
U.S. funds and 0.004 U.K. funds. The difference between the average indices in both 
countries for both the Sharpe and Treynor ratios are statistically significant. The average 
Jensen alpha is -0.040% for US funds, whereas the UK average is -0.218%. Examining 
alpha, it can be seen that only 5.56% of U.K. funds have positive alphas compared to 
42.59% of U.S. funds. Using the Treynor and Mazuy (1966) model to test for timing 
ability, they find that none and 5.71% of the gamma parameter are both positive and 
significant for the U.K. and U.S., respectively. Thus they find evidence that U.S. 
managers of U.S. equities significantly outperform U.K. managers of U.S. equities, and 
attribute this outperformance mainly to informational advantages, but also to fund size 
to a lesser extent (UK funds are much smaller than US domestic funds). 
 
Otten and Bams (2007) study the performance of U.S. funds investing in the U.S. equity 
market (locals) and UK funds also investing in the U.S. equity market (foreigners). 
Using a sample of 2436 U.S. funds and 95 UK funds, with monthly returns data from 
January 1990 to December 2000, they use more elaborate multi-factor models than 
Shukla and van Inwegen (1995) to assess performance. As well as employing the more 
traditional models of CAPM and a multi-factor model allowing for size, value and 
momentum effects, Otten and Bams also use a conditional multi-factor model.  In order 
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to make an adequate comparison of funds across two different locations, they control for 
the effects of tax treatment, fund objectives and investment style.  The authors found no 
evidence of the expected outperformance of U.S. funds, in any of the models they used. 
In fact, they found slight outperformance of UK funds compared to U.S. funds, in the 
small company segment.  An unexpected finding in this study is the apparent inclusion 
of UK equity holdings in the UK managed US equity funds, which the fund’s mandate 
strictly prohibits. They attempt to explain this observed investment in UK funds using 
the fact that UK funds invest in cross-listed stocks in the USA.  
 
3.3 Methodology 
 
The study is carried out using a number of different performance models, such as the the 
Capital Assets Pricing Model, or CAPM and the Fama and French three factor model. 
The CAPM with Jensen’s alpha measure is represented by the formula: 
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where SMB is ‘small [market capitalization] minus big’ and HML is ‘high [book 
value/price] minus low’. The SMB factor was constructed for both the U.S. and 
European markets by subtracting the return on a large cap index from the return on a 
small cap index. The HML factor for both markets was constructed by subtracting the 
return on a growth index from the return on a relevant value index. 
 
Mean alphas and betas of these two models were calculated, as well as the 
corresponding t-statistics. The number of positive and negative significant alphas was 
examined. As well as the value of mean alpha (the higher the better), performance will 
be judged on the number of managers generating significant alpha (again the higher the 
better). It is hypothesized that local managers will have higher alphas than equivalent 
overseas managers of the same set of equities.  
 
Only funds that have at least 36 monthly return observations are used in the analysis. 
The robustness of this minimum criterion is tested. This is done by increasing the 
minimum number of observations to 60 and decreasing it to 24 within the study and any 
resulting differences noted. To examine whether results are robust for sub-periods 
within the sample, the data was split up by decade; Jan 1970-Dec 1979, Jan 1980-Dec 
1989, Jan 1990-Dec 1999, Jan 2000-Dec 2009. Not all groups of data had funds in 
every sub-section. All statistics used in the analysis are Newey-West adjusted. This 
corrects for any serial correlation and any heteroscedasticity that might be present. 
 
Using the Treynor and Mazuy method, the study tests for market timing ability of fund 
managers. This test centres around the γi (rm,t+1)2 term which captures market timing 
ability. A positive gamma will indicate that the manager has successfully timed the 
market. 
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It is hypothesized that local funds will have better market timing ability, as they are 
more familiar and closer to the market. As well as the statistics examined for the 
performance models, the significance of gamma is examined. Market timing ability will 
be judged on the mean gamma figure (the higher the better) and the number of 
managers generating significant gamma (again the higher the better).  
 
The difference between mean statistics was tested using a test for differences between 
means Freund (2003) given as: 
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time period. Each portfolio is then held for a time i.e. a year. The process is repeated 
recursively each year. This generates the holding period returns of the ranking period’s 
portfolios. Decile portfolios were then formed based on alphas in this study for 12 
month formation and 4 month holding periods. If the alphas for the deciles are 
significant, it is evidence of performance persistence. To test for robustness, the analysis 
was also carried out on t-alphas and quartile portfolios. Funds which display persistent, 
good performance are deemed to be superior to those that don’t. It is again hypothesized 
here that local fund returns will persist relative to foreign fund returns, for the same 
reasons discussed above. 
 
Lastly, returns based style analysis (RBSA) was carried out on the funds. Returns based 
style analysis is a technique which breaks down a funds composition into its most 
dominant investment style or asset class (Sharpe 1992, as discussed in the literature 
review). It establishes the exposure of a portfolio to variations in returns of major asset 
classes and thus provides a description of fund performance. Twelve different ‘asset 
classes’ are considered and benchmark indices are used as proxies; bills, intermediate-
term government bonds, long-term government bonds, corporate bonds, mortgage 
related securities, large cap value stocks, large cap growth stocks, medium cap stocks, 
small cap stocks, non-U.S./European bonds, European/U.S. stocks, Japanese stocks. The 
study examines performance after adjusting for the funds’ style. It also compares style 
between markets. Lastly it is hypothesised that because of informational advantages, 
local fund managers would have a higher proportion of small stocks than foreign fund 
managers. Otten and Bams (2007) ‘expected foreigners to invest relatively more in 
visible, well-known large company stocks, which suffer less from informational 
disadvantages.’  
 
3.4 Data 
 
The investment performance returns used in this study are from Morningstar Inc. The 
dataset is comprised of Unit Trusts and Open Ended Investment Companies (OEICs). 
All fund returns are monthly, and span various horizons from January 1970 to June 
2010.  A selection of non-surviving funds is included to account for survivorship bias. 
A nonsurviving fund is one which has existed for some time during the sample period 
but has not ‘survived’ until the end of the sample period. These funds do not survive for 
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a variety of reasons, for example, due to a merger with other funds or closure due to bad 
performance. The inclusion of such funds prevents a possible upward bias in the results. 
There are 4545 funds in total, including 714 ‘foreign’ funds, defined in this study as a 
fund that is managed in a location other than the market the fund invests in.  
 
All funds in the dataset are independent funds. This means any merged, split or 
combined fund was excluded to ensure no duplication of funds existed. ‘Second units’ 
were also removed. ‘Second units’ include the same fund packaged in a different way 
and sold to different types of investors (such as retail or institutional investors) – thus it 
contains the same stocks as the independent fund and in order to ensure unbiased 
results, such funds are omitted. For statistical robustness a minimum observation 
restriction is applied.  
 
The fund returns used are before (gross) buying and selling expenses and after (net) 
annual management fees for both U.S. and European funds. Returns are pre income-tax 
to control for any differential tax treatments between the two regions. Also, returns are 
inclusive of reinvested income.  This ensures an accurate comparison of funds.  
The data used in the location analysis is: 
• U.S. mutual funds investing in U.S. equities (US/US) 
• U.S. mutual funds investing in European equities (US/EU) 
• European mutual funds investing in European equities (EU/EU) 
• European mutual funds investing in U.S. equities (EU/US) 
2 main comparisons are examined on the basis of:  
• Management Location 
 Local versus ‘foreign’ managers investing in the U.S. equity market, 
i.e. U.S. based managers investing in U.S. equity in USD v European 
based managers investing in U.S. equity in USD and regressed on U.S. 
factors in USD.  
 Local versus foreign managers investing in the European market 
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i.e. European based managers investing in European equity in EUR v 
U.S. based managers investing in European equity in EUR and regressed 
on European factors in EUR.  
 
 
 
• Market 
 U.S. based managers investing  in local equity versus U.S. based 
managers investing in foreign equity 
i.e. U.S. based managers investing in U.S. equity in USD v U.S. based 
managers investing in European equity in USD, and regressed on U.S. 
factors in USD.  
 European based managers investing  in local equity versus European 
based managers investing in foreign equity 
i.e. European based managers investing in European equity in EUR v 
European based managers investing in European equity in EUR, and 
regressed on European factors in EUR.  
See Figure 3.4 for a graphical representation of these comparisons.  
 
Funds returns were denominated in USD, Euro or Sterling so all were converted to the 
required currency for the comparison at the appropriate historic exchange rate, if 
necessary. Table 3.4.1 summarises this information. 
 
As discussed in the introduction, funds were individually examined to ensure that those 
classed as ‘foreign’ were in fact managed in the remote market. This was carried out 
using the fund information statistics provided by Morningstar. In other databases, a fund 
is classified as ‘foreign’ if it is domiciled in a different country to the market it is 
investing in. As well as providing details of a funds domicile, Morningstar also provides 
management location. Each fund was examined to ensure the management location 
conformed to the funds classification as ‘local’ or ‘foreign’. This was done mainly by 
examining each fund’s management location and confirming with the management 
company’s website. This detailed examination by fund was deemed vital as a large 
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number of funds were not managed where they were domiciled. For example, a fund 
that was classified as foreign (investing in European equity and managed in the U.S.) 
was a fund named ‘Henderson European Focus A’. Its domicile was listed as the United 
States but on closer examination, its Advisor city was London. This fund was removed 
from the database. Other common databases such as Datastream seem to use domicile as 
a proxy for management location, which could result in biased results. 
 
The benchmark indices for the performance model factors and returns based style 
analysis came from a number of different sources. Tables 3.4.2 and 3.4.3 show all 
sources. All U.S. factors were available for the full span of the study, but some of the 
European factors only went back to 1990 so this limited the span of the study of 
European funds. Where necessary, indices were converted to the appropriate currency at 
the appropriate rate. Where no general European index existed, a German Deutschmark 
index was used as a proxy. All indices were monthly and had income reinvested (total 
returns) in order to match the actual fund returns.  
 
Table 3.4.4 presents a breakdown of funds by market. It can be seen that ‘local’ funds 
represent the largest section of the dataset, that is European funds investing in European 
equity and U.S. funds investing in U.S. equity. The subset of U.S. funds investing in 
European equity was the smallest sample. Table 3.4.5 presents a breakdown of fund 
numbers over time (minimum of 36 observations required for fund to be included). It 
can be seen that the number of funds in existence grew consistently over the sample 
period, with the bulk of funds after Jan 2000.  
 
3.5 Results 
 
Due to the very high volume of output generated, the study will present only an 
abbreviated form of results. These abbreviated set of results are an excellent 
representation of the whole data set and give a very good overall picture of fund 
performance.  
 
3.5.1 Alpha generation and location 
 
3.5.1.1 Analysis on the basis of comparing Management Location 
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Table 3.5.1 shows results for the comparison of funds that invest in the same market, 
but which are managed in different locations. Panel A presents results based upon the 
CAPM and Panel B presents results based upon the Fama and French Three Factor 
model - discussed below in the robustness section.  
 
Examining the management of U.S. equities using the CAPM (columns 1 and 2 in Table 
3.5.1) it can be seen that of the 2106 locally managed funds analyzed, 6.9% of the total 
fund alphas analyzed were significantly positive. 6.1% of the total fund alphas analyzed 
were significantly negative. Mean alpha was 0.059. This is an abnormal return of 0.6% 
per month. These results compare very favourably to the set of funds managed in 
Europe. Of the 599 foreign funds analyzed, 1.3% of the total fund alphas analyzed were 
significantly positive and 32.7% of the total fund alphas analyzed were significantly 
negative. Mean alpha was -0.182. Values for betas are also given in the table and they 
are very close to one and statistically significant on average, for both management 
locations. The difference between mean alphas was tested and the difference was found 
to be statistically significant. The distributions were also examined using the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and the two distributions were found to be statistically 
different. These results are presented in Table 3.5.4. It is apparent that U.S. managed 
funds outperform European managed funds in terms of higher mean alpha, and 
statistically significant outperformance. U.S. managed funds have higher significant 
positive alpha (above average performance) and lower significantly negative alpha 
(below average performance).    
 
Table 3.5.1 also presents the results relating to the management of European equities 
(columns 3 and 4 in Table 3.5.1). These results are extremely interesting. Instead of the 
expected outperformance by local European managed funds, the European equity funds 
managed in the U.S. perform better. Again this can be seen in terms of higher mean 
alpha, and statistically significant outperformance. U.S. managed funds have a higher 
percentage of significant positive alpha (18.5% and 2.7% for U.S. and European 
managed funds respectively) and a lower percentage of significant negative alpha 
(14.8% and 17.7% for U.S. and European managed funds respectively). U.S. managed 
funds also produce a higher alpha than European managed funds on average (0.302 and 
-0.070 respectively). Again values for betas can be seen to very close to one and 
statistically significant on average, for both management locations. The difference 
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between mean alphas test and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test were employed and means 
and distributions were found to be statistically significant, as presented in Table 3.5.4, 
confirming that the two sets of fund returns are statistically different.  
 
These results are broadly consistent with those of Shukla and van Inwegen (1995) who 
examined the performance of US and UK funds managing US equities, for the period 
June 1981 to May 1993.  Using the CAPM model and some of its associated 
performance measures they found that US managers of US equities significantly 
outperformed UK managers of US equities.   Results found here are at odds with those 
of Otten and Bams (2007), who also studied the performance of US equity funds 
managed in the US and in the UK. Using various factor models to assess performance, 
they found no evidence of the expected outperformance of US-based managers over 
UK-based fund managers, in any of the models they used.  In fact, they found slight 
outperformance of UK funds compared to US funds, in the small company segment.   
 
3.5.1.2 Comparing Market invested in 
 
To look at the story from a different angle, a comparison was also made of funds that 
are managed in the same location, but invests in different markets. The results are also 
displayed in Table 3.5.1. Looking initially at funds managed in the U.S. and either 
investing locally in the U.S. market or in Europe (columns 5 and 6 in Table 3.5.1) , the 
European market funds display higher mean alpha and a higher proportion of significant 
positive alpha (0.336 mean alpha compared to 0.059 for the U.S. market, and 18.5% and 
6.9% significant positive alpha for the European and U.S. market respectively).  
However, European market funds also display a higher proportion of significant 
negative alpha (14.8% and 6.1% for the European and U.S. market respectively).  The 
difference between mean alphas was tested and found to be statistically significant. The 
distributions were also examined using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and the two 
distributions were found to be statistically different. These results are presented in Table 
3.5.4. Values for betas are also given in the table and they are very close to one and 
statistically significant on average, for both management locations. 
 
Finally, for funds managed in Europe, and investing locally in European equities or in 
U.S. equities (columns 7 and 8 in Table 3.5.1), the findings are consistent. European 
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equity funds again display higher mean alpha and a higher proportion of significant 
positive alpha but also a higher proportion of significant negative alpha. The differences 
in mean alphas and distributions were tested and both were found to be statistically 
different, as shown in Table 3.5.4.  
 
Overall, the results presented here suggest clearly that investors, on average, would 
have been better off engaging a US fund manager to manage their portfolio of US 
equities.  These results are consistent with the location hypothesis, that is, that local 
managers may benefit from informational advantages compared to foreign managers of 
the same set of securities. However, the results with regard to the management of 
European equities indicate, at least tentatively that the source of out-performance may 
not be due to the exploitation of local information by local managers, but instead that, 
on average, US-based managers are better than managers based in Europe.  
 
Looking at the market comparison, the small number of European equity funds 
managed by US managers makes it difficult to draw very definitive conclusions, but a 
higher proportion of the funds of European equities produced positive and significant 
alphas, although a higher proportion produced a significant negative mean alpha for 
their investors. The mean difference and distribution difference tests indicate that the 
difference is significant. This study therefore finds no support for the location 
hypothesis with this comparison. The comparison of European-based fund managers 
presents clearer evidence in support of the location hypothesis, and reinforces the case 
for Europeans to have their US equity portfolios managed by US-based fund managers.  
Similarly, it reinforces the case for European fund management companies to establish 
offices in the US. 
 
3.5.1.3 Examining sub-periods 
 
Having analysed the data using the full sample period available (Jan 1970-June 2010), a 
question arises as to whether results are robust for sub-periods within the sample. To 
examine this, the same tests were performed again, but now examining four sub-
periods; Jan 1970-Dec 1979, Jan 1980-Dec 1989, Jan 1990-Dec 1999, Jan 2000-Dec 
2009. Not all groups of data had funds in every sub-section. The results are presented in 
Table 3.5.2. For the management location comparison in the U.S. market, results are 
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consistent for two of the three decades examined - that is, U.S. managed funds of U.S. 
equities outperform European managed funds of U.S. equities in the 1980s and 2000s. 
In the 1990’s however, U.S. managed funds of U.S. equities still had less significantly 
negative alpha but also had less significantly positive alpha. In the European market, in 
every decade examined, U.S. managed funds of European equities positively 
outperform European funds of European equities. However, they also negatively 
outperform European funds - U.S. managed funds of European equities display more 
negative significant alphas as well. For the market comparison, funds managed in the 
U.S. are consistent for both decades, with European equity funds generating more 
positive and negative alpha. Looking at European managed funds, it can be seen that 
funds investing in Europe positively and negatively outperform funds investing in the 
U.S. in the 2000s, whereas the opposite happened in the 1990s - funds investing in the 
U.S. generated more positive and less negative alpha than funds investing in Europe.  
 
3.5.1.4 Fama and French model 
 
A further question arises as to whether the results that have been found are dependent 
on the performance model used, namely the CAPM. Analysis was also carried out using 
the Fama and French model. Panel b of Table 3.5.1 presents the results using the Fama 
and French Three Factor Model (market, size and value variables). Generally results 
generated from the two different performance models are consistent. The only notable 
difference is the fact that the Fama and French model leads to a slightly greater 
proportion of negative alpha. However, this finding does not bias conclusions. Overall 
findings and conclusions are robust with respect to the choice of performance model. 
This lends further support to all the results presented. 
 
3.5.1.5 Observations Restriction 
 
Finally, to test whether the restriction of using only funds which had a minimum of 36 
observations impacted results,  the analysis was carried out again relaxing this 
assumption. Analysis was performed looking at funds with longer and shorter minimum 
numbers of observations than the original model, namely 24 months and 60 months. 
Tables 3.5.8 and 3.5.9 present these results and it can be seen that the results generated 
from this robustness test are very consistent with the original model.  
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3.5.2 Market Timing and Location 
 
Using the Treynor and Mazuy method, the study tests the market timing ability of U.S. 
and European fund managers. Results are presented in Table 3.5.3. This test centres 
around the γi (rm,t+1)2 term which captures market timing ability. A positive gamma 
indicates that the manager has successfully timed the market. As discussed above, this 
method was also augmented to include the Fama and French three factor model. 
Initially looking at the management location comparison using the traditional Treynor 
and Mazuy method (Panel A, columns 1 and 2 in Table 3.5.3), it can be seen that U.S. 
managed funds investing in U.S. equity funds exhibit more market timing ability than 
European managed funds investing in the U.S. market - that is, U.S. managed funds 
investing in U.S. equities have 6.8% positive significant gamma whereas only 5% of 
European managed funds investing in U.S. equities have positive and significant 
gamma. The European fund managers also display more market timing ability in locally 
managed funds (columns 3 and 4 in Table 3.5.3), with European managed equity funds 
investing in European equities exhibiting more market timing ability than U.S. managed 
funds investing in European equities - 1.7% and 0% positive significant gamma 
respectively. The difference between mean gammas across markets was tested and the 
difference was found to be statistically significant, as demonstrated by the p-value of 0 
seen in Table 3.5.5. Results are consistent when the augmented three factor model was 
employed, as shown in Panel B of Table 3.5.3.  
 
Next, examining the market comparison, again it is funds investing in local equities 
which display the most timing ability, regardless of management location or model 
employed.  Funds managed in the U.S. investing in Europe (columns 6 in Table 3.5.3)  
display no market timing ability compared to 6.8% positive significant gamma for funds 
managed in the same location and investing locally (columns 5 in Table 3.5.3)  when 
the standard Treynor and Mazuy model was employed and results are again consistent 
for the three factor model. Examining European managed funds (columns 7 and 8 in 
Table 3.5.3), 1.7% of managers investing in European equities display market timing 
ability compared to 0.3% for managers investing in U.S. equities.  
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These market timing results again confirm the results of other studies in the area. Only 
one of the specific location studies testing for market timing ability, Shukla and van 
Inwegen (1995). Also using the Treynor and Mazuy measure, they examine the timing 
ability of U.S. funds and UK funds investing in U.S. equities and find that no UK funds 
and 34.29% of US funds generate positive gamma. Treynor and Mazuy (1966) find very 
little evidence of market timing ability in the U.S. - less than 2% of the funds they 
analyse have positive gamma. Cuthbertson, Nitzsche and O’Sullivan (2009) present a 
similar finding for the U.K.  
These results present some tentative evidence to suggest that managers based locally are 
better able to time the local market than their foreign counterparts.  
 
3.5.3 Persistence and Location 
 
Funds were examined for persistence using the recursive portfolio technique. Results 
are presented in Table 3.5.6. Decile portfolios were formed on alphas for 12 month 
formation and 4 month holding periods. The t-statistics shown are the t-statistics of the 
procedure sorted on alphas.  
 
Examining the U.S. equity market in the management location comparison, it is 
apparent from the significant alphas that persistence is present in U.S. funds investing in 
U.S. equities. This is positive persistence, that is winning funds remain winners and 
losing funds remain losers.  There is also evidence of persistence in European funds 
investing in U.S. equities; in the bottom deciles. This means that losing funds remain 
losers but winning funds do not show persistence in performance. Looking at the 
European equity market, locally managed funds also display persistence in the bottom 
deciles.  Again this means that losing funds remain losers but winning funds do not 
show persistence in performance. It can be seen that there is little evidence of 
persistence in U.S. fund managers investing in European equities.  
 
For the market comparison, it is again the locally managed funds that display 
persistence-in the bottom deciles. There is no persistence evident in U.S. funds 
investing in Europe or European funds investing in the U.S. To test for robustness, the 
analysis was also carried out on t-alphas and quartile portfolios and results were 
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consistent. It can be concluded that persistence exists in both markets, with local funds 
displaying the most persistence.  
 
The initial hypothesis that local fund returns will persist relative to foreign fund returns 
has gained some supportive evidence here. In terms of performance, only U.S. managed 
funds investing in U.S. equities could be considered to have good performance - 
winning funds persist. These results provide both statistically and economically 
significant evidence, because of the recursive portfolio technique used. U.S. managed 
funds in the top deciles were shown to have consistently good performance, and can be 
seen to provide an opportunity for investors to earn abnormal profit. Another anomaly is 
apparent here – surely losing funds with consistent bad performance (for example, 
European funds investing in U.S. equities) should have been wiped out? It suggests 
investor inertia – investors seem to be happy investing in losing funds.  
 
3.5.4 Returns Based Style Analysis and Location 
 
The study examines performance after adjusting for the funds’ style. It also compares 
style between markets. Results are presented in Table 3.5.7 below. Twelve different 
‘asset classes’ are considered and benchmark indices are used as a proxy. Examining the 
management location comparison first, it can be seen in the table that very few alpha 
coefficients are significantly positive in the U.S. market. There are considerably more 
significantly negative alpha, that is 13.1% and 22.2% for U.S. and European managed 
funds investing in U.S. equities respectively. This suggests that when a fund’s exposure 
to variations in returns of major asset classes has been accounted for (i.e. style), there is 
very little, if any, significant positive performance.  In other words, very little value has 
been added through active management. The European equity market presents a 
different story with U.S. managed funds investing in European equity displaying 14.8% 
significant positive alpha, as compared to 0.3% for European managed funds investing 
in European equity. This is the only category of fund managers that display any 
substantial level of performance skill. Again, there are considerably more significantly 
negative alpha, that is 6.7% and 14.8% for European and U.S. managed funds investing 
in European equities respectively. 
The table also shows the style of each fund. The table shows the average beta per factor, 
which represents the proportion of a fund invested in each asset class.   For the 
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management location comparison, it can be seen that a fund’s style is very consistent 
across markets.  Equities form the bulk of investment in all segments - above 90%. This 
is also represented graphically in Figure 3.5 which shows the average beta per style 
factor. The hypothesized theory that locally managed funds invest in more small 
company stocks has been proven by the fact that U.S. managed funds investing in U.S. 
equities invest in 18.3% small company stock as opposed to 4.6% for European 
managed funds investing in US equity market and 32.2% as opposed to 26.2% for 
European managed funds investing in European equities and U.S. managed funds 
investing in European equities respectively. This finding would suggest that funds 
managed overseas are less comfortable with investing in small companies and would 
support the home bias puzzle. This is at odds with Otten and Bams (2007) who found 
that foreign funds invest more in smaller companies, compared to their locally managed 
peers.  
 
Another interesting finding is that funds investing in U.S. equities have a bias towards 
large and growth orientated stocks. It can be seen that U.S. managers investing in U.S. 
equities invest more in large stocks than small and medium stocks combined - 51.6% 
investment in large stocks as compared to 37.7% investment in small and medium 
stocks combined. This is also apparent for European managers investing in U.S. equities 
with 59.1% investment in large stocks as compared to 15.3% investment in small and 
medium stocks combined. Funds investing in European equities show a much more 
equal distribution of investment in large, medium and small stocks.  
 
3.6 Conclusions 
 
Using a dataset of over 4500 U.S. and European equity funds for the period January 
1970 to June 2010, this chapter examines whether a fund’s location influences the 
return it generates. It also looks at comparing returns generated from investing in 
different markets.  
 
Results do suggest that management location is a factor in fund performance.  In 
particular, when investigating the potential impact of location on alpha generation it has 
been found that on average, investors would have been better off engaging a US fund 
manager to manage their portfolio of US equities.  These results are consistent with the 
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location hypothesis, that is, that local managers may benefit from informational 
advantages compared to foreign managers of the same set of securities. However, the 
results with regard to the management of European equities indicate, at least tentatively 
that the source of out-performance may not be due to the exploitation of local 
information by local managers, but instead that, on average, US-based managers are 
better than managers based in Europe.  Similarly, these results reinforce the case for 
European fund management companies to establish offices in the US. Comparing 
markets invested in, regardless of management location, funds investing in European 
equities generate more significant positive and negative alpha than funds investing in 
the U.S. equities. In other words, European equity fund managers display more skill- 
however this skill is at both sides of the scale (both good and bad skill).  
 
Data sub periods were also studied where results were broken up by decade. For 
management location in the U.S. market, results are consistent for two of the three 
decades examined U.S. managed funds outperform  In the European equity market, in 
every decade examined, U.S. managed funds positively outperform European managed 
funds. However, they also negatively outperform European funds, that is U.S. managed 
funds display more negative significant alphas as well. For the market comparison, 
funds managed in the U.S. are consistent for both decades, with European equity funds 
performing best. Funds investing in European equities positively and negatively 
outperform funds investing in the U.S. in the 2000s, whereas the opposite happened in 
the 1990s-funds investing in the U.S. generated more positive and less negative alpha 
than funds investing in Europe.  
 
Results and conclusions of the study are generally not sensitive to the performance 
model or the observations restrictions relative to the original model.  
 
The presence of market timing ability and performance persistence was tested for. It can 
be concluded that market timing and persistence exists in both markets, with local funds 
displaying the most. These results provide both statistically and economically 
significant evidence that U.S. managed funds in the top deciles were shown to have 
consistently good performance, and can be seen to provide an opportunity for investors 
to earn abnormal profit.  
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The study also examines performance after adjusting for the funds’ style and compares 
style between markets. It is observed that when a fund’s exposure to variations in 
returns of major asset classes has been accounted for (i.e. style), there is little significant 
positive performance. It can be seen that a fund’s style is very consistent across markets, 
with equities forming the bulk of investment in all segments-above 90%. The 
hypothesized theory that locally managed funds invest in more small company stocks 
has been proven. 
 
Chapter 4: Mutual Fund Performance and Families 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
“When we consider the mutual fund industry over the past decade, one of the most 
notable developments is the enormous growth of funds that are operated by fund 
families.” 
Verbeek and Huij (2007) 
 
A mutual fund family is a group of funds all managed by the same fund management 
company. According to Nanda, Wang and Zheng (2004), over 80% of U.S. mutual 
funds belong to a family. The main reasons for this are economies of scale in 
promotion, servicing and distribution and centralized decision making. “Compared to 
stand alone funds, a family has greater flexibility in reallocating its human and other 
resources in response to market opportunities. A family’s reputation can help to reassure 
investors about the selection and monitoring of investment managers” Nanda, Wang 
and Zheng (2004). Since family membership is so prevalent, it is interesting that more 
research has not been carried out on family status and associated performance. This is 
the focus of this study where a comparison will be performed between the performance 
of family funds and non-family funds.  
 
Performance is initially analyzed in terms of persistence. Guedj and 
Papastaikoudi (2005) suggest that funds within a family are more likely to have 
persistent performance than those not in families, given the strategy of the family to 
promote only a few of their funds. The main rational behind this strategy is the convex 
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performance-flow relationship. Guedj and Papastaikoudi (2005) argue that ‘abnormal 
positive returns generate disproportionately more inflows than abnormal negative 
returns would generate outflows. This implies that if the family had the choice between 
owning two mediocre performing funds or one well performing fund and one poorly 
performing fund, the family would prefer the latter combination.’ It follows that it might 
be adequate for a family to only have some well performing funds to still benefit from 
positive cash flows.  
 
If more persistence is detected within a family than outside, it is evidence that families 
are actively intervening in their funds’ performance. It is also expected that larger 
families would be more capable of affecting the performance of their funds, since ‘in 
order to act along these lines, the family needs to possess the latitude to do so, i.e. it 
needs to have enough funds to be able to move resources from one to the other’ Guedj 
and Papastaikoudi (2005). Thus it might be expected that large families display more 
persistence than small families. To investigate this issue, two different persistence 
testing techniques are employed - the recursive portfolio technique and Rhodes utility 
based measure.   
 
It is hypothesized that funds within a family are more likely to display persistence in 
performance than those not in families. This is because the family selectively promotes 
only a few of their funds.  If more persistence is detected within a family than outside, it 
might be taken as evidence that families are actively intervening in their funds’ 
performance. To test this, the persistence of funds that are in a family is compared to 
those that do not belong to a family. Persistence is also tested in individual markets – 
that is, persistence in the U.S. and Europe is tested for separately. A second 
methodology and an additional market (Europe as well as the U.S.) are studied here 
compared to Guedj and Papastaikoudi (2005). In addition the time period used here is 
considerably longer and more recent and the persistence based on family size was also 
examined. 
 
Since resources (salary, marketing activities etc) within a family are not infinite, it is 
assumed that funds compete with each other for them. Allocation of resources is usually 
made on the basis of performance. The hypothesis tested in this chapter is that fund 
managers make their risk decision to influence performance for the second part of the 
51 
 
year based on their performance in the first part of the year. The Risk Adjusted Ratio as 
well as a derivative of Kempf and Ruenzi’s (2008) risk adjustment strategy model is 
used to test this hypothesis. Again, the hypothesis is tested using data from both the 
U.S. and from Europe.  
 
A considerable strength of this study is the dataset used. Virtually all research carried 
out to date on mutual fund families has been on U.S. families. This study also includes 
European funds. Two markets are examined; the data spans a much longer and more 
recent time period; and a much larger sample is examined than has been considered 
before. To summarise, the contributions of this study are: 
• multiple techniques used to evaluate persistence and risk adjustment; 
• multiple market analysis including Europe; 
• persistence and risk adjustment behaviour examined based on family size 
• dataset spanning a much longer and more recent time period; and 
• a much larger sample than has been considered before. 
 
4.2 Literature Review 
 
This section presents the most relevant literature in the area of mutual fund families. It 
is organized on the basis of common themes.  
 
4.2.1 Performance within Mutual Fund Families 
 
There are a number of studies looking at the general performance of funds within 
families.  
 
Guedj and Papastaikoudi (2005) examine fund performance within U.S. mutual fund 
families from 1990 to 2002. They hypothesise that families want to promote their funds 
selectively and that this bias may cause unequal performance. They argue that the 
reason for such a strategy is that cash inflows are attracted to good past performance 
while bad performance does not lead to fund outflows.  This convex relationship 
between past performance and investors’ flows creates the incentive for a family to 
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produce good performing funds even if it causes some of its other funds to be bad 
performing ones. They also hypothesize that larger families are more capable of 
affecting the performance of their funds since they have more funds at their disposal and 
thus more latitude to move resources. In order to test their theory, they use Carhart’s 
(1997) methodology to test for persistence of fund performance.  
 
They find short term persistence in fund performance and cite this as evidence that 
families are actively intervening in their funds’ performance. ‘The difference in 
abnormal returns between a portfolio of funds which were last year’s winners and a 
portfolio of funds which were last year’s losers is 58 basis points per month 
(statistically significant at the 1% level)’. They also find that persistence in fund 
performance is positively related to the number of funds in the family. ‘The spread in 
alphas between deciles 1 and 10 is estimated at 58 basis points per month with a t-stat of 
2.86.’ This is evidence that bigger families display more persistence in performance 
than smaller families. They also examine the issue of the preferential treatment of some 
funds by looking at the allocation of resources. The resource they consider is the fund 
manager. They hypothesize that a fund family ‘promotes its best performing mutual 
funds by using its main resource’. They try and explain the probability of adding a 
manager to a fund given that it is one of the best (respectively, one of the worst) 
performing funds within the family by regressing it on alpha as a proxy for 
performance, the size of the fund and expenses of the funds. They find that there is a 
higher probability of adding a new/better manager to a fund that was the family’s 
relative best performer in the previous year.  
 
In a similar study, Gaspar, Massa and Matos (2006) examine the issue of favouritism 
within the top 50 U.S. mutual fund families over the period 1991 to 2001. Favouritism 
is a family strategy which involves transferring performance (assigning cheap IPO 
offerings or similar on the basis of performance) across member funds to favour 
particular funds, and usually the high fee funds. They call this strategy ‘cross-fund 
subsidisation’ and they cite similar reasons to Guedj and Papastaikoudi (2005) as to 
why such a strategy may take place. They make it clear that a ‘cross-fund subsidisation’ 
strategy benefits the family, at the expense of some investors. They investigate the cross 
subsidisation by examining whether families enhance the performance of ‘high-value’ 
funds (high fee, high performance and young funds) at the expense of ‘low-value’ funds 
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(low fee, low performance and old funds). They find that families enhance the 
performance of ‘high-value funds to the order of 0.7 to 3.3% per year, depending on the 
classification used.  
 
They also study how this ‘cross-fund subsidisation’ takes place. They present a similar 
examination of allocation of resources to Guedj and Papastaikoudi (2005). They 
examine ‘preferential allocation’ (favouritism in allocation of cheap IPO offerings) and 
‘opposite trades’ (coordinating trades of funds such that they place opposite orders) 
using holdings data on their funds and regression analysis. They match up pairs of high-
value and low value funds and regress the difference in returns between each pair on 
two dummy variables representing whether the two funds in the pair belong to the same 
fund family and whether the two funds in the pair belong to the same style. They also 
include some control variables for the size of the funds, the age of the funds, the size of 
the funds’ families and the age of the funds’ families. They find that ‘high-value’ funds 
benefit from both ‘preferential allocation’ and ‘opposite trade’ strategies. This finding is 
substantiated by Cuthbertson, Nitzsche and O’Sullivan’s (2008) (discussed in the 
general literature review) finding that old funds underperformed.  
 
Tower and Zheng (2008) present a study on performance of funds within families. In 
particular, they examine the role of the characteristics of mutual fund families in 
explaining fund performance and the influence of the expense ratio on fund 
performance. They hypothesize that gross mutual fund performance would be 
negatively affected by expenses and turnover. They evaluate performance in three 
different ways. Firstly they compare equally weighted managed fund portfolios with a 
tracking index that mirrors the portfolio’s style. ‘The excess return of the former 
measures whether the family picks stocks and styles just before they appreciate, 
controlling for average style choice: i.e. it measures whether the fund family possesses 
stock selection and style jumping skills’. They also compare the performance of the 
portfolio to the Wilshire 7000 index.  This measures the same skills as the first method 
as well as family style selection skills. Finally, they analyse the return of historical 
portfolios compared to the Wilshire 5000 index.  
 
By comparing fund performance to different types of indices - a tracking index and the 
Wilshire 5000 index, the authors measure stock selection, style selection and family 
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style selection skills. Their main finding is that expenses for the best performing (gross 
returns after adjusting for style) mutual fund families are characterised by low expense 
ratios for their most preferred clients, low turnover and low maximum front end and 
deferred loads. 
 
 
 
 
4.2.2 Competition, Cash Flows and Advertising 
 
When studying the effects of diversification within mutual fund families (adding more 
funds with different styles to the family), Siggelkow (2003) finds that funds belonging 
to more focused fund families outperform similar funds in more diversified families. He 
defines focus as: 
 Focuskt = ∑(assets of family k in category j at time t)                                     (23) 
                             total assets of family k at time t 
 
He claims that this is a good measure of the focus of a family because it measures the 
degree to which the family has focused on similar funds. He also analyses the driver of 
the focus effect. To do this, he tests whether a mutual fund benefits from belonging to a 
family which specializes in that type of fund, or merely belonging to a family with a 
narrow product portfolio, regardless of whether the family specializes in that fund or 
not, and finds that the former is the one that matters. Finally he examines whether the 
interests of investors and family owners are aligned when it comes to the issue of focus. 
He finds that there is a divergence of interests between the two as shareholders would 
benefit from focused families whereas owners have an incentive to broaden a family’s 
offerings to attract cash flows.  
 
Another question in the relationship between mutual fund performance and their 
subsequent growth is analyzed in the U.S. market by Kempf and Ruenzi (2004).  They 
argue that funds not only compete for cash flows within their market segment, but also 
within their family. The position of a fund within a family will influence its growth 
because families advertise their star performers. They find that there is a positive and 
convex relationship between the family rank of a fund and its subsequent growth. The 
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top 20% of funds in a family grow by an additional 6.78% as compared to the other 
funds in the family after controlling for their position within their segment.  
 
Analysing the spillover effects of having a star performer in a family, Nanda, Wang and 
Zheng (2004) look at whether having a star performer (a fund performing among the top 
5% of funds) in the family affects cash flow to the other funds in the family, as well as 
the star performer. They look at the effects of having a star performing fund in a family 
at family level, that is on family cash flow. They do this by comparing the growth in 
new money of star families to that of non-star families. They also look at the effect of 
having a star performer in the family on other funds in the same family. The spillover 
effect hypothesis suggests that ‘investors come to have a more positive view of other 
funds in the star family’ and that the star fund attracts cash to the other members of the 
family.   
 
They test both of these hypotheses by using a fixed effect panel regression. They find 
supporting evidence for this hypothesis by finding that a star performer in a family 
delivers an aggregate cash flow increase that is more than three times larger than a 
standalone star fund. They also verify the asymmetric cash flow response to fund 
performance theory by also examining the spillover effects of having a ‘dog’ (a fund 
performing among the bottom 5% of funds) in the family. They find that while there is a 
negative effect for this particular fund, there are no spillover effects on the other family 
members. It follows then that families may well engage in a strategy to create a star 
performer. However, they find that this is mainly just the families with poor 
performance. Lastly, they examine whether having a star performer impacts on 
performance, using the Fama and French three factor model and Carhart four factor 
model. They find that stars do not, on average, indicate investment ability. They 
‘document that a naive strategy of chasing families with star performers does not 
enhance investor return.’ 
 
On the same theme, Gallaher, Kaniel and Starks (2006) study how family strategic 
decisions affect investor demand. They find that a family’s strategic decision can 
significantly influence investor flows to the family. They focus on aggregate flows to 
the entire family of funds. They look at factors such as family performance, family 
offerings, fees and operating costs. They use regression techniques to evaluate whether 
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a relationship exists.  There is a positive relationship between family performance and 
the number of funds that a family offers and cash flows to the family and a negative 
relationship between fees and expenses and cash flows to the family. They then focus in 
particular on the relationship between the family’s advertising decision and cash flows 
to the family. They obtain their advertising data from Competitive Media Research 
(CMR) and use monthly information on the print advertising expenditures of mutual 
fund families. They find that high relative levels of advertising are significantly related 
to high fund flows and that there is no significant relationship for low levels of relative 
advertising. Finally, they examine the determinants of the family’s advertising 
expenditures by regressing the relative level of advertising on proxies for family quality 
plus other strategic decision and control variables used in the earlier analyses. They find 
that the main influencing factors are the expense ratio of the family (positive 
relationship) and the distribution channel (fund families with higher average load fees 
do not advertise as much as do fund families with lower average load fees).  
 
Expanding on their earlier work on advertising and the mutual fund family, Gallaher, 
Kaniel and Starks (2009) find that advertising has a significant impact on cash flows to 
the industry as a whole, at the family level and at an individual fund level. At the 
industry level, every family benefits from advertising expenditure, not just those 
families who actually advertise. They find that cash flows are higher in months where 
more advertising expenditure takes place. At the family level, they again find high 
relative levels of advertising are significantly related to high fund flows and that there is 
no significant relationship for low levels of relative advertising. At the individual fund 
level, the effect of advertising is different depending on whether they are top or bottom 
performing funds. Advertising for bottom performing funds lowers their flow-
performance sensitivity while advertising increases flow-performance sensitivity for top 
performing funds.  
 
Also studying the marketing decisions of a fund family, Verbeek and Huij (2007) look 
at spillover effects of marketing. The authors test whether the flow-performance 
relationship is affected by the marketing and distribution expenses at an individual fund 
level, as well as the family level. To model the fund flow-performance relationship, they 
use: 
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rank would suggest that managers change risk because of their family rank. A positive 
coefficient would suggest that the managers are behaving strategically, or cooperating. 
A negative coefficient would suggest that the managers are engaging in non-strategic 
behavior i.e. competing with one another. They find that managers change their risk 
depending on rank.  They also analyse competition within families of different sizes, 
and show that strategic interaction takes place in small families but not in large ones. 
Thus they find that whether they compete or behave strategically depends on family 
size. Fund managers in large families compete but fund managers in small families 
behave strategically.  
 
4.2.3 Mutual Fund Families and Risk 
 
Deriving a measure of risk shifting behaviour, Huang, Shialm, and Zheng, (2011) look 
at holdings data in the U.S. market over the period 1980 to 2006. They provide several 
reasons why a fund might change its risk level, including increasing risk to increase 
personal compensation.  They also study the mechanisms through which a fund can 
adjust its risk. Methods include adjusting the composition of the portfolio between risky 
and less risky assets (equity versus cash) and adjusting the composition of the equity 
holdings between low and high beta stocks. They are particularly interested in 
consequences of risk shifting on performance.  Their risk shifting measure is a unique 
one based solely on a fund’s holdings information.  It is the difference between a fund's 
current holdings volatility (standard deviation of the most recently disclosed fund 
holdings) and its past realised volatility (standard deviation of the fund’s actual return). 
They interpret the measure as being positive (and thus the fund increasing risk) if the 
most recently disclosed holdings are riskier than the actual fund holdings. They 
conclude that funds that increase risk have inferior perform to those that keep risk levels 
constant. Thus risk shifting is detrimental to fund performance.  
 
Elton, Green and Gruber (2007) study the correlation between U.S. mutual fund returns 
within and between fund families. They find that returns are more closely correlated 
within families. ‘The average correlation between stock funds and combination funds is 
0.757 if they are inside a family and 0.709 if they are from two separate families’. This 
correlation is mainly attributed to common stock holdings and similar exposure to broad 
economic factors. Thus a strategy of investing within one family is a riskier one than 
59 
 
diversifying across families. They also show that families are likely to have a risk 
strategy - i.e. either to have high standard deviation or low standard deviation funds.  
 
4.2.4 Performance as influenced by Industry Structure and Entry Decisions 
 
Khorana and Servaes (1999) investigate the rationale behind new and existing families 
deciding to launch a new fund into the market. They look at 1163 new U.S. fund 
openings over the period 1979-1992. To explain the launch of new funds, they regress 
fund openings on a number of explanatory factors such as cash inflows, performance, 
family size, etc. They find that fund openings are positively related to a number of 
factors: the ability of families to generate additional fee income, family size (larger 
families are more likely to open new funds because substantial economies of scale 
exists in the fund opening decision), and the decision making process of large families 
(families are more likely to open a fund in an objective/class where a large family had 
already opened a fund in that objective in the previous year).   
 
The link between industry structure and mutual fund family performance is analyzed by 
Massa (2003). He examines the U.S. mutual fund market using data from CRSP. He 
suggests that family specific characteristics influence the way investors evaluate funds. 
The most important of these characteristics is the idea that investors can move in and 
out of funds within a family at very low cost. The larger the number of funds in a 
family, the greater the value of this option. He finds that this low cost ability to switch 
between funds affects the degree of competition between them. The greater the value an 
investor puts on the low-cost switching option, the less the competition between funds 
and the greater the segmentation of the industry, in terms of family affiliation. He also 
finds that investors are influenced by a number of other factors - namely their 
investment horizons, family size and fees and the fact that investors perceive funds as 
differentiated products.  To conclude, he finds that families compete not only on the 
basis of performance but fees and family size are also very important. He argues that 
‘the level of performance of a fund will be negatively related to the degree of product 
differentiation in the category the fund is in, measured as the dispersion in the 
‘‘services’’ (fees, performance) that the competing funds offer. If families are able to 
differentiate themselves in terms of non-performance-related characteristics (e.g., a 
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higher degree of fee differentiation), they have less need to compete in terms of 
performance.’ 
 
Zhao (2005) draws on the Khorana and Servaes (1999) study and further investigates 
the fund family entry decision. Zhao extends the earlier work by making a distinction 
between two separate entry decisions: the introduction of new portfolios (either single-
class or multiple-class) and the introduction of new classes (variations of the same fund, 
i.e. Growth A and Growth B etc) for existing portfolios. He finds that factors such as 
performance, cash flows, size, expenses and tax considerations affect whether a family 
introduces a new fund, or a new class of an existing fund. Comparing results to Khorana 
and Servaes’ (1999), both studies ‘predict fund families are more likely to introduce 
new portfolios (funds) in objectives with high capital gains overhang and a strong 
introduction record. On the other hand, in terms of family returns and inflows, or 
objective size and returns, the results are quite different’.  Zhao’s results differ 
substantially from those of Khorana and Servaes (1999) for the introduction of new 
classes in existing portfolios. ‘The contradictory results underscore the importance of 
distinguishing between the decisions to introduce new portfolios vs. new classes’.  
 
In conclusion, it is apparent that virtually all research done on mutual fund families to 
date has been on the U.S. market. It is a significant strength of this study that it features 
European funds too. Research has centred on some common themes.  Examining 
Performance within Mutual Fund Families, it was found that bigger families display 
more persistence in performance than smaller families. Also, better performing funds 
within families got preferential treatment in the allocation of resources. The factors that 
affect mutual fund performance were also examined. Exploring the theme 
of Competition within families, Cash Flows and Advertising, it was found that funds 
within families compete for resources. The factors affecting cash flows in and out of a 
fund were found to be having a star performer, family performance, family offerings, 
fees and operating costs and advertising. Industry Structure and Entry Decisions was 
also a popular choice for analysis. Research found that fund openings are positively 
related to a number of factors: the ability of families to generate additional fee income, 
family size and the decision making process of large families.  
 
4.3 Methodology 
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This study examines the extent to which fund performance is influenced by family 
status. As mentioned in the introduction, a mutual fund family is a group of funds all 
managed by the same fund management company.  To analyze this, the dataset is 
decomposed into funds that form part of a family, and those that do not. 
 
 
 
4.3.1 Persistence 
 
Guedj and Papastaikoudi (2005) suggest that funds within a family are more likely to 
have persistently good performance than those not in families, given the strategy of the 
family to promote only a few of their funds.  If more persistence is detected within a 
family than outside, it may be taken as evidence that families are actively intervening in 
their funds’ performance. To test this, the persistence of family funds is compared to 
that of non-family funds. Persistence is also tested in the U.S. and Europe individually. 
It is also expected that larger families would be more capable of affecting the 
performance of their funds, since ‘in order to act along these lines, the family needs to 
possess the latitude to do so, i.e. it needs to have enough funds to be able to move 
resources from one to the other’ Guedj and Papastaikoudi (2005). Funds were examined 
for persistence using the recursive portfolio technique. This technique involves forming 
equally weighted portfolios of funds based on the sorted fund returns over the previous 
time period. Each portfolio is then held for a time i.e. a year. The process is repeated 
recursively each year. This generates the holding period returns of the ranking period’s 
portfolios. Decile portfolios were then formed based on alphas in this study for 12 
month formation and 4 month holding periods. If the alphas for the deciles are 
significant, it is evidence of performance persistence. To test for robustness, the analysis 
was also carried out on t-alphas and quartile portfolios. Funds which display persistent, 
good performance are deemed to be superior to those that do not. 
 
As an alternative way of determining the degree of persistence evident in family and 
non-family mutual funds, a utility-based method developed by Rhodes (2000) for the 
UK’s Financial Services Authority (FSA) was employed. This method tracks the 
relative performance of funds over time, to a greater extent than other methods. Funds 
62 
 
were ranked into quintiles each year based on fund return. Utility scores were then 
assigned based on the quintile. The utility function is just the set of preferences over the 
rate of return of a representative investor. For example, quintile 5 (lowest performance) 
is assigned a score of 2 while quintile 1 is assigned a score of 10. The difference, in 
absolute performance, between each quintile each year is assumed to be the same. The 
study relies on a framework where it is assumed that the investor’s utility each period is 
directly related to the utility score. A utility function provides a utility measure. This 
utility function is assumed to exhibit diminishing marginal utility. Therefore, higher 
relative performance increases utility but at a diminishing rate, possibly reflecting the 
increased risk associated with high relative performance. The concave shape of the 
utility function implies that the average utility over two periods from a score of say 2 in 
period 1 and 6 in period 2 is less than the average utility from a score of 4 in both 
periods even though the average performance is the same in both scenarios. That is, 
given the same average performance outcome less volatility is preferred to more. For 
each fund the average utility may be calculated across all the years for which returns are 
available. Funds which consistently remain in the higher(est) quintiles will produce the 
highest average utility. Rhodes demonstrates that if relative performance is random then 
the cross sectional distribution of average utilities is normal. Thus the average utility per 
fund over time was calculated. Average utility scores were adjusted to account for funds 
with different life spans. This utility measure of persistence does not equally weight the 
scores for funds which have different numbers of observations. (Each individual score 
must be weighted by the square root of the ratio of two expected variances.) If this 
distribution of adjusted utility scores is normally distributed, then this indicates no 
evidence of persistence in performance. To summarize the method step by step: 
• Yearly performance is determined by averaging the monthly returns for each 
fund by year 
• Funds are ranked into quintiles for every year with quintile 1 containing the top 
performers and quintile 5 containing the worst performers 
• Utility scores are assigned for each quintile: 
o Quintile 1 gets a utility score of 9.2 
o Quintile 2 gets a utility score of 6.4 
o Quintile 3 gets a utility score of 2.2 
o Quintile 4 gets a utility score of -4.1 
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o Quintile 5 gets a utility score of -13.5 
• The average utility per fund over time was calculated 
• Average utility scores were adjusted to account for funds with different life 
spans 
• These average utility scores now form a distribution of utility over time 
• This distribution is tested for normality 
• If this distribution of adjusted utility scores is normally distributed, then there is 
no evidence of persistence in performance 
Rhodes (2000) carries out the normality tests with a number of alternative utility 
function specifications to change the level of risk aversion. The study’s conclusions are 
generally found to be quite robust. To test for normality, three difference statistics were 
employed here-the Skewness/Kurtosis test, the Sharpio-Wilk and Sharpio-Francia tests. 
The Skewness/Kurtosis test is a test for normality based on skewness and kurtosis 
which then combines the two tests into an overall test statistic. All tests operate under 
the null hypothesis that the distributions of average utility scores are normal. To 
examine for robustness, several variations of the test were performed. Funds were 
ranked both relative to all funds in the sample (family and non-family funds) and 
relative only to family funds. Funds were also ranked relative to other funds in the same 
market and also regardless of market. Finally, the persistence based on family size was 
examined. A large family is classified as having 7 or more funds. This figure is the 
average number of funds per family, as per Kempf and Ruenzi’s (2008) methodology. 
 
4.3.2 Risk Adjustment Strategy 
 
Examining the behaviour of fund managers in relation to risk has interested researchers 
in recent years. However, examining the risk taken by mutual fund managers relative to 
other managers in the same family has received little attention. Because fund managers 
within a family compete for resources (salary, marketing activities etc), they may 
compete with each other. The hypothesis here is that fund managers make their risk 
decision for the second part of the year based on their performance in the first part of 
the year. In order to have the best performance, a manager could adjust their risk if 
necessary. To test this, the RAR (Risk Adjustment Ratio) is employed, in order to test if 
managers adjust the subsequent risk of their portfolio in response to past performance. 
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All funds in the dataset are independent funds. This means any merged, split or 
combined fund was excluded to ensure no duplication of funds existed. ‘Second units’ 
were also removed. ‘Second units’ include the same fund packaged in a different way 
and sold to different types of investors (such as retail or institutional investors) – thus it 
contains the same stocks as the independent fund and in order to ensure unbiased 
results, such funds are omitted. For statistical robustness a minimum observation 
restriction is applied. The fund returns used are before (gross) buying and selling 
expenses and after (net) annual management fees for both U.S. and European funds. 
Returns are pre income-tax to control for any differential tax treatments between the 
two regions. Also, returns are inclusive of reinvested income.  This ensures an accurate 
comparison of funds.  
The benchmark indices for the persistence model factors came from a number of 
different sources. Table 3.4.2 in Chapter 3 shows all sources. All U.S. factors were 
available for the full span of the study, but some of the European factors only went back 
to 1990 so this limited the span of the study of European funds. Where necessary, 
indices were converted to the appropriate currency at the appropriate rate. Where no 
general European index existed, a German Deutschmark index was used as a proxy. All 
indices were monthly and had income reinvested (total returns) in order to match the 
actual fund returns.  
 
As discussed above, a mutual fund family is a group of funds all managed by the same 
fund management company. The data used in the family analysis are ffunds in families 
and single funds not in families. . For example,  Legal and General Ltd has a fund 
family with 6  funds in it and Davidson Mutual Funds only has one. Morningstar 
provides the management company name of each fund so it was possible to divide funds 
into families. There are 666 families in the dataset with the number of funds per family 
ranging from 2 to 141. Table 4.4 presents a breakdown of families by number of funds. 
It is apparent that the majority of families are small, with 80% of families having 9 or 
less funds in them. Only 9% of families have 20 or more funds. There are also 498 
funds that are classified as being single funds, that is funds not in a family group. 
Analysis is performed on returns in the fund’s base currency. 
 
4.5 Results 
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The following sections present the empirical findings about the performance of mutual 
funds.   
Before examining different risk adjusted strategies, some results are presented about the 
persistence of funds which belong to families versus funds which operate on their own. 
 
4.5.1 Persistence in Family and Non-Family funds 
 
Funds were examined for persistence using the recursive portfolio technique and the 
utility based measure of Rhodes (2000). Table 4.5.1 shows the recursive portfolio 
technique results. Decile portfolios were formed on alphas for 12 month formation and 
4 month holding periods. The t-statistics shown are the t-statistics of the procedure 
sorted on alphas. Examining the U.S. market, it can be seen from the significant alphas 
that persistence is present for the top two deciles for both family funds and non-family 
funds. For example, the top two deciles for family funds has alpha t-statistics of 2.315 
and 2.649 respectively and the top two deciles for non-family funds has alpha t-statistics 
of 2.032 and 2.084 respectively. This means that winning funds remain winners but 
losing funds do not show persistence in performance.  Looking at the E.U. market, there 
is a lot more evidence of persistence-again, both in family and non-family funds. Alphas 
are significant for almost all deciles in both family and non-family funds. For example, 
the top three deciles for family funds has alpha t-statistics of 3.826, 4.556 and 2.464 
respectively and the top three deciles for non-family funds has alpha t-statistics of 
4.569, 4.025 and 2.102 respectively. The difference between mean t-statistics for family 
and non-family funds was tested for the top three deciles and the difference was found 
not to be statistically significant. To test for robustness, the analysis was also carried out 
on t-alphas and quartile portfolios and results were consistent. It can be concluded that 
persistence exists in both family and non-family datasets. This shows that there is no 
evidence of family funds passing on economies of scale to investors in the form of 
lower expenses and higher persistent returns.  
 
Table 4.5.2 shows the results of the utility based measure of persistence. Funds were 
ranked into quintiles each year based on fund return. Utility scores were then assigned 
based on the quintile and the average utility per fund over time was calculated. If this 
distribution of utility scores is normally distributed, then there is no evidence of 
persistence in performance. The probability-values of the three techniques to test for 
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normality (the Skewness/Kurtosis test, the Sharpio-Wilk and Sharpio-Francia tests) are 
presented in Panel A of Table 4.5.2. All tests operate under the null hypothesis that the 
distributions of average utility scores are normal. Since the p-value is zero in all cases, 
the null hypothesis can be rejected both for family funds and non-family funds. This 
supports persistence as the distribution is non-normal. 
 
When testing for robustness, the sample used to rank funds made no difference to 
results (i.e. including/excluding non-family funds, market/entire sample etc). Panel B of 
Table 4.5.2 shows the results of the utility based measure of persistence by market. It 
can be seen by the p-value of zero that the null hypothesis that the distribution is normal 
can be rejected in each case, for family funds and non-family funds for both markets 
examined. Again this supports persistence in both markets examined as the distribution 
is non-normal. 
 
Finally Panel C presents the utility based persistence measure based on family size. It 
can be seen that the utility measure for large families and small families (0.01 and -0.05 
respectively) are very similar, especially when one considers that this variable has a 
range of 12.93. This refutes the expected hypothesis that larger families would be more 
capable of influencing the performance of their funds and thus display more persistence.  
 
It is suggested that as a result of analysis carried out in this study, family status, family 
size or market examined does not affect persistence in performance. The initial 
hypothesis that funds within a family are more likely to have persistent performance 
than those not in families, given the strategy of the family to promote only a few of their 
funds, has not been proven here. This is in contrast to Guedj and Papastaikoudi (2005) 
who find that funds that belong to larger families have a more persistent performance 
than the entire universe of funds. However, they use only one methodology and look 
only at large families.  
 
An important implication is raised here – there seems to be no apparent advantage to an 
investor in investing in a fund belonging to a family in terms of persistence. Generally 
the popular ‘brand name’ funds are part of a family and this finding would suggest that 
there is no rational reason to invest in these funds over the smaller, less popular funds. 
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Also the finding that fund managers within a family compete for resources in terms of 
performance could have negative implications for the family. Kempf and Ruenzi (2008) 
discuss how ‘tournament behaviour of fund managers leads to suboptimal portfolios’. 
 
4.5.2 Risk Adjustment Strategy 
 
Table 4.5.3 and 4.5.4 present results of the RAR analysis. The hypothesis here is that 
fund managers make their risk decision to influence performance for the second part of 
the year based on their performance in the first part of the year. A RAR > 1 can be 
interpreted as an increase in risk, and a RAR < 1 as a decrease in risk. Table 4.5.3 
presents the average RAR per family category. It can be seen that the ratios are similar, 
regardless of the number of funds per family. All are greater than one; this can be 
interpreted as meaning that on average managers increase their risk for the second part 
of the year. Table 4.5.4 presents the average RAR per family category over time. The 
RAR varies over time, but most coefficients are greater than one. Some of the notable 
findings include: 
• The lowest average RAR was 0.5 and occurred in the last year of testing, 2009. 
This figure was not due to the presence of an outlier as all family sizes in that 
year had RAR’s of 0.5. Since the RAR is less than 1 fund managers are 
decreasing risk in the second half of the year.  It would be interesting to see if 
this is an indication of things to come and if this trend continues in coming 
years.  
• The highest average RAR was 3.6 and occurred in 1973. RAR’s broken down by 
family were more variable this year with families with 5 funds having the 
highest RAR (5.6) and families with 4 funds having the lowest RAR (2.1) that 
year. This would suggest that this high average figure is due to the outlier of 5.6.  
• This RAR of 5.6 was the highest ratio of any family size in any year.  
• The lowest ratio of any family size in any year was 0.4 for families with 5 funds 
in 1980 
 
Table 4.5.5 presents results of the risk adjustment strategy model. A significant 
coefficient on the family rank would suggest that managers change risk because of their 
family rank. A positive coefficient would suggest that the managers are behaving 
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strategically, or cooperating. In other words, a positive coefficient would mean that the 
best performing managers are increasing risk more than worst performing managers in 
the second half of the year. A negative coefficient would suggest that the managers are 
engaging in non-strategic behavior i.e. competing with one another. In other words, a 
negative coefficient would mean that the best performing managers are decreasing risk 
more than worst performing managers in the second half of the year. Panel A shows the 
results of funds in all families, regardless of family size. The influence of family rank is 
negative and significant at all levels. This indicates that family rank has an impact on 
the risk adjustment behaviour of fund managers. The fact that the coefficient is negative 
suggests that managers are not behaving strategically. The coefficient value of -0.145 
can be interpreted as showing that the best fund manager in a family decreases risk by 
14.5% more than the worst fund manager. Or, put another way, the worst fund manager 
in a family increases risk by 14.5% more than the best manager. This finding suggests 
refuting the notion of managerial over confidence as it can be seen that the best 
performing managers do not increase their risk.  
 
The next two panels of Table 4.5.5 present the results of the models allowing one to 
simultaneously test if managers’ adjust risk relative to their family rank and whether the 
effect differs between large and small families. It is hypothesized that a small family 
would behave strategically and a large family would behave non-strategically, or 
compete. Panel B shows the results of the model when a variable is included to account 
for family size. Family rank is again negative and significant. The coefficient value on 
rank of -0.107 approximately can be interpreted as showing that the best fund manager 
in a family decreases risk by 10.7% more than the worst fund manager. The coefficient 
on the size variable is significant but tiny, suggesting that family size has little impact 
on risk adjustment strategy.  
 
Panel C shows the results of the model distinguishing between large and small families, 
using interaction dummy variables. Again it can be seen that the influence of family 
rank for both large and small families is negative and significant at all levels. The 
coefficient value on the interaction dummy for large families is -0.10 approximately and 
for small families is -0.19 approximately. As above, the fact that the coefficients are 
negative suggests that managers are competing.  
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In all models, the negative significant coefficient on the mean reversion variable 
suggests the standard deviation mean reverts. It can be seen that the hypothesis that a 
small family would behave strategically and a large family would compete has not been 
proven. Kempf and Ruenzi (2008) also find that managers change their risk depending 
on rank.  However, they find that whether they compete or behave strategically depends 
on family size. Fund managers in large families compete but fund managers in small 
families behave strategically.  
 
Tables 4.5.6 and 4.5.7 present the results for U.S. funds and E.U. funds respectively. 
From Panel A of both tables, it is apparent that the results vary quite a lot by market. It 
can be seen from the sign of the coefficient that managers within a family compete in 
the U.S. and behave strategically in Europe. The coefficient on rank is negative and 
significant in the U.S, -0.42. This same coefficient is positive and significant in Europe, 
0.52.  Thus the best fund manager in a family in the U.S. decreases risk by 42% more 
than the worst fund manager, compared with a 52% increase in Europe.  This effect of 
the rank variable is consistent regardless of model used-see Panels B and C of Tables 
4.5.6 and 4.5.7. It can also be seen that family size makes little impact on results in the 
U.S. - Panels C and D of Table 4.5.6. However, in Europe, the coefficient value on the 
interaction dummy for large families is 0.65 compared with 0.39 for small families. 
 
Table 4.5.8 presents the results of the risk adjustment strategy regression, per year. It 
can be seen that the results have changed over time, with the influence of the rank 
variable becoming more important in more recent years. The rank coefficient was 
mainly insignificant in the 1970s. The size of the coefficient varies greatly depending 
on the year. The coefficient is mainly negative. Some of the notable findings include: 
• The highest coefficient of the rank variable in the standard model was in 1973 
and it was 3.6. This can be interpreted as the best fund manager in a family 
increasing risk by 360% more than the worst fund manager. This is evidence of 
managers cooperating. The extreme value of this variable would be considered 
an outlier however as the values in the years preceding and following were much 
lower (1.3 and 0.4 for 1972 and 1974 respectively).  
• The lowest coefficient of the rank variable in the standard model was in 1978 
and it was -2. This can be interpreted as the best fund manager in a family 
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decreasing risk by 200% more than the worst fund manager and is evidence of 
managers competing. Again, the extreme value of this variable would be 
considered an outlier as the values in the years preceding and following were 
much lower.  
• Of the 40 years analysed, only 5 years (1973, 1978, 1979, 1987 and 2002) 
display an insignificant coefficient on the mean reversion variable. Two of these 
years were the ones that had the highest and the lowest coefficient on the rank 
variable. This suggests that there is mean reversion in the standard deviation.  
It can be seen that there was great variability throughout the decades, in particular the 
1970s. Over time, family rank influenced risk adjustment more and more.  
 
It is suggested here from the risk adjustment ratios examined that managers increase 
risk for the second part of the year. When looking at risk adjustment behavior, fund 
managers adjust risk relative to their family rank. The hypothesis that a small family 
would behave strategically and a large family would compete has not been proven. In 
this dataset, funds within families have been found to compete, regardless of family 
size. This finding is worrying for fund management companies and investors in light of 
Kempf and Ruenzi (2008)’s discussion on ‘tournament behaviour of fund managers 
leads to suboptimal portfolios’. Looking at individual markets, managers within a 
family compete in the U.S. and behave strategically in Europe. One would expect that 
there would be more evidence of persistence in performance when managers are 
behaving strategically, because of Kempf and Ruenzi (2008). This study did not find 
more evidence of persistence in Europe than in the U.S. 
 
4.6 Conclusions 
 
Funds were examined for persistence based on certain criteria (family status, family size 
and market) using the recursive portfolio technique and Rhode’s utility based measure. 
Persistence is present in both family and non-family funds in both the U.S. and 
European markets, and regardless of family size. Results are consistent for the two 
techniques. Results here suggest that family status, family size or market does not affect 
persistence in performance. The initial hypothesis that funds within a family are more 
likely to have persistent performance than those not in families, given the strategy of the 
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family to promote only a few of their funds has not been proven here. This suggests a 
lack of evidence of family funds passing on economies of scale to investors in the form 
of lower expenses and higher persistent returns.  
 
Looking at risk strategy within families, two different techniques were employed. The 
Risk Adjustment Ratio was used along with a Risk Adjustment Strategy model. It can 
be seen that the RAR are greater than one for all families; this can be interpreted as an 
increase in risk for the second part of the year. Examining the risk adjustment strategy 
model, the influence of family rank is negative and significant at all levels. This 
indicates that family rank has an impact on the risk adjustment behaviour of fund 
managers. The fact that the coefficient is negative suggests that managers are not 
behaving strategically. This finding refutes the notion of managerial over confidence as 
it can be seen that the best performing managers do not increase their risk. This result 
holds for the U.S. when markets are examined individually but is the opposite for 
Europe-family compete in the U.S. and behave strategically in Europe. The coefficient 
on the size variable is significant but tiny, suggesting that family size has little impact 
on risk adjustment strategy. 
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Chapter 5: Mutual Fund Performance and Asset Allocation 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
“However asset allocation is defined, its ultimate objective is first to design and then to 
shift the asset mix of a portfolio in response to the changing reward patterns available in 
the capital markets.”                                                                                       Chan and 
Chen (1992) 
 
A number of researchers emphasise the importance of the strategic asset allocation 
decision. One of the seminal studies in this area is Brinson, Hood, and Beebower (1986) 
who were first responsible for the claim that ‘asset allocation policy explains more than 
90 percent of performance’. It therefore seems odd that asset allocation, seemingly the 
most important determinant of performance, has not been the focus of more research. 
Research has tended to focus on single asset class mutual funds so remarkably little is 
known about the investment performance of multiple-asset-class portfolios. The 
performance, asset allocation skills and timing ability of balanced funds (funds which 
invest in multiple asset classes-stocks, bonds, cash etc) as a sector has received scant 
attention. In particular, the ability of balanced fund managers to time particular asset 
classes has not been researched at all. Thus, this area is the focus of this study. One of 
the main reasons investors choose balanced funds is because they are accessing a source 
of diversification across asset classes. However, it is assumed that by claiming to 
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actively manage the fund, the fund manager is able to time each asset class - that is 
‘shifting the asset mix of a portfolio in response to the changing reward patterns 
available in the capital markets’. If managers are not able to do this, balanced funds 
must be questioned as a deserving source of investment - or at the very least, managers 
should not charge active management fees.  
 
Two different timing techniques are employed to analyse the performance of multi-asset 
class funds: one using returns data to test for absolute and relative timing ability and one 
using actual asset allocation data. The first technique using fund and benchmark index 
returns is derived from traditional market timing techniques. This dataset contains 714 
balanced funds spanning the period January 2000 to December 2010. The second 
methodology is a new approach based on regression analysis using actual asset 
allocation data. By ‘asset allocation data’ is meant a dataset which has the proportions 
of investment in each asset class. This dataset contains 355 balanced funds spanning the 
period January 2006 to December 2010.  Overall, 11 years of balanced fund data is 
examined, from January 2000-December 2010 and the total value of the funds in the 
dataset is almost 500 billion euro. Three markets are examined- the U.S., U.K. and 
Canada. Asset allocation data is limited in span and continuity so this data from 
Morningstar presents a new perspective.  In order to check the reliability of the asset 
allocation data, the technique of Returns Based Style Analysis was used. As the 
technique is used to determine the ‘style’ of a fund, it is an ideal way of checking the 
dependability of the data used here.  The Morningstar asset allocation data was deemed 
dependable as a result of the test.  
 
Results vary depending on the model employed, but it is apparent that there is more 
timing ability found using the data on the proportions of investment in each asset class.  
Taking US managers ability to time equity as an example, it can be seen that 0.7% of 
US managers are able to significantly time equities using the returns data model as 
opposed to 6.3% using the asset allocation data model. This is still a very small number 
and results are similar for other assets and markets and are consistent with Jiang, Yao 
and Yu (2007) who found more timing ability in the market when using holdings-based 
measures of return.  
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The new techniques and the large, up-to-date and multi-market dataset provide a new 
angle to this topical issue. To summarise, the contributions of this study include 
multiple techniques used to ascertain timing ability, a unique regression based technique 
and multiple market analysis. The data is continuous and its reliability is tested, it spans 
a much longer and more recent time period and uses a much larger sample than has been 
considered before.  
 
5.2 Literature Review 
 
5.2.1 Traditional Market Timing Tests and Conditional Performance Models 
The literature on this topic is reviewed extensively in Chapter 2, section 4.  
 
5.2.2 Asset Allocation Decisions and Tests 
 
The previous section examined the most relevant traditional market timing and 
performance literature. Whilst these papers are important in terms of technique, it is the 
asset allocation literature that is most interesting and significant for this study. This 
research contributes to the topic of asset allocation in that it specifically looks at 
balanced funds and looks at the issue of asset class timing ability.  
 
Initially looking at asset allocation from an individual (representative) investor point of 
view, a brief review of the seminal papers in the area is presented here. Generally 
investors have a particular form of utility function and make asset allocation decisions 
to maximise this utility. A number of papers derive models for strategic asset allocation, 
to examine how various factors affect the optimal allocation of financial wealth between 
risky and riskless assets. Brennan, Schwartz, and Lagnado (1999) use dynamic 
programming to consider asset allocation among stocks, bonds, bills, and interest-rate 
futures. They make assumptions about the representative investors utility function, 
namely that it is a power function. They look at the case when there is time variation in 
expected returns. This suggest this variation is driven by three variables, namely short-
term interest rates, long-term bond rates and the dividend yield on a stock portfolio. As 
expected, they find that the optimal portfolio proportions for long-term investors are 
very different to those with a short-term investment horizon. In a book titled ’Strategic 
Asset Allocation: Portfolio Choice for Long-Term Investors’, Campbell and Viceira 
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(2002) review existing theories and commonly accepted frameworks for asset allocation 
and derive ‘optimal portfolio rules that investors can compare with existing rules of 
thumb’.  
 
Campbell, Chan and Viceira (2003) present a multivariate VAR approach to modeling 
the asset allocation decision. They develop a model for the optimal consumption of an 
infinitely-lived investor.  Using long-run annual and quarterly US data, they suggest 
that the predictability of stock returns greatly increases the optimal demand for stocks. 
They also examine bonds and their effect on investor utility. With a similar aim, 
Campbell, Chacko, Rodriguez and Viceira (2004) examine the impact of predictable 
variation in stock returns on inter-temporal optimal portfolio choice and consumption 
using a continuous time VAR-model. They derive a model which has an ‘exact 
analytical solution when the investor has unit elasticity of intertemporal substitution in 
consumption and an approximate analytical solution otherwise’. One of the big 
contributions this paper makes is that it shows in the presence of correlation, discrete-
time representations of univariate continuous-time processes do not translate 
immediately to multivariate processes. This paper draws heavily on earlier work done 
by Campbell and Viceira (1999) but who derive a discrete time model. Again they look 
at the optimal portfolio choice of an infinitely lived investor. Using US data they 
conclude that inter-temporal hedging increase the average demand for stocks for risk-
averse investors. Viceira (2006) presents a review paper outlining developments to date 
in modeling in the area.  
 
The focus in this thesis however is on a different aspect of asset allocation, that is, from 
the perspective of a fund manager and impact on performance. In one of the earliest 
papers aimed at examining asset allocation policy towards asset class weights, Brinson, 
Hood and Beebower (1986) examine the performance of 91 US pension funds using 
data from 1974 to 1983. They focus on managerial investment decisions and the 
resulting impact on total return. These investment decisions are investment policy, 
market timing and security selection, and they attribute returns to them. They use a 
simple methodology based on a passive benchmark portfolio representing the plan's 
long-term asset classes, weighted by their long-term allocation. They attribute returns to 
timing using: 
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In two seminal papers Sharpe (1988, 1992) asserted that a fund’s asset allocation 
decisions account for almost all of its fund’s performance. His earlier paper is a 
theoretical examination of the ‘asset allocation procedure’. His later paper sets out his 
Returns based style analysis technique. This technique breaks down a fund’s 
composition into its most dominant investment style or asset class. The technique 
regresses a funds return on 12 benchmark indices, each one representing an asset class: 
equity, bonds or cash. The equation is: 
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market returns’. This finding is very much at odds with more recent market timing 
literature, which finds very little evidence of market timing ability. This could be due to 
the very small sample used here (17 fund managers).  
 
Henzel, Ezra and Ilkiw (1991) also explore the importance of the asset allocation 
decision. Their basic premise is very similar to the Brinson et al papers discussed above 
in that they  look at a method that investors can use to analyse their returns and then the 
implications on returns of various different risk decisions (security selection, market 
timing etc). The basis of the model is the comparison of a portfolio’s actual return with 
the return on a hypothetical portfolio that is formed as a result of different policy 
decisions (various asset allocation and asset weight decisions). They state that 
sometimes the appropriate comparison is not always obvious. To examine the effect of 
the aforementioned decisions on portfolio returns they use 7 US funds over the period 
1985 to 1988. To analyse the impact of market timing, they subtract the returns on the 
sponsor’s policy portfolio (Y1) from the returns on the timing allocated portfolio (Z1), 
that is: 
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Also examining what they term ‘asset allocation funds’ or balanced funds, Chan and 
Chen (1992) use weekly and monthly data for U.S. funds. They examine managers’ 
stock selection ability and market timing ability. Using Henriksson and Merton’s 
market timing methodology, they find no evidence of market timing ability. Results for 
stock selection ability are at odds for the different data frequency, that is they find proof 
of stock selection ability in weekly data but not when they examine monthly data. They 
find no evidence of market timing ability for either dataset. Lastly, by comparing their 
funds to the ‘market portfolio’ (the S&P 500) and using the Sharpe and Treynor ratios, 
they find no proof of superior fund performance.  
 
In a theoretical paper, Canner, Mankiw and Weil (1997) examine the theory of portfolio 
allocation. In particular they investigate the inconsistency between asset allocation 
theories and decisions. They look at the popular portfolio allocation that investors 
should vary their asset allocation decision as influenced by their attitude to risk. Popular 
practice results in the recommended ratio of bonds to stocks falling as the investor 
becomes more willing to take on risk. They then contrast this with the fund separation 
theorem, that is that all investors should hold the same composition of risky assets. The 
authors find current explanations of this puzzle unsatisfactory. They claim that despite 
the fact that various studies have shown that the CAPM does not fit the data on asset 
returns, the validity of the mutual-fund separation theorem does not depend on the 
CAPM being the right model of asset return. They do conclude however, that the failure 
to use the ‘optimal’ allocation only results in a loss of 22 basis points of return by 
comparing the means and variances of 4 professionally recommended portfolios to the 
mean-variance efficient frontier. 
 
Using pension funds instead of mutual funds and using UK data, Blake, Lehmann & 
Timmerman (1999) examine fund holdings. They essentially test for fund performance 
but also examine asset allocation dynamics, that is changing portfolio weights and 
active/passive management. They employ a simple decomposition to help identify the 
factors causing portfolio weights to change.  Their formula is: 
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where 
 
 
 is the portfolio weight of asset class j , 
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Ibbotson and Kaplan (2000) look at how much of performance is attributed to asset 
allocation policy. They look at a ten year period from 1988 to 1998 using U.S. mutual 
funds. They decompose the total return of each fund into policy return and active return. 
Policy return is the part of the total return that comes from the asset allocation policy: 
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relationship between pension fund characteristics (i.e. asset size, costs etc) and risk-
adjusted performance. They find that changes in asset allocation, market timing and 
security selection generate positive abnormal returns of 17, 27 and 45 basis points per 
year respectively.  They find that the relationship between size and cost and 
performance is not uniform and ‘depends on the asset class and investment style’. They 
also find evidence of persistence in performance.  
 
This chapter contributes to the topic of asset allocation in that it specifically looks at 
balanced funds and looks at the issue of asset class timing ability. New techniques are 
utilised to those used currently. A considerable advantage of the study is its large 
database with funds from three different markets and its recent time span. It also 
employs both returns-based timing techniques and asset-allocation data-based timing 
techniques which, as described in Jiang, Yao and Yu (2007), is a big benefit.  
 
 
5.3 Methodology 
 
In order to ascertain the balanced fund managers’ market timing ability, three 
methodologies are used.  The first two methodologies are derivatives of the conditional 
beta model derived in Ferson and Schadt (1996), and are based on fund returns. The full 
data set was used for these models as the data on the proportions of investment in each 
asset class is not needed so data continuity is not an issue. (Results were also produced 
for the subset of data for comparison purposes.) The first model tests for absolute asset 
class timing ability and is derived below. 
From CAPM:     
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where 
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where 
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Model 5: Prop Casht = α + β4( 
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countries, US, UK and Canada.  The data spans 11 years from January 2000 to 
December 2010. Monthly returns and asset allocation data on equity, bond, cash and 
‘other’ allocation are available for each fund.  This data is from Morningstar. All funds 
in the dataset are independent funds – that is, any merged, split or combined fund was 
examined to ensure no duplication of funds existed. ‘Second units’ were also removed. 
‘Second units’ are basically the same fund packaged in a different way and sold to 
different types of investors (such as retail or institutional investors) – thus it contains the 
same stocks as the independent fund and in order to ensure unbiased results, such funds 
are omitted. Fund returns used are before (gross) buying and selling expenses and after 
(net) annual management fees. Returns are pre income-tax to control for any differential 
tax treatments between the regions. Also, returns are inclusive of reinvested income. 
 
Table 5.4.1 presents the breakdown of funds per region. Some funds have limited asset 
allocation data, so funds were also separated based on data continuity. There are 355 
funds with 5 years continuous asset allocation data (January 2006-December 2010). 
Continuous data is defined in our sample as funds with 10 months or less of missing 
observations. In other words, a fund was only included in the data subset if it had 52 or 
more observations of asset allocation data. This subset was used instead of the full 
sample in the third methodology. 
 
Within each country group, funds are broken up into categories, depending on the 
composition of assets within the fund.  Table 5.4.1 presents the definitions and shows 
the number of funds in each category. It can be seen from the definitions that fund 
categories vary a lot from each other. The definitions mainly specify the proportion of 
equity and/or fixed income securities a fund has. It is also clear that the number of funds 
per category, and per country is uneven, ranging from 5 funds in the Canadian Tactical 
Balanced segment to 196 funds in the US Moderate Allocation segment.  Each fund has 
data on allocation of funds to equity, bonds, cash and ‘other’.  Table 5.4.2 shows the 
average holding of each asset class, by country. It is apparent that the average holding is 
very similar across countries for some categories, for example cash, and varies quite 
significantly for other asset classes, namely bonds. This average holding information 
was then further broken up by sectors within the countries - see Table 5.4.2. The 
benchmark indices for the timing models and Returns Based Style Analysis came from 
a number of different sources. Table 5.4.3 shows all benchmark sources. Where 
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necessary, indices were converted to the appropriate currency at the appropriate rate. All 
indices were monthly and had income reinvested (total returns) in order to match the 
actual fund returns.  
 
5.4.1 Checking the reliability of the data 
 
In order to check the reliability of the data on the proportions of investment in each 
asset class, the technique of Returns Based Style Analysis was used. As the technique is 
used to determine the ‘style’ of a fund, it is an ideal way of checking the dependability 
of the data used here. A fund’s return is regressed on 12 benchmark indices; each one 
representing an asset class - equity, bonds or cash. All coefficients are constrained to 
sum to 1 and the coefficient values represent the proportions invested in each asset 
class.  The simulated proportion as a result of the technique invested in equity, bonds 
and cash was compared to the actual proportion. This allows a comparison of the actual 
asset allocation data as supplied by the fund managers to Morningstar, with the asset 
allocation proportions generated by Sharpe’s model.  These distributions (actual 
allocations versus simulated allocations) were then tested using the Spearman rank 
correlation coefficient and Kendall’s rank correlation coefficient. Results are presented 
in Panel A of Table 5.4.4. It can be seen that the null hypothesis of no correlation is 
rejected in all cases. The correlation coefficient is especially high for equity at 0.83. The 
difference between the two distributions was graphed-see figure 5.4. It is evident that 
the difference is small. Lastly, the mean difference between the two distributions was 
tested and found not significant in all cases. Also it can be seen that the mean difference 
is less than 8% in all cases. Panel B of Table 5.4.4 presents the results. The fact that the 
actual asset allocation data as supplied by fund managers to Morningstar and the asset 
allocation proportions as generated by Sharpe’s model is evidence that the asset 
allocation data is dependable and that the Returns Based Style Analysis technique is 
reliable. 
 
5.5 Results 
 
Due to the very high volume of output generated, the chapter will present only an 
abbreviated form of results. These abbreviated set of results give a very good overall 
picture of asset class timing ability. Tables 5.5.1-5.5.3 present the results of the test for 
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absolute asset class timing ability. Tables 5.5.4-5.5.6 present the results of the test for 
relative asset class timing ability. Table 5.5.7 displays the results of the regressions 
based on the data on the proportions of investment in each asset class.  
 
5.5.1 Results based on fund returns 
 
Table 5.5.1 and Table 5.5.2 present an abbreviated set of results for methodology 1, the 
test for absolute asset class timing ability. The percentage of positive and negative 
coefficients per asset class, as well as the percentage of significant positive and negative 
coefficients is presented in Table 5.5.1. Statistics on alpha are also presented in this 
table. Examining these first, it is obvious from column 1 that US managers fare the best 
with 62% positive significant alpha (as seen in row 1) compared with 21% for UK 
managers (as seen in row 7) and 15% for Canadian managers (as seen in row 13). It is 
clear that there is little timing ability present, across all markets. Looking at equity first 
in rows 3, 9 and 15 of column 1 and 3, it can be seen that US mangers display the most 
timing ability, with 25.5% positive gamma and 1.43% positive significant gamma; that 
is 1.43% of managers are able to significantly time equities. This is compared with 
13.43% and 26.41% positive gamma for the U.K. and Canada respectively; that is 0% 
of U.K. managers and 0.43% of Canadian managers are able to significantly time 
equities. Corporate bonds can be timed by timed by 78.51% of US managers, 55.97% of 
UK managers and 43.29% of Canadian managers and significantly timed by 4.58% of 
US managers (as seen in column 1 row 4), 5.22% of UK managers (as seen in column 1 
row 10) and 3.46% of Canadian managers (as seen in column 1 row 16). 24.07% of U.S. 
managers are able to time government bonds as opposed to 11.19% for the UK and 
55.84% for Canada and 0.86% of U.S. managers are able to significantly time 
government bonds as opposed to 0% for the UK and 2.6% for Canada, as seen in 
column 1 rows 5, 11 and 17. US managers timing cash (column 1, row 6) present the 
most ability of any asset class and all markets, with 7.74% significant timing ability. 
UK and Canadian managers have less timing skill with 1.49% and 4.33% respectively 
(column 1 rows 12 and 18).  
 
Table 5.5.1 also presents results broken down by category. It is clear that, regardless of 
country or segment, very few fund managers are able to time the equity class. The best 
performing managers are in the Aggressive Allocation segment in the US, with 2% 
91 
 
showing statistically significant ability to time equity (column 4 row 3). Bond timing 
results vary quite substantially, with managers displaying more skill in timing corporate 
bonds as opposed to government bonds. The best performing managers are again in the 
US in the Conservative Allocation sector, with 13.5% of managers able to time 
corporate bonds (column 2 row 4). Results for timing cash are stable within countries, 
regardless of category. Overall, there is a relatively small amount of balanced fund 
managers displaying asset class timing ability.  
 
Although the definitions of the categories are not identical, an effort was made to 
compare conservative versus aggressive managers across all markets. Conservative 
Allocation fund managers in the US can be compared to Cautious managed fund 
managers in the UK and Income Balanced fund managers in Canada, and Aggressive 
Allocation fund managers in the US can be compared to Active managed fund  
managers in the UK and Equity Balanced fund managers in Canada.  It is impossible to 
claim that any set of managers are better at timing, as seen by the fact that results differ 
depending on market. In the US, conservative managers beat aggressive managers in 
three out of the 4 asset classes. In the UK, aggressive managers beat or draw with 
conservative managers in all categories. Finally, in Canada, aggressive managers beat 
conservative managers in three out of 4 assets classes.  
Table 5.5.2 shows the timing ability for all asset classes, in other words, it presents a 
more general view of timing ability, for all asset classes together. Results are presented 
for positive coefficients and significantly positive coefficients, including and excluding 
cash. Results are quite consistent across markets. No, or very few, managers are able to 
significantly time all, 3 out of 4, or 2 out of 4 asset classes, including cash. 13.47% of 
US managers are able to time 1 out of the 4 asset classes, compared to 6.72% of UK 
managers and 9.09% of Canadian managers. Over 85% of managers cannot time any of 
the classes, with UK managers displaying the least skill, at 93.28% of managers able to 
time nothing.  Results are very similar when cash is excluded. This would suggest that 
market timing ability is limited in nature to a single asset classes, and skill at timing one 
asset class does not translate to other asset classes. 
 
Results of methodology 2 to test for relative asset class timing ability are presented in 
Table 5.5.3 and Table 5.5.4.  Results are presented for positive and negative coefficients 
and significantly positive and negative coefficients, including and excluding cash in 
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Table 5.5.3. Statistics on alpha are also presented. Examining these first, US managers 
perform the best with 48% positive significant alpha compared with 10% for UK 
managers and 6% for Canadian managers (column 1 rows 1, 6 and 11).   In this model, 
negative timing coefficients can also be interpreted. The percentage positive coefficient 
tells the proportion of managers that were able to time one particular asset class in 
relation to a second whereas the percentage negative coefficient tells the proportion of 
managers that were able to time the second asset class relative to the first. Thus, total 
significant coefficients are also displayed. Results vary hugely across asset classes and 
market. Some of the notable findings include: 
• 52.81% of Canadian managers are able to significantly time corporate bonds to 
government bonds compared to only 3.44% for US managers and 11.94% for 
UK managers (column 5 rows 11, 1 and 6) 
• 28.37% of US managers display significantly timing ability in corporate bonds 
to equity (column 3 row 2) 
• 0% of UK fund managers are able to time government bonds relative to 
corporate bonds compared to 13.47% for US managers and 1.73% for Canadian 
managers (column 5 rows 7, 2 and 12) 
• Cash relative to equity is the most poorly timed category with only 3.76% of all 
managers able to time it (column 6 rows 2, 7 and 12) 
• Corporate bonds relative to government bonds is the best timed category with 
68.19% of all managers able to time it (column 5 rows 1, 6 and 11) 
Again, in order to display a more general view of timing ability, for all asset classes 
together Table 5.5.4 presents the total number of asset class ratios timed. Results are 
presented for positive and negative coefficients and significantly positive and negative 
coefficients, including and excluding cash. Results are quite consistent across markets. 
No or very few managers are able to significantly time all or 5 out of 6 asset class ratios 
including cash. Less than 10% of managers in any market are able to time 4 out of 6 or 
3 out of 6 asset class ratios. Between 17% and 41% of managers are able to time 2 out 
of 6 or 1 out of 6 asset class ratios. 43.28% of UK managers are able to time none of the 
asset class ratios, compared to 33.81% of US managers and 25.11% of Canadian 
managers. Results are very similar when cash is excluded.  
 
5.5.2 Results based on ‘asset allocation’ data 
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Results of the regressions based on the data on the proportions of investment in each 
asset class for testing for timing ability are presented in Table 5.5.5. As discussed in the 
data and methodology sections, a subset of the data was used here as asset allocation 
data was used and continuous data was not available for the full sample. The figures 
presented in the table are the percentage significant positive coefficients of the return 
variable. The results of this model present a more positive picture of timing ability. 
Managers are best able to time cash with 29.6% positive significant return coefficient 
(column 5 row 1) as opposed to 13% for the next highest asset class. Looking at 
individual markets, US and Canadian managers have 34% significant positive return 
coefficient compared to only 3.6% of UK managers (column 5, rows 2, 4 and 3 
respectively). This finding is not surprising as cash would be considered easiest to time 
or forecast because of short term interest rates are easiest to predict.  
 
Examining equity, 21.79% of Canadian managers are able to time this asset class 
compared to 6.29% for US managers and 5.36% for UK managers (column 1, rows 4, 2 
and 3 respectively). Looking at the robustness model, using excess return as opposed to 
return made very little difference to results.  Conversely, Canadian managers are least 
able to time equity relative to corporate bonds or government bonds compared to US 
and UK managers. Lastly, results of model 7 (testing for bond timing ability), shows 
that results vary a lot by market and by bond category. UK managers timing 
government bonds display the most ability-16.07% of managers showing skill (column 
4, row 3). These results show that there is no consistent evidence that one market as a 
whole is easier to predict than another, thus the markets are equally efficient.  
 
Tables 5.5.6 and 5.5.7 present results of technique 1 (returns-based measure), but using 
the smaller subset of data, for comparison purposes with technique 2 (asset allocation 
data-based measure). Comparing the two methods it is apparent that there is more 
timing ability found using technique 2. Taking US managers ability to time equity as an 
example, it is apparent that 0.7% of US managers are able to significantly time equities 
using technique 1 as opposed to 6.3% using technique 2. Results are similar for other 
assets and markets.  This is consistent with Jiang, Yao and Yu (2007) who found more 
timing ability in the market when using holdings-based measures of return.  
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5.6 Conclusions 
 
Using three different models and three different markets, performance is assessed in 
terms of alpha and market timing ability. Looking at alpha, it is suggested that US 
managers fare the best with considerably more positive significant alpha compared to 
UK managers and Canadian managers for both the absolute and relative timing ability 
models. It is clear that there is little timing ability present, across all markets and 
models. US managers timing cash present the most ability of any asset class and all 
markets, with 7.74% ability. Results vary hugely across asset classes and market when 
relative market timing was examined for. Taking a broader view, no or very few 
managers are able to significantly time all, 3 out of 4, or 2 out of 4 asset classes, 
including cash. This would suggest that market timing ability is limited in nature to 
single asset classes-skill at timing one asset class does not translate to other asset 
classes. Results are similar when relative market timing was examined for. Tests were 
also performed to compare the different categories of fund managers within each 
market.  It is impossible to definitively claim that either aggressive or conservative fund 
managers are better at timing-results differ depending on market.  
 
The results of the regression model for timing ability present a more positive picture of 
timing ability. Managers are best able to time cash with 29.6% positive significant 
return coefficient as opposed to 13% for the next highest asset class. Comparing the 
results of technique 1 (returns-based measure) and technique 2 (asset allocation data-
based measure), it is apparent that there is a lot more timing ability found using 
technique 2. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusions 
 
This study evaluates the performance of mutual funds from a number of different 
angles. The locational angle is first examined. Using a dataset of over 4500 U.S. and 
European equity funds for the period January 1970 to June 2010, chapter 3 examines 
whether a fund’s location influences the return it generates. It also looks at comparing 
returns generated from investing in different markets. Results found when examining 
performance based on management location are consistent with the location hypothesis 
for the U.S. market, that is, that local managers may benefit from informational 
advantages compared to foreign managers of the same set of securities. However, the 
results with regard to the management of European equities indicate, at least tentatively 
that the source of out-performance may not be due to the exploitation of local 
information by local managers, but instead that, on average, US-based managers are 
better than managers based in Europe.  Similarly, results reinforce the case for European 
fund management companies to establish offices in the US. It was found that market 
timing and persistence exists in both markets, with local funds displaying the most. It is 
observed that when a fund’s exposure to variations in returns of major asset classes has 
been accounted for (i.e. style), there is little significant positive performance. It can be 
seen that a fund’s style is very consistent across markets, with equities forming the bulk 
of investment in all segments-above 90%.  
 
Chapter 4 looks at family status and its implications. Funds were examined for 
persistence based on family status, family size and market using the recursive portfolio 
technique and Rhode’s utility based measure. It is suggested that family status, family 
size or market does not affect persistence in performance and the initial hypothesis that 
funds within a family are more likely to have persistent performance than those not in 
families has not been proven. To examine risk strategy within families, the Risk 
Adjustment Ratio was used along with a Risk Adjustment Strategy model. The finding 
of a RAR greater than 1 for all families can be interpreted as an increase in risk for the 
second part of the year. The influence of family rank in the Risk Adjustment Strategy 
model is negative and significant at all levels, which indicates that family rank has an 
impact on the risk adjustment behaviour of fund managers. The fact that the coefficient 
is negative suggests that managers are not behaving strategically. When markets are 
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examined individually, fund managers within managers compete in the U.S. and behave 
strategically in Europe. The coefficient on the size variable is significant but tiny, 
suggesting that family size has little impact on risk adjustment strategy. 
 
Looking at strategic asset allocation, Chapter 5 assesses balanced fund performance 
based   on three different models and three different markets. Performance is assessed 
both in terms of alpha and market timing ability. It is apparent that US managers fare 
best with considerably more positive significant alpha compared to UK managers and 
Canadian managers for both the absolute and relative timing ability models. There is 
little evidence in support of timing ability present, across all markets and models. Tests 
were also performed to compare the different categories of fund managers within each 
market but is impossible to definitively claim that either aggressive or conservative fund 
managers are better at timing-results differ depending on market. The results of the 
regression model for timing ability present a more positive picture of timing ability.  
 
Implications of the findings can be looked at from three different perspectives. From an 
investor point of view, it is suggested that a U.S. based fund might be a better choice 
regardless of the equities they want to invest in. In terms of persistence in performance 
there is no advantage to an investor to invest within a family of funds rather than a 
stand-alone fund. Results of the timing ability of balanced fund managers are 
disappointing and would fail to convince an investor that balanced funds are being 
actively managed correctly. From the fund manager point of view, lack of evidence 
supporting managerial skill and ability would raise the question whether fund managers 
deserve the fees they charge.  
 
For fund management companies, the locational results also imply that management 
offices should be set up in the U.S.  That fact that fund managers within a family were 
found to compete for resources could have negative implications for the family. It 
means that managers are increasing risk to improve their performance in the hope of 
being allocated the best resources. Also as Kempf and Ruenzi (2008) discuss, 
‘tournament behaviour of fund managers leads to suboptimal portfolios’.  
 
From a policy point of view, the results on performance of managed funds are mixed. 
The evidence here would suggest that large scale investment in the majority of actively 
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managed funds would be a misallocation of resources relative to passively managed 
funds.  
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 3.4.1 - Summary of the comparisons analysed 
This table summarises the management location and market comparisons performed, including details of currency and benchmark factors. US/US 
are U.S. mutual funds investing in U.S. equities, US/EU are U.S. mutual funds investing in European equities, EU/EU are European mutual funds 
investing in European equities, and EU/US are European mutual funds investing in U.S. equities.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Management 
Location of Fund 
Market 
Invested 
 
 
Management 
Location of Fund 
Market 
Invested 
Currency Benchmark 
Factors 
(Currency) 
Management 
Location 
comparison 
 US/US v. 
EU/US, usd 
United States US equity  
V.  
Europe US equity USD US factors, in USD 
  EU/EU v. 
US/EU, eur 
Europe European 
equity 
 
V.  
United States European 
equity 
Euro European factors, 
in Euro 
Market Comparison  US/US v. 
US/EU, usd 
United States US equity  
V.  
United States European 
equity 
USD US factors, in USD 
  EU/EU v. 
EU/US, eur 
Europe European 
equity 
 
V.  
Europe US equity Euro European factors, 
in Euro 
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Table 3.4.2 - Sources of Indices-Performance Models 
This table shows the source of the benchmark indices for the performance model. 
Factor United States Europe 
Risk-free rate Kenneth French FT/ICAP 
Return on market Kenneth French MSCI 
Value Kenneth French MSCI 
Growth Kenneth French MSCI 
Large Cap Kenneth French MSCI 
Small Cap Kenneth French Datastream 
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Table 3.4.3 - Sources of Indices-Returns Based Style Analysis  
This table shows the source of the benchmark indices for returns based style analysis. 
Factor United States Europe 
Bills Kenneth French FT/ICAP 
Intermediate-term 
Gov Bonds 
Barclays Datastream 
Long-term Gov 
bonds 
Barclays Bank of America, 
Merrill Lynch 
Corporate bonds Barclays Salomon Brothers 
CGBI 
Mortgage Related 
Securities 
FTSE N/A 
Large Cap Value 
stocks 
Dow Jones 
Wilshire 
MSCI 
Large Cap Growth 
stocks 
Dow Jones 
Wilshire 
MSCI 
Medium Cap stocks Dow Jones 
Wilshire 
MSCI 
Small Cap stocks S&P Datstream 
Non-US/EU bonds Salomon Brothers 
CGBI 
Bank of America, 
Merrill Lynch 
European/US 
stocks 
MSCI MSCI 
Japanese stocks MSCI MSCI 
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Table 3.4.4 - Number of funds by subset 
This table provides summary statistics of the funds returns.  The sample period ranges 
from January 1970 to June 2010.  The number of funds by subset is presented. 
Location of Fund Market 
Invested  
Number 
of Funds 
US Funds US Equities 2265 
European Funds US Equities 685 
European Funds  European 
Equities 
1567 
US Funds European 
Equities 
28 
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Table 3.4.5 - Breakdown of Number of Funds over time 
This table presents a breakdown of fund numbers over time (minimum of 36 
observations required for fund to be included). US/US are U.S. mutual funds 
investing in U.S. equities, US/EU are U.S. mutual funds investing in European 
equities, EU/EU are European mutual funds investing in European equities, and 
EU/US are European mutual funds investing in U.S. equities.  
 
 
 Jan 70: 
Dec 79 
Jan 80: 
Dec 89 
Jan 90: 
Dec 99 
Jan 00: 
Dec 07 
US/US 160 266 870 2061 
EU/US 0 45 161 582 
EU/EU 0 0 362 1324 
US/EU 0 0 13 27 
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Table 3.5.1 - Regression Analysis Results for Different Categories 
This table reports the average statistics of the regression results for the different funds organised by different categories.  US/US are U.S. mutual funds investing in U.S. 
equities, US/EU are U.S. mutual funds investing in European equities, EU/EU are European mutual funds investing in European equities, and EU/US are European mutual 
funds investing in U.S. equities. Panel A reports the results from a one factor CAPM model, whereas Panel B reports the results for the Fama-French 3 factor model.  The whole 
sample period is from January 1970 to June 2010 and only funds with at least 36 monthly observations are included.   
 
 Management Location comparison Market Comparison 
 US/US v. EU/US, usd EU/EU v. US/EU, eur US/US v. US/EU, usd EU/EU v. EU/US, eur 
 US/US EU/US EU/EU US/EU US/US US/EU EU/EU EU/US 
Management 
Location of 
Fund 
US Europe Europe US US US Europe Europe 
Market 
Invested 
US US Europe Europe US Europe Europe US 
Number of 
funds 
2106 599 1324 27 2106 27 1324 599 
Currency USD USD EUR EUR USD USD EUR EUR 
Benchmark 
Factors 
(Currency) 
US factors 
(USD) 
US factors 
(USD) 
European 
factors (Euro) 
European 
factors (Euro) 
US factors 
(USD) 
US factors 
(USD) 
European 
factors (Euro) 
European 
factors (Euro) 
Panel A : CAPM Model 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1   Mean (α), 
     Mean (tα) 
0.059 
(1.03) 
-0.182 
(1.62) 
-0.070 
(1.27) 
0.302 
(1.28) 
0.059 
(1.03) 
0.336 
(0.957) 
-0.070 
(1.27) 
-0.192 
(1.012) 
2   Mean (β1),   
     Mean (tβ1) 
0.999   
 (26.10) 
0.949   
 (23.43) 
0.974   
 (23.86) 
1.085 
  (29.01) 
0.999   
 (26.10) 
1.076 
(13.938) 
0.974    
(23.86) 
0.818 
(13.530) 
3   Positive 6.9%   (145) 1.3%   (7) 2.7%   (38) 18.5%   (6) 6.9%   (145) 18.5% (6) 2.7%   (38) 1% (6 ) 
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significant 
alpha funds  
4   Negative 
significant 
alpha funds 
6.1%   (129) 32.7%   (142) 17.7   (230) 14.8%   (4) 6.1%   (129) 14.8% (4) 17.7   (230) 10.5% (63) 
Panel B : FF-3 factor model 
 
5   Mean (α),     
     Mean (tα) 
-0.002  
(1.12) 
-0.167 
   (1.59) 
-0.122   
(1.302) 
0.227   
 (1.04) 
-0.002   
 (1.12) 
0.288 
(0.998) 
-0.122   
(1.302) 
-0.195 
(1.039) 
6   Mean (β1),  
     Mean (tβ1) 
0.981    
(27.27) 
0.957   
 (24.39) 
0.983   
(22.965) 
1.137   
(28.191) 
0.981   
 (27.27) 
1.114 
(14.674) 
0.983   
(22.965) 
0.837 
(11.788) 
7   Mean (β2),  
     Mean (tβ2) 
0.164   
 (2.92) 
0.008   
 (2.00) 
0.272    
(2.712) 
0.646   
 (3.155) 
0.164   
 (2.92) 
-0.055 
(1.019) 
0.272  
  (2.712) 
0.018 
(0.983) 
8   Mean (β3),  
     Mean (tβ3) 
0.048  
  (3.51) 
-0.052 
   (1.90) 
0.006  
  (1.521) 
-0.089  
 (1.982) 
0.048  
  (3.51) 
0.132 
(2.257) 
0.006 
   (1.521) 
-0.089 
(1.144) 
9   Positive 
significant 
alpha funds 
5%   (106) 1.5%   (9) 1.1%   (14) 18.5%   (5) 5%   (106) 14.8%(4) 1.1%   (14) 1.3%(8) 
10  Negative 
significant 
alpha funds 
11.3%   (239) 31.1%   (186) 20%   (265) 14.8%   (4) 11.3%   (239) 14.8%(4) 20%   (265) 11.9%(71) 
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Table 3.5.2 - Regression Analysis Results by decade 
This table reports the average statistics of the regression results for the different funds organised by 
different categories, by decade. To examine whether results are robust for sub-periods within the sample, 
the data was split up by decade; Jan 1970-Dec 1979, Jan 1980-Dec 1989, Jan 1990-Dec 1999, Jan 2000-
Dec 2009. Not all groups of data had funds in every sub-section. US/US stands for U.S. managed funds 
investing in U.S. equity, EU/US stands for European managed funds investing in U.S. equity,  EU/EU 
stands for European managed funds investing in European equity and US/EU stands for U.S. managed 
funds investing in European equity.  
Panel A : Management Location comparison - US/US v. EU/US 
 US/US v. EU/US, usd 
, 1980s 
US/US v. EU/US, usd 
, 1990s 
US/US v. EU/US, 
usd , 2000s 
 US/US EU/US US/US EU/US US/US EU/US 
Management 
Location of 
Fund 
US Europe Europe US US US 
Market 
Invested 
US US US US US US 
Number of 
funds 
266 45 870 161 2061 582 
Currency USD USD USD USD USD USD 
Benchmark 
Factors 
(Currency) 
US factors 
(USD) 
US 
factors 
(USD) 
US 
factors 
(USD) 
US 
factors 
(USD) 
US 
factors 
(USD) 
US 
factors 
(USD) 
Mean (α), 
Mean (tα) 
0.008 
(1.099) 
-0.174 
(1.007) 
-0.081 
(0.952) 
0.043 
(0.932) 
0.099 
(1.225) 
-0.163 
(1.643) 
Mean (β1), 
Mean (tβ1) 
0.949 
(22.322) 
0.930 
(11.603) 
0.995 
(19.245) 
0.818 
(12.740) 
0.998 
(22.184) 
0.954 
(22.175) 
Positive 
significant 
alpha funds 
9%   (24) 8.9%   (4) 2.1%   (18) 6.8%   (11) 13.8%   
(285) 
2.4% (14) 
Negative 
significant 
alpha funds 
4.9%   (13) 15.6%   (7) 5.5%   (48) 5.6%   (9) 6.5%   
(133) 
33.2%(193) 
 
Panel b : Management Location comparison - EU/EU v. US/EU 
 
 EU/EU v. US/EU, eur 
, 1990s 
EU/EU v. US/EU, 
eur , 2000s 
 EU/EU US/EU EU/EU US/EU 
Management 
Location of 
Fund 
Europe US Europe US 
Market 
Invested 
Europe Europe Europe Europe 
Number of 
funds 
362 13 1324 27 
Currency EUR EUR EUR EUR 
Benchmark 
Factors 
(Currency) 
European  
factors 
(Euro) 
European 
factors 
(Euro) 
European 
factors 
(Euro) 
European 
factors 
(Euro) 
Mean (α), -0.130 -0.423 -0.056 0.298 
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Mean (tα) (1.012) (0.744) (1.291) (1.555) 
Mean (β1), 
Mean (tβ1) 
0.912 
(15.318) 
1.185 
(28.927) 
0.987 
(23.523) 
1.044 
(25.912) 
Positive 
significant 
alpha funds 
2.8%   (10) 30.8%   (4) 3.8%   (50) 25.9%   (7) 
Negative 
significant 
alpha funds 
9.4%   (34) 30.8%   (4) 17.4% 
(230) 
22.2%   (6) 
 
Panel c : Market comparison - US/US v. US/EU 
 US/US v. US/EU, usd 
, 1990s 
US/US v. US/EU, usd 
, 2000s 
 US/US US/EU US/US US/EU 
Management 
Location of 
Fund 
US US US US 
Market 
Invested 
US Europe US Europe 
Number of 
funds 
870 13 2061 27 
Currency USD USD USD USD 
Benchmark 
Factors 
(Currency) 
US factors 
 (USD) 
US 
factors 
(USD) 
US 
factors 
(USD) 
US 
factors 
(USD) 
Mean (α), 
Mean (tα) 
-0.081 
(0.952) 
-0.163 
(0.733) 
0.099 
(1.225) 
0.397 
(1.159) 
Mean (β1), 
Mean (tβ1) 
0.995 
(19.245) 
0.906 
(7.099) 
0.998 
(22.184) 
1.099 
(14.189) 
Positive 
significant 
alpha funds 
2.1%   (18) 30.8%   (4) 13.8%   
(285) 
29.6%   (8) 
Negative 
significant 
alpha funds 
5.5%   (48) 30.8%   (4) 6.5%   
(133) 
14.8%   (4) 
 
Panel d : Market comparison - EU/EU v. EU/US 
 EU/EU v. EU/US, 
eur, 1990s 
EU/EU v. EU/US, 
eur, 2000s 
 EU/EU EU/US EU/EU EU/US 
Management 
Location of 
Fund 
Europe Europe Europe Europe 
Market 
Invested 
Europe US Europe US 
Number of 
funds 
362 94 1324 259 
Currency EUR EUR EUR EUR 
Benchmark 
Factors 
(Currency) 
European 
 factors 
(Euro) 
European 
factors 
(Euro) 
European 
factors 
(Euro) 
European 
factors 
(Euro) 
Mean (α), -0.130 -0.073 -0.056 -0.338 
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Mean (tα) (1.012) (0.724) (1.291) (1.297) 
Mean (β1), 
Mean (tβ1) 
0.912 
(15.318) 
0.495 
(6.232) 
0.987 
(23.523) 
0.786 
(12.650) 
Positive 
significant 
alpha funds 
2.8%   (10) 5.3%   (5) 3.8%   (50) 1.5%   (4) 
Negative 
significant 
alpha funds 
9.4%   (34) 4.3%   (4) 17.4%   
(230) 
18.1%   
(47) 
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Table 3.5.3 - Market Timing Results 
This table reports the average statistics of the regression results for the market timing tests.  US/US stands for U.S. managed funds investing in U.S. 
equity, EU/US stands for European managed funds investing in U.S. equity, EU/EU stands for European managed funds investing in European equity 
and US/EU stands for U.S. managed funds investing in European equity. Panel A reports the results of the Treynor-Mazuy model, whereas Panel B 
reports the results for the modified Treynor-Mazuy model, the Fama-French 3 factor model with the addition of the market timing coefficient. The 
whole sample period is from January 1970 to June 2010 and only funds with at least 36 monthly observations are included.  ‘Gamma’ in the table is 
the marketing timing coefficient.  
 
 Management Location comparison Market Comparison 
 US/US v. EU/US, usd EU/EU v. US/EU, eur US/US v. US/EU, usd EU/EU v. EU/US, eur 
 US/US EU/US EU/EU US/EU US/US US/EU EU/EU EU/US 
Management 
Location of 
Fund 
US Europe Europe US US US Europe Europe 
Market 
Invested 
US US Europe Europe US Europe Europe US 
Number of 
funds 
2106 599 1324 27 2106 27 1324 599 
Currency USD USD EUR EUR USD USD EUR EUR 
Benchmark 
Factors 
(Currency) 
US factors 
(USD) 
US factors 
(USD) 
European 
factors 
(Euro) 
European 
factors 
(Euro) 
US factors 
(USD) 
US factors 
(USD) 
European 
factors 
(Euro) 
European 
factors 
(Euro) 
 
Panel A : Treynor and Mazuy 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1      Mean (α), 
  Mean (tα) 
0.051 
(1.183) 
-0.206 
(1.539) 
0.062 
(1.181) 
0.338 
(1.370) 
0.051 
 (1.183) 
0.418 
(0.930) 
0.062 
(1.181) 
-0.088 
(0.867) 
 2    Mean (β1), 
 Mean (tβ1) 
1.000 
(26.355) 
0.949 
(23.658) 
0.964 
(24.314) 
1.083 
(27.976) 
1.000 
(26.355) 
1.077 
(13.965) 
0.964 
(24.314) 
0.810 
(13.689) 
3   Mean Gamma, -0.133 0.362 -0.005 -0.001 -0.133 -0.864 -0.005 -0.004 
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  Mean t(Gamma) (1.037) (0.879) (1.224) (0.625) (1.037) (0.523) (1.224) (0.955) 
4      Positive                        
significant alpha    
funds 
6.3% (133) 
 
1.5% (9) 8.4% (111) 18.5%   (5) 6.3% (133) 
 
21.4% (6) 8.4% (111) 1.7% (10) 
5      Negative                        
significant alpha    
funds 
10.8% (228) 
 
28.4% (170) 9.1% (121) 14.8%   (4) 10.8% 
(228) 
 
14.8%   ( 4) 9.1% (121) 3.8% (23) 
6      Positive                        
significant gamma 
funds 
6.8% (145) 
 
5.0% (30) 
 
1.7% (23) 
 
0% 
 
6.8% (145) 
 
0% 
 
1.7% (23) 
 
0.3%(2) 
 
 
Panel B : FF-3 factor model + MT 
 
7     Mean (α),  
Mean (tα) 
-0.093 
(1.066) 
 
-0.193 
(1.312) 
0.011 
(1.071) 
0.167 
(1.006) 
-0.093 
(1.066) 
 
0.443 
(0.908) 
0.011 
(1.071) 
-0.098 
(0.956) 
8     Mean (β1),  
      Mean (tβ1) 
0.980 
(27.260) 
0.957 
(24.380) 
0.964 
(21.947) 
1.142 
(27.654) 
0.980 
(27.260) 
1.118 
(14.772) 
0.964 
(21.947) 
0.825937 
(11.147) 
9     Mean (β2),  
      Mean (tβ2) 
0.168 
(2.882) 
0.010042 
(1.976) 
0.261 
(2.736) 
0.664 
(3.179) 
0.168 
(2.882) 
-0.068 
(1.007) 
0.261 
(2.736) 
0.005 
(1.030) 
10     Mean (β3),  
      Mean (tβ3) 
0.047 
(3.521) 
-0.052 
(1.908) 
0.038 
(1.604) 
-0.082 
(2.014) 
0.047 
(3.521) 
0.130 
(2.258) 
0.038 
(1.604) 
-0.078 
(1.151) 
11 Mean Gamma, 
Mean t(Gamma) 
0.977 
(0.967) 
0.284 
(0.763) 
-0.005 
(1.221) 
0.003 
(0.693) 
0.977 
(0.967) 
-2.184 
(0.545) 
-0.005 
(1.222) 
-0.004 
(0.960) 
12      Positive                        
significant alpha    
funds 
1.5%  (31) 1% (5) 3.6% (48) 18.5%   (5) 1.5% (31) 14.8%   (4) 3.6% (48) 3% (18) 
13      Negative                        
significant alpha    
funds 
12.7% (268) 20.9% (125) 10.1% (134) 14.8%   (4) 12.7% (268) 14.8%   (4) 10.1%(134) 5.5% (33) 
14      Positive                        
significant gamma 
funds 
7.9% (167) 
 
3.2% (19) 
 
1.7% (22) 
 
0% 
 
7.9% (167) 
 
0% 
 
1.7% (22) 
 
1%(4) 
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Table 3.5.4 - Differences in Mean Alphas and Distributions 
This table reports test statistics of differences between the mean alphas and differences in the distributions.  Testing differences in the alpha 
distributions has been performed using the Kolmogorov-Smirmov test. US/US stands for U.S. managed funds investing in U.S. equity, EU/US stands 
for European managed funds investing in U.S. equity,  EU/EU stands for European managed funds investing in European equity and US/EU stands for 
U.S. managed funds investing in European equity. 
 
 
 
     Difference in 
Mean Alpha 
 Differences in 
Distribution 
 
 Alpha 1 Alpha 2 Currency Factors Mean (α1) – 
Mean (α2) 
p-value of test  
H0 :  
Mean (α1)-
Mean (α2) = 
0 
KS Statistic p-value 
 Panel A : CAPM Model 
Management 
Location 
comparison 
US/US EU/US USD US, in USD 0.241 
 
0.002 
 
0.440 0.000 
EU/EU US/EU EUR EUR, in Euro -0.381 
 
0.002 
 
0.538 0.000 
Market 
Comparison 
US/US US/EU USD US, in USD -0.277 
 
0.004 
 
0.269 0.002 
EU/EU EU/US EUR EUR, in Euro 0.122 
 
0.002 
 
0.485 0.000 
                               Panel B : FF-3 factor model 
Management 
Location 
comparison 
US/US EU/US USD US, in USD 0.165 
 
0.002 
 
0.373 0.000 
EU/EU US/EU EUR EUR, in Euro -0.349 
 
0.002 
 
0.532 0.000 
Market 
comparison 
US/US US/EU USD US, in USD -0.290 
 
0.004 
 
0.515 0.000 
EU/EU EU/US EUR EUR, in Euro 0.073 0.002 
 
0.444 0.000 
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Table 3.5.5 - Differences in Mean Alphas and Distributions-Market Timing tests 
This table reports test statistics of differences between the mean gammas and differences in the distributions.  Testing differences in the gamma 
distributions has been performed using the Kolmogorov-Smirmov test. US/US stands for U.S. managed funds investing in U.S. equity, EU/US stands 
for European managed funds investing in U.S. equity,  EU/EU stands for European managed funds investing in European equity and US/EU stands for 
U.S. managed funds investing in European equity. 
 
     Difference in 
Mean Gamma 
 Differences in 
Distribution 
 
 Alpha 1 Alpha 2 Currency Factors Mean(γ1) – 
Mean(γ2) 
p-value of test  
H0 : 
Mean(γ1)-
Mean(γ2) = 0 
KS Statistic p-value 
 Panel A : CAPM Model+MT 
Management 
Location 
comparison 
US/US EU/US USD US, in USD -0.495 0.002 
 
0.364 0.000 
EU/EU US/EU EUR EUR, in Euro -0.004 0.002 
 
0.426 0.000 
Market 
Comparison 
US/US US/EU USD US, in USD 0.731 0.002 
 
0.226 0.002 
EU/EU EU/US EUR EUR, in Euro -0.001 0.002 
 
0.582 0.000 
                                         Panel B : FF-3 factor model+MT 
Management 
Location 
comparison 
US/US EU/US USD US, in USD 0.693 0.002 0.261 0.008 
EU/EU US/EU EUR EUR, in Euro -0.007 0.043 0.191 0.000 
Market 
comparison 
US/US US/EU USD US, in USD 3.1607 0.002 0.318 0.009 
EU/EU EU/US EUR EUR, in Euro -0.00119 0.002 0.3663 0.000 
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Table 3.5.6 - Persistence 
This table reports the results of the persistence test using the recursive portfolio technique. Decile portfolios were formed on alphas for 12 month formation and 4 month holding 
periods. The t-statistics shown are the t-statistics of the procedure sorted on alphas. If the alphas for the deciles are significant, it is evidence of persistence. US/US stands for U.S. 
managed funds investing in U.S. equity, EU/US stands for European managed funds investing in U.S. equity,  EU/EU stands for European managed funds investing in European 
equity and US/EU stands for U.S. managed funds investing in European equity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 Management Location comparison Market Comparison 
 US/US v. EU/US, usd EU/EU v. US/EU, eur US/US v. US/EU, usd EU/EU v. EU/US, eur 
 US/US EU/US EU/EU US/EU US/US US/EU EU/EU EU/US 
Manageme
nt Location 
of Fund 
US Europe Europe US US US Europe Europe 
Market 
Invested 
US US Europe Europe US Europe Europe US 
Number of 
funds 
2106 599 1324 27 2106 27 1324 599 
Currency USD USD EUR EUR USD USD EUR EUR 
Benchmark 
Factors 
(Currency) 
US factors 
(USD) 
US factors 
(USD) 
European 
factors 
(Euro) 
European 
factors (Euro) 
US factors 
(USD) 
US factors 
(USD) 
European 
factors (Euro) 
European 
factors 
(Euro) 
 Alpha T-stat Alpha T-stat Alpha T-stat Alpha T-
stat 
Alpha T-
stat 
Alpha T-stat Alph
a 
T-stat Alph
a 
T-stat 
Decile 1 0.313 2.93 0.086 0.705 0.088 0.455 0.459 1.198 0.313 2.93 0.441 1.012 0.088 0.455 0.242 1.007 
Decile 2 0.205 2.807 0.027 0.275 -0.066 -0.581 0.536 2.353 0.205 2.807 0.404 1.394 -0.066 -0.581 0.101 0.487 
Decile 3 0.124 2.26 -0.115 -1.238 -0.073 -0.727 0.158 1.296 0.124 2.26 0.323 1.607 -0.073 -0.727 -0.037 -0.178 
Decile 4 0.145 3.208 -0.101 -1.217 -0.108 -1.233 0.074 0.547 0.145 3.208 0.143 0.733 -0.108 -1.233 -0.077 -0.356 
Decile 5 0.065 1.678 -0.226 -2.736 -0.189 -2.078 -0.068 -0.78 0.065 1.678 0.078 0.373 -0.189 -2.078 -0.099 -0.451 
Decile 6 0.02 0.451 -0.287 -4.075 -0.179 -2.074 0.086 1.008 0.02 0.451 0.036 0.185 -0.179 -2.074 -0.131 -0.596 
Decile 7 0.022 0.517 -0.184 -2.201 -0.222 -2.764 -0.025 -0.33 0.022 0.517 -0.012 -0.064 -0.222 -2.764 -0.145 -0.670 
Decile 8 -0.033 -0.704 -0.3 -3.529 -0.211 -2.408 0.055 0.473 -0.033 -0.704 -0.082 -0.400 -0.211 -2.408 -0.223 -1.002 
Decile 9 -0.068 -1.058 -0.302 -3.465 -0.249 -2.501 -0.208 -0.77 -0.068 -1.058 -0.197 -0.756 -0.249 -2.501 -0.175 -0.790 
Decile 10 -0.173 -1.912 -0.403 -4.181 -0.324 -2.508 -0.178 -0.53 -0.173 -1.91 -0.312 -0.822 -0.324 -2.508 -0.230 -1.005 
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Table 3.5.7 - Style Analysis 
This table reports the average statistics of the regression results examining performance after adjusting for the funds’ style. Panel A reports the results 
of alpha.  Twelve different ‘asset classes’ are considered and benchmark indices are used as a proxy. The table also show results when the style of 
each fund was examined. Panel B shows the average beta per factor, which represents the proportion of a fund invested in each asset class. US/US 
stands for U.S. managed funds investing in U.S. equity, EU/US stands for European managed funds investing in U.S. equity,  EU/EU stands for 
European managed funds investing in European equity and US/EU stands for U.S. managed funds investing in European equity. 
 
 Management Location comparison 
 US/US v. EU/US, usd EU/EU v. US/EU, eur 
 US/US EU/US EU/EU US/EU 
Management 
Location of Fund 
US Europe Europe US 
Market Invested US US Europe Europe 
Number of funds 2106 599 1324 27 
Currency USD USD EUR EUR 
Benchmark 
Factors (Currency) 
US factors 
(USD) 
US factors 
 (USD) 
European 
factors (Euro) 
European 
factors (Euro) 
Panel A-Alphas 
       Mean (α),  
Mean (tα) 
-0.179 
(1.004) 
-0.349 
(1.366) 
-0.288 
(0.878) 
0.085 
(0.824) 
Positive significant 
alpha funds 
0.2%   (4) 0.1%   (4) 0.3%   (4) 14.8%   (4) 
Negative 
significant alpha 
funds 
13.1%   (275) 22.2%   (133) 6.7%   (89) 14.8%   (4) 
Panel B-Average beta 
Bills 0.024 0.031 0.029 0.004 
IT Gov bonds 0.003 0.002 0.006 0.002 
LT Gov bonds 0.002 0.004 0.015 0 
Cor bonds 0.011 0.021 0.004 0.001 
Mort Rel Sec 0.012 0.011 N/A N/A 
LC Value 0.24 0.187 0.138 0.111 
LC Growth 0.276 0.404 0.139 0.228 
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Med Cap 0.194 0.107 0.303 0.286 
Small Cap 0.183 0.046 0.322 0.262 
Non-US bonds 0.005 0.013 0.009 0.018 
Euro/US stocks 0.038 0.143 0.016 0.054 
Jap stocks 0.013 0.03 0.019 0.033 
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Table 3.5.8 - Regression Analysis Results - Minfund 24 
This table reports the average statistics of the regression results from a one factor CAPM model, where only funds with at least 24 monthly 
observations are included. US/US stands for U.S. managed funds investing in U.S. equity, EU/US stands for European managed funds investing in U.S. 
equity,  EU/EU stands for European managed funds investing in European equity and US/EU stands for U.S. managed funds investing in European 
equity. 
 Management Location comparison Market Comparison 
 US/US v. EU/US, usd EU/EU v. US/EU, eur US/US v. US/EU, usd EU/EU v. EU/US, eur 
 US/US EU/US EU/EU US/EU US/US US/EU EU/EU EU/US 
Management 
Location of 
Fund 
US Europe Europe US US US Europe Europe 
Market 
Invested 
US US Europe Europe US Europe Europe US 
Number of 
funds 
2206 640 1459 27 2206 27 1459 640 
Currency USD USD EUR EUR USD USD EUR EUR 
Benchmark 
Factors 
(Currency) 
US factors 
(USD) 
US factors 
(USD) 
European 
factors (Euro) 
European 
factors (Euro) 
US factors 
(USD) 
US factors 
(USD) 
European 
factors 
(Euro) 
European 
factors 
(Euro) 
Panel A : CAPM Model 
 
Mean (α), 
Mean (tα) 
0.063 
(1.035) 
-0.190 
(0.950) 
-0.065 
(0.967) 
0.302 
(1.085) 
0.063 
(1.035) 
0.336 
(0.957) 
-0.065 
(0.967) 
-0.160 
(0.816) 
Mean (β1), 
Mean (tβ1) 
0.999 
(25.869) 
1.579 
(22.946) 
1.247 
(23.139) 
1.283 
(29.011) 
0.999 
(25.869) 
1.076 
(13.938) 
1.247 
(23.139) 
0.992 
(13.255) 
Positive 
significant 
alpha funds 
6.7%   (149) 1.3%   (8) 2.7%   (39) 18.5%   (5) 6.7%   (149) 18.5% (6) 2.7%   (39) 1% (6) 
Negative 
significant 
alpha funds 
6.1%   (135) 31.3%   (200) 16.7   (243) 18.5%   (5) 6.1%   (135) 14.8% (4) 16.7   (243) 10.5% (63) 
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Table 3.5.9 - Regression Analysis Results - Minfund 60 
This table reports the average statistics of the regression results from a one factor CAPM model, where only funds with at least 60 monthly 
observations are included. US/US stands for U.S. managed funds investing in U.S. equity, EU/US stands for European managed funds investing in U.S. 
equity,  EU/EU stands for European managed funds investing in European equity and US/EU stands for U.S. managed funds investing in European 
equity. 
 
 
 Management Location comparison Market Comparison 
 US/US v. EU/US, usd EU/EU v. US/EU, eur US/US v. US/EU, usd EU/EU v. EU/US, eur 
 US/US EU/US EU/EU US/EU US/US US/EU EU/EU EU/US 
Management 
Location of 
Fund 
US Europe Europe US US US Europe Europe 
Market 
Invested 
US US Europe Europe US Europe Europe US 
Number of 
funds 
1847 514 1110 25 1847 25 1110 523 
Currency USD USD EUR EUR USD USD EUR EUR 
Benchmark 
Factors 
(Currency) 
US factors 
 (USD) 
US factors 
(USD) 
European 
factors (Euro) 
European 
factors (Euro) 
US factors 
(USD) 
US factors 
 (USD) 
European 
factors 
(Euro) 
European 
factors 
(Euro) 
Panel A : CAPM Model 
 
Mean (α), 
Mean (tα) 
0.070 
(1.045) 
-0.176 
(1.676) 
-0.067 
(1.326) 
0.261 
(1.310) 
0.070 
(1.045) 
0.319 
(0.997) 
-0.067 
(1.326) 
-0.209 
(1.092) 
Mean (β1), 
Mean (tβ1) 
0.998 
(26.560) 
0.947 
(23.223) 
0.981 
(24.825) 
1.065 
(30.696) 
0.998 
(26.560) 
1.045 
(14.486) 
0.981 
(24.825) 
0.827 
(13.991) 
Positive 
significant 
alpha funds 
7.4%   (137) 1.6%   (8) 3.2%   (35) 20%   (5) 7.4%   (137) 24% (6) 3.2%   (35) 1.1%(6 ) 
Negative 
significant 
alpha funds 
6%   (110) 34.6%   (178) 19.6%   (218) 20%   (5) 6%   (110) 16% (4) 19.6% (218) 11.9%( 62) 
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Table 4.4 - Breakdown of Families by number of funds 
Table 4.4 shows the breakdown of the number of funds per family. It is apparent that the 
majority of families are small, with 80% of families having 9 or less funds in them.  
 
No. of Funds in 
Family 
No. of Families 
2 216 
3 93 
4 73 
5 53 
6-9 97 
10-19 75 
20+ 59 
Total 666 
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Table 4.5.1 - Persistence-Recursive Portfolio technique 
Table 4.5.1 shows results for the full set of mutual funds, when examining for persistence. The first row shows the alpha for each decile fund. The 
second row reports the t-statistic of the alphas. If the alphas for the deciles are significant, it is evidence of persistence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
US market- funds in families 
 
Decile 
Portfolio 
1  2  3  4   5  6  7  8  9  10 
Alpha 0.602  0.638  0.564  0.416  0.330  0.329  0.349  0.272  0.189  0.081 
T-stat 2.315  2.649  2.448  1.830  1.451  1.456  1.512  1.148  0.752  0.297 
 
US market- funds not in families 
 
Decile 
Portfolio 
1  2  3  4   5  6  7  8  9  10 
Alpha 0.442  0.445  0.359  0.371  0.302  0.197  0.170  0.200  0.177  0.100 
T-stat 2.032  2.084  1.737  1.716  1.417  0.904  0.794  0.895  0.767  0.382 
 
EU market- funds in families 
 
Decile 
Portfolio 
1  2  3  4   5  6  7  8  9  10 
Alpha 1.235  1.475  0.689  0.882  1.014  0.490  0.575  0.691  0.607  0.546 
T-stat 3.826  4.556  2.464  2.836  3.657  1.776  1.707  2.303  1.901  1.709 
 
  EU market- funds not in families 
 
Decile 
Portfolio 
1  2  3  4   5  6  7  8  9  10 
Alpha 1.664  1.397  0.557  0.408  0.516  0.902  0.737  0.740  0.640  0.598 
T-stat 4.569  4.025  2.102  1.715  2.135  3.588  2.951  2.745  2.559  2.376 
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Table 4.5.2 - Persistence-Utility based test 
Table 4.5.2 shows the results of the Rhodes utility based technique. In Panel A, the 
probability values for the three tests for normality used (Skewness/Kurtosis, Sharpio-
Francia and Sharpio-Wilk) are presented. Panel B shows the same statistics broken 
down by market and Panel C is broken down by family size. If this distribution of utility 
scores is normally distributed, then there is no evidence of persistence in performance. 
All tests operate under the null hypothesis that the distributions of average utility scores 
are normal. If the p-value is less than the level of significance, the null hypothesis can 
be rejected and this would support persistence as the distribution is non-normal. 
 
Panel A-Utility based technique results 
p-values 
(null=normal distribution  
=> no persistence) 
Family Funds Non-Family Funds 
Sktest 0.00 0.00 
Swilk 0.00 0.00 
SFrancia 0.00 0.00 
Panel B-Utility based technique results, by market 
p-values 
(null=normal distribution  
=> no persistence) 
Family Funds Non-Family Funds 
U.S. market 
Sktest 0.00 0.00 
Swilk 0.00 0.00 
SFrancia 0.00 0.00 
E.U. market 
Sktest 0.00 0.00 
Swilk 0.00 0.00 
SFrancia 0.00 0.00 
Panel C-Utility based technique results, by family size 
 
 Large Families Small Families 
Average Utility 0.01 -0.05 
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Table 4.5.3 - Results of the Risk Adjustment Ratio 
This table shows the results of the risk adjustment ratio. The hypothesis here is that fund 
managers make their risk decision to influence performance for the second part of the 
year based on their performance in the first part of the year. A RAR > 1 can be 
interpreted as an increase in risk, and a RAR < 1 as a decrease in risk. The average 
RAR per family category is presented.  
 
 
Funds in Families Average RAR 
2 1.4 
3 1.1 
4 1.6 
5 1.4 
6 - 9 1.1 
10 - 19 1.5 
20+ 1.7 
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Table 4.5.4 - Results of the Risk Adjustment Ratio, by year 
This table shows the results of the risk adjustment ratio over time. The hypothesis here is that fund managers make their risk decision to influence 
performance for the second part of the year based on their performance in the first part of the year. A RAR > 1 can be interpreted as an increase in 
risk, and a RAR < 1 as a decrease in risk. The average RAR per family category over time is presented.  
 
Funds in 
Family 
2 3 4 5 6 - 9 10 - 19 20+ Average 
1970 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.6 
1971 1.6 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.8 2.5 1.6 1.8 
1972 1.3 1.2 0.3 2.4 0.7 2.2 1.1 1.3 
1973 3.0 4.6 2.1 5.6 3.5 2.8 3.7 3.6 
1974 4.7 2.4 4.7 1.8 3.8 2.9 3.1 3.4 
1975 1.2 1.0 0.8 0.6 1.5 1.0 1.0 1.0 
1976 0.9 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.9 0.8 
1977 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.9 1.2 1.1 0.9 1.0 
1978 1.5 1.3 2.1 1.3 1.7 1.7 1.9 1.7 
1979 1.4 1.0 0.9 1.5 1.4 1.7 1.2 1.3 
1980 0.8 1.0 1.1 0.4 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.8 
1981 1.4 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.3 1.5 1.4 1.4 
1982 1.8 1.5 1.2 2.2 1.6 1.4 1.1 1.5 
1983 1.2 1.7 2.1 0.9 1.3 1.1 1.4 1.4 
1984 1.4 1.2 0.9 1.3 1.4 1.2 1.4 1.2 
1985 3.1 1.0 2.3 1.5 1.2 1.1 1.3 1.6 
1986 1.6 1.9 1.4 1.4 1.7 1.3 1.4 1.5 
1987 2.1 2.3 3.0 3.0 2.5 2.5 2.3 2.5 
1988 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.6 0.8 0.8 
1989 1.7 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.0 1.3 
1990 1.4 1.2 1.8 1.9 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.5 
1991 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 
1992 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.2 1.0 1.1 1.1 
1993 1.3 1.0 1.3 2.5 1.2 1.6 1.4 1.5 
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1994 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 
1995 1.6 1.3 1.3 1.6 1.4 1.6 1.5 1.5 
1996 2.2 1.9 2.1 2.5 2.1 2.2 2.0 2.1 
1997 1.6 1.4 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.6 
1998 2.8 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.4 
1999 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.7 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 
2000 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.0 
2001 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.3 
2002 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 
2003 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.9 0.6 0.7 
2004 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.3 
2005 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.1 1.0 1.0 
2006 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6 
2007 1.4 1.5 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.3 1.4 
2008 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 
2009 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
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Table 4.5.5 - Risk Adjustment Strategy-All families 
Table 4.5.5 shows results for the pooled regression. T-values are reported in 
parenthesis and ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels 
respectively. The risk adjustment strategy model takes the form of a pooled regression: 
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Table 4.5.6 - Risk Adjustment Strategy-U.S. market 
Table 4.5.6 shows results for the pooled regression for the U.S. market. T-values are 
reported in parenthesis and ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% 
levels respectively. The risk adjustment strategy model takes the form of a pooled 
regression: 
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Table 4.5.7 - Risk Adjustment Strategy-Europe 
This table shows results for the pooled regression for Europe. T-values are reported in 
parenthesis and ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels 
respectively. The risk adjustment strategy model takes the form of a pooled regression: 
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Table 4.5.8 - Risk Adjustment Strategy, by year 
This table shows results for the pooled regression, by year. T-values are reported in parenthesis and ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 
and 10% levels respectively. The risk adjustment strategy model takes the form of a pooled regression: 
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1991 -0.523*** -2.62 -0.48*** -12.00 -0.36** -1.68 -0.71*** -3.24 -0.48*** -11.95 
1990 -1.122*** -5.35 -0.45*** -11.79 -1.27*** -5.71 -0.90*** -3.77 -0.44*** -11.53 
1989 -0.171 -1.09 -0.60*** -14.06 -0.11*** -0.68 -0.25 -1.42 -0.60*** -14.09 
1988 -0.262 -1.8 -0.77*** -37.69 -0.23 -1.45 -0.31 -1.90 -0.77*** -37.65 
1987 -0.849*** -2.01 -0.09 -1.16 -0.90** -1.98 -0.79* -1.68 -0.09 -1.17 
1986 -0.686*** -2.65 -1.04*** -20.83 -0.64** -2.31 -0.77** -2.56 -1.04*** -20.80 
1985 -0.551*** -2.65 -0.73*** -21.18 -0.55** -2.48 -0.56** -2.29 -0.73*** -21.10 
1984 0.773*** 2.66 -0.39*** -6.49 1.02*** 3.34 0.38 1.17 -0.41*** -6.81 
1983 -1.915*** -6.89 -0.91*** -15.40 -2.00*** -6.88 -1.74*** -5.29 -0.90*** -15.31 
1982 -0.269 -0.62 -0.40*** -4.00 -0.15 -0.33 -0.47 -0.94 -0.41*** -4.07 
1981 0.473 1.47 -0.37*** -6.64 0.54 1.61 0.32 0.83 -0.37*** -6.67 
1980 0.185 0.47 -0.56*** -11.68 0.32 0.78 -0.10 -0.20 -0.55*** -11.54 
1979 0.052 0.18 -0.0 -1.13 0.20 0.66 -0.22 -0.64 -0.05 -0.87 
1978 -2.017*** -3.01 -0.12 -1.29 -2.40*** -3.48 -1.12 -1.39 -0.14 -1.52 
1977 -0.258 -0.91 -0.43*** -6.04 -0.41 -1.43 0.16 0.47 -0.43*** -6.16 
1976 0.048 0.17 -0.63*** -13.11 0.00 -0.01 0.16 0.48 -0.64*** -13.03 
1975 -0.783 -1.19 -0.96*** -9.93 -0.66 -0.97 -1.07 -1.34 -0.95*** -9.63 
1974 0.369 0.44 -1.07*** -7.22 0.46 0.52 0.16 0.15 -1.06*** -6.92 
1973 3.607*** 4.53 -0.09 -0.50 3.56*** 4.25 3.70*** 3.98 -0.09 -0.49 
1972 1.254*** 2.49 -0.75*** -12.80 1.20*** 2.26 1.36*** 2.29 -0.75*** -12.75 
1971 -1.502*** -3.24 -0.73*** -10.33 -1.42*** -2.89 -1.68*** -2.92 -0.72*** -9.85 
1970 0.155 0.29 -0.20** -2.21 0.05 0.09 0.42 0.65 -0.20** -2.22 
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Table 5.4.1 - Fund Information by country and category 
Table 5.4.1 shows number of funds per category and per country, as well as the number 
of funds in the continuous data subset. It is also seen that the number of funds per 
category, and per country is uneven, ranging from 5 funds in the Canadian Tactical 
Balanced segment to 196 funds in the US Moderate Allocation segment. Some funds 
have limited asset allocation data, so funds were also separated based on data 
continuity. There are 355 funds with 5 years continuous data (January 2006-December 
2010). Definitions of fund categories are also provided. It can be seen from the 
definitions that fund categories vary a lot from each other. The definitions mainly 
specify the proportion of equity and/or fixed income securities a fund has.  
US No.of 
Funds 
Funds with 5 
years 
continuous 
data (Jan 
2006-Dec 2010) 
Definition of fund categories 
Conservative 
Allocation 
116 51 Conservative-allocation portfolios seek to provide 
both capital appreciation and income by investing 
in three major areas: stocks, bonds, and cash. 
These portfolios tend to hold smaller positions in 
stocks than moderate-allocation portfolios. These 
portfolios typically have 20% to 50% of assets in 
equities and 50% to 80% of assets in fixed income 
and cash. 
Moderate 
Allocation 
196 80 Moderate-allocation portfolios seek to provide 
both capital appreciation and income by investing 
in three major areas: stocks, bonds, and cash. 
These portfolios tend to hold larger positions in 
stocks than conservative-allocation portfolios. 
These portfolios typically have 50% to 70% of 
assets in equities and the remainder in fixed 
income and cash. 
Aggressive 
Allocation 
37 12 Aggressive-allocation portfolios seek to provide 
both capital appreciation and income by investing 
in three major areas: stocks, bonds, and cash. 
These portfolios tend to hold larger positions in 
stocks than moderate-allocation portfolios. These 
portfolios typically have 70% to 90% of assets in 
equities and the remainder in fixed income and 
cash. 
Total 349 143  
UK    
Active 
Managed 
37 13 Funds would offer investment in a range of assets, 
with the Manager being able to invest up to 100% 
in equities at their discretion.  At least 10% of the 
total fund must be held in non-UK equities.  There 
is no minimum Sterling/Euro balance and equities 
are deemed to include convertibles.  At any one 
time the asset allocation of these funds may hold a 
high proportion of non-equity assets such that the 
asset allocation would by default place the fund in 
either the Balanced or Cautious sector.  These 
funds would remain in this sector on these 
occasions since it is the Manager's stated intention 
to retain the right to invest up to 100% in equities. 
Balanced 49 21 Funds would offer investment in a range of assets, 
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Managed with the maximum equity exposure restricted to 
85% of the Fund.  At least 10% of the total fund 
must be held in non-UK equities.  Assets must be 
at least 50% in Sterling/Euro and equities are 
deemed to include convertibles. 
Cautious 
Managed 
48 22 Funds investing in a range of assets with the 
maximum equity exposure restricted to 60% of the 
fund and with at least 30% invested in fixed 
interest and cash.  There is no specific requirement 
to hold a minimum % of non UK equity within the 
equity limits. Assets must be at least 50% in 
Sterling/Euro and equities are deemed to include 
convertibles. 
Total 134 56  
Canada    
Equity 
Balanced 
58 39 Funds in the Canadian Equity Balanced category 
must invest at least 70% of total assets in a 
combination of equity securities domiciled in 
Canada and Canadian dollar-denominated fixed 
income securities. In addition, they must invest 
greater than 60% but less than 90% of their total 
assets in equity securities. 
Fixed Income 
Balanced 
73 53 Funds in the Canadian Fixed Income Balanced 
category must invest at least 70% of total assets in 
a combination of equity securities domiciled in 
Canada and Canadian dollar-denominated fixed 
income securities. In addition, they must invest 
greater than 5% but less than 40% of their total 
assets in equity securities. 
Neutral 
Balanced 
95 61 Funds in the Canadian Neutral Balanced category 
must invest at least 70% of total assets in a 
combination of equity securities domiciled in 
Canada and Canadian dollar-denominated fixed 
income securities. In addition, they must invest 
greater than or equal to 40% but less than or equal 
to 60% of their total assets in equity securities. 
Tactical 
Balanced 
5 3 Balanced Funds with a specific mandate to employ 
tactical asset allocation strategies and funds that 
the CIFSC deems to employ tactical asset 
allocation strategies will be assigned to the 
Tactical Balanced fund category. 
Total 231 156  
138 
 
Table 5.4.2 - Average Holding of Asset by country, and broken down by category 
This table shows the average holding of each asset class per country and then broken down by category, in percentage. It is apparent that the 
average holding is very similar across countries for some categories-cash and varies quite significantly for other asset classes-bonds.  
 
US 
All categories 
Conservative Allocation Moderate Allocation Aggressive Allocation   
Average Holding 
of:Equity 50.17 30.98 58.57 68.08   
Bond 34.99 48.61 29.88 17.23   
Cash 9.54 12.35 7.74 6.04   
Other 3.78 6.33 2.51 4.67   
No of funds 349 116 196 37   
UK All categories Active Managed Balanced Managed Cautious Managed   
Average Holding 
of:Equity 63.76 80.97 68.74 45.24   
Bond 17.17 2.31 12.99 33.20   
Cash 10.15 7.23 9.80 12.78   
Other 8.58 9.26 8.25 8.34   
No of funds 134 37 49 48   
Canada All categories Equity Balanced Fixed Income Balanced Neutral Balanced Tactical Balanced 
Average Holding 
of:Equity 48.48 64.1 26.01 53.26 64.05 
Bond 36.97 23.67 50.76 34.23 26.45 
Cash 10.53 7.08 14.62 10.06 8.53 
Other 1.26 1.05 1.66 1.06 0.73 
No of funds 231 58 73 95 5 
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Table 5.4.3 - Sources of Indices-Timing Models and Returns Based Style Analysis 
Table 5.4.3 shows the source of each benchmark index per country for the timing 
models employed and the Returns Based Style Analysis Technique. Where necessary, 
indices were converted to the appropriate currency at the appropriate rate. All indices 
were monthly and had income reinvested (total returns) in order to match the actual 
fund returns.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Factor United States United Kingdom Canada 
Return on market Russel FTSE S&P/TSX 
Return on 
corporate bond 
Barclays IBOXX Dex Capital 
Return on 
government bond 
Barclays IBOXX Dex Capital 
Return on Cash Thomson 
Financial 
Thomson 
Financial 
 
 
Thomson Financial 
 
Bills Kenneth French Thomson 
Financial 
 
 
Thomson Financial 
 
Intermediate-term 
Gov Bonds 
Barclays Barclays Barclays 
Long-term Gov 
bonds 
Barclays Barclays Barclays 
Corporate bonds Barclays IBOXX Dex Capital 
Mortgage Related 
Securities 
FTSE N/A N/A 
Large Cap Value 
stocks 
Dow Jones 
Wilshire 
MSCI MSCI 
Large Cap 
Growth stocks 
Dow Jones 
Wilshire 
MSCI MSCI 
Medium Cap 
stocks 
Dow Jones 
Wilshire 
FTSE FTSE 
Small Cap stocks S&P MSCI MSCI 
Non-US/EU 
bonds 
CGBI WGBI JP Morgan JP Morgan 
European/US 
stocks 
MSCI MSCI MSCI 
Japanese stocks MSCI MSCI MSCI 
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Table 5.4.4 - Correlation coefficients and Mean Difference test between the RBSA 
and actual asset allocations 
 
Panel A of Table 4 presents the results of the test for correlation between the actual 
asset allocations and the asset allocations as a result of Returns based style analysis. 
The probability values associated with the Spearman correlation coefficient and the 
Kendall’s rank correlation for the null hypothesis of no correlation are shown. Since 
the p-value is zero, the null hypothesis of no correlation can be rejected. Panel B 
presents the results of the test for correlation between the actual asset allocations and 
the asset allocations as a result of Returns based style analysis. The mean difference 
and the t-statistic are shown. From the low value of the t-statistic, it can be seen that the 
null hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A 
Null:No correlation Spearman correlation coefficient P-value 
Equity 0.8285 0.000 
Bond 0.6703 0.000 
Cash 0.3459 0.000 
Null:No correlation Kendall's rank correlations P-value  
Equity 0.000  
Bond 0.000  
Cash 0.000  
Panel B 
Null:Coeff not sig Mean Difference T-statistic 
Equity 0.04 0.41 
Bond -0.06 -0.53 
Cash 0.08 0.60 
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Table 5.5.1 - Timing Ability, individual Asset Classes, and by category 
Table 5.5.1 presents the results of the first model employed to test for absolute timing ability: 
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11 Gov 
Bond 0 14.18 11.19 88.81 0.00 8.11 5.41 94.59 0.00 18.37 0.00 100.00 0.00 14.58 27.08 72.92 
12 Cash 1.49 13.43 32.09 67.91 2.70 0.00 54.05 45.95 2.04 8.16 44.90 55.10 0.00 29.17 2.08 97.92 
  Canada-All Canada- Equity Balanced Canada- Fixed Income 
Balanced 
Canada- Neutral Balanced  
 
Canada- Tactical Balanced 
  % 
Sig 
Pos 
% 
Sig 
Neg 
% 
Pos 
% 
Neg 
% 
Sig 
Pos 
% 
Sig 
Neg 
% 
Pos 
% 
Neg 
%  
Sig 
Pos 
% 
Sig 
Neg 
% 
Pos 
% 
Neg 
% 
 Sig 
Pos 
% 
Sig 
Neg 
% 
Pos 
% 
Neg 
% 
Sig 
Pos 
% 
Sig 
Neg 
% 
Pos 
% 
Neg 
13 Alpha 
15.15 0.43 71.86 28.14 13.79 1.72 65.52 34.48 23.29 0.00 94.52 5.48 10.53 0.00 57.89 42.11 0 0 80 
20 
 
14 Rm 98.27 0 100 0 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 94.52 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 
15 Equity 0.43 12.12 26.41 73.59 0.00 3.45 43.10 56.90 1.37 21.92 8.22 91.78 0.00 10.53 30.53 69.47 0.00 0.00 20.00 80.00 
16 Cor 
Bond 
3.46 3.46 43.29 56.71 5.17 3.45 60.34 39.66 0.00 6.85 16.44 83.56 5.26 1.05 52.63 47.37 0.00 0.00 60.00 40.00 
17 Gov 
Bond 
2.6 0.87 55.84 44.16 3.45 0.00 43.10 56.90 2.74 1.37 75.34 24.66 2.11 1.05 49.47 50.53 0.00 0.00 40.00 60.00 
18 Cash 4.33 9.96 42.86 57.14 5.17 15.52 44.83 55.17 1.37 6.85 34.25 65.75 6.32 9.47 48.42 51.58 0.00 0.00 40.00 60.00 
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Table 5.5.2 - Timing Ability, all classes 
This table presents the results of the first model employed to test for absolute timing 
ability by total number of asset classes timed. It presents a more general view of timing 
ability, for the all asset classes together. Results are presented for positive coefficients 
and significantly positive coefficients, including and excluding cash. Results are quite 
consistent across markets. No or very few managers are able to significantly time all, 3 
out of 4, or 2 out of 4 asset classes, including cash. 13.47% of US managers are able to 
time 1 out of the 4 asset classes, compared to 6.72% of UK managers and 9.09% of 
Canadian managers. Over 85% of managers cannot time any of the classes, with UK 
managers displaying the least skill, at 93.28% of managers able to time nothing. 
  US UK CAN 
% with All 4 classes Sig + Pos (cash included) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
% with 3 out of 4 Sig + Pos (cash included) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
% with 2 out of 4 Sig + Pos (cash included) 0.57 0.00 0.87 
% with 1 out of 4 Sig + Pos (cash included) 13.47 6.72 9.09 
% with none Sig + Pos (cash included) 85.96 93.28 89.18 
% with 3 out of 3 Sig + Pos (cash excluded) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
% with 2 out of 3 Sig + Pos (cash excluded) 0.29 0.00 0.00 
% with 1 out of 3 Sig + Pos (cash excluded) 6.30 5.22 6.49 
% with none Sig + Pos (cash excluded) 93.41 94.78 92.64 
% with All 4 classes Pos (cash included) 0.29 0.00 1.30 
% with 3 out of 4 Pos (cash included) 7.45 4.48 9.96 
% with 2 out of 4 Pos (cash included) 35.24 23.13 46.75 
% with 1 out of 4 Pos (cash included) 55.59 52.99 38.96 
% with none Pos (cash included) 1.43 19.40 2.16 
% with 3 out of 3 Pos (cash excluded) 0.86 0.75 2.16 
% with 2 out of 3 Pos (cash excluded) 28.94 14.93 24.24 
% with 1 out of 3 Pos (cash excluded) 67.62 48.51 69.70 
% with none Pos (cash excluded) 2.58 35.82 3.03 
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Table 5.5.3 - Timing Ability, asset classes relative to each other 
Table 5.5.3 presents the results of the second model employed to test for relative timing ability. 
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9 % Pos 50 100 67.16 47.76 66.42 69.40 76.12 12.69 
10 % Neg 50 0 32.84 52.24 33.58 30.60 23.88 87.31 
 CAN                
11 % Sig 
Pos 5.63 99.13 0.87 18.18 52.81 3.03 18.61 1.30 
12 % Sig 
Neg 3.90 0 13.85 0.43 1.73 0.43 0.43 12.99 
13 Total 
Sig 
9.52 
99.13 14.72 18.61 54.55 3.46 19.05 14.29 
14 % Pos 37.66 100 5.63 76.19 90.91 78.35 78.79 21.65 
15 % Neg 62.34 0 94.37 23.81 9.09 21.65 21.21 78.35 
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Table 5.5.4 - Timing Ability, all classes 
This table presents the results of the second model employed to test for relative timing 
ability by total number of asset classes timed. Results are presented for positive and 
negative coefficients and significantly positive and negative coefficients, including and 
excluding cash. Results are quite consistent across markets. No or very few managers 
are able to significantly time all or 5 out of 6 asset class ratios including cash. Less 
than 10% of mangers in any market are able to time 4 out of 6 or 3 out of 6 asset class 
ratios. Between 17% and 41% of managers are able to time 2 out of 6 or 1 out of 6 asset 
class ratios. 43.28% of UK managers are able to time none of the asset class ratios, 
compared to 33.81% of US managers and 25.11% of Canadian managers. 
 
 
 
 
 
  US UK CAN 
% with All 6 classes Sig + Pos/Neg (cash included) 0.00 0 0 
% with 5 out of 6 Sig + Pos/Neg (cash included) 0.00 1.492537 0 
% with 4 out of 6 Sig + Pos/Neg (cash included) 2.87 2.985075 3.463203 
% with 3 out of 6 Sig + Pos/Neg (cash included) 9.46 3.731343 8.658009 
% with 2 out of 6 Sig + Pos/Neg (cash included) 17.77 13.43284 22.07792 
% with 1 out of 6 Sig + Pos/Neg (cash included) 36.10 34.32836 40.69264 
% with none Sig + Pos/Neg (cash included) 33.81 43.28358 25.10823 
% with 3 out of 3 Sig + Pos/Neg (cash excluded) 0.29 3.731343 2.164502 
% with 2 out of 3 Sig + Pos/Neg (cash excluded) 12.89 7.462687 19.48052 
% with 1 out of 3 Sig + Pos/Neg (cash excluded) 37.25 23.13433 42.42424 
% with none Sig + Pos/Neg (cash excluded) 49.57 64.92537 35.93074 
% with All 6 classes Pos (cash included) 0.00 0 0.4329 
% with 5 out of 6 Pos (cash included) 4.87 23.13433 7.792208 
% with 4 out of 6 Pos (cash included) 20.92 25.37313 42.42424 
% with 3 out of 6 Pos (cash included) 36.68 29.10448 41.55844 
% with 2 out of 6 Pos (cash included) 26.36 10.44776 7.792208 
% with 1 out of 6 Pos (cash included) 10.89 10.44776 0 
% with none Pos (cash included) 0.29 0.746269 0 
% with 3 out of 3 Pos (cash excluded) 7.45 29.10448 4.329004 
% with 2 out of 3 Pos (cash excluded) 23.50 28.35821 67.96537 
% with 1 out of 3 Pos (cash excluded) 49.57 35.07463 23.80952 
% with none Pos (cash excluded) 19.48 6.716418 3.896104 
% with All 6 classes Neg (cash included) 0.29 0.746269 0 
% with 5 out of 6 Neg (cash included) 10.89 10.44776 0 
% with 4 out of 6 Neg (cash included) 26.36 10.44776 7.792208 
% with 3 out of 6 Neg (cash included) 36.68 29.10448 41.55844 
% with 2 out of 6 Neg (cash included) 20.92 25.37313 42.42424 
% with 1 out of 6 Neg (cash included) 4.87 23.13433 7.792208 
% with none Neg (cash included) 0.00 0 0.4329 
% with 3 out of 3 Neg (cash excluded) 19.48 6.716418 3.896104 
% with 2 out of 3 Neg (cash excluded) 49.57 35.07463 23.80952 
% with 1 out of 3 Neg (cash excluded) 23.50 28.35821 67.96537 
% with none Neg (cash excluded) 7.45 29.10448 4.329004 
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Table 5.5.5 - Timing Ability, regressions 
Table 5.5.5 presents results of the regressions based on asset allocations data used for testing for timing ability. i.e. 
Prop Equityt = α + β(
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Table 5.5.6 - Timing Ability, individual Asset Classes, subset of data 
Table 5.5.6 presents the results of the first model employed to test for absolute timing 
ability for the subset of data with continuous data. Results are very consistent with 
Table 5.5.1. 
 
 
 
1 
2 3 4 
5 
6 
 
US 
 
          
 
  
Alpha 
Rm Equity Cor Bond Gov Bond Cash 
1 
% Sig Pos 66.43 98.60 0.70 2.80 0.70 8.39 
2 
% Sig Neg 0.00 0.00 4.90 0.00 6.99 47.55 
3 
% Pos 97.20 99.30 27.97 79.72 21.68 18.18 
4 
% Neg 2.80 0.70 72.03 20.28 78.32 81.82 
 
UK             
5 
% Sig Pos 12.50 100.00 0.00 3.57 0.00 0.00 
6 
% Sig Neg 0.00 0.00 7.14 0.00 21.43 10.71 
7 
% Pos 80.36 100.00 7.14 53.57 14.29 21.43 
8 
% Neg 19.64 0.00 92.86 46.43 85.71 78.57 
 
Can             
9 
% Sig Pos 13.46 98.72 0.64 1.92 1.92 3.85 
10 
% Sig Neg 0.64 0.00 11.54 2.56 0.64 10.26 
11 
% Pos 70.51 100.00 25.64 42.31 53.21 42.95 
12 
% Neg 29.49 0.00 74.36 57.69 46.79 57.05 
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Table 5.5.7 Timing Ability, asset classes relative to each other, subset of data 
 
Table 5.5.7 presents the results of the second model employed to test for relative timing ability for the subset of data with continuous data. Results 
are very consistent with Table 5.5.3. 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
US 
Alpha 
Rm 
Equity to Cor 
Bond 
Equity to Gov 
Bond 
Cor Bond to Gov 
Bond 
Equity to 
Cash 
Cor Bond to 
Cash 
Gov Bond to 
Cash 
1 % Sig 
Pos 53.85 100.00 1.40 16.08 4.20 23.78 4.90 5.59 
2 % Sig 
Neg 0.00 0.00 26.57 3.50 10.49 2.80 18.88 5.59 
3 Total 
Sig 53.85 100.00 27.97 19.58 14.69 26.57 23.78 11.19 
4 % Pos 95.10 100.00 21.68 74.83 20.28 77.62 30.07 51.05 
5 % Neg 4.90 0.00 78.32 25.17 79.72 22.38 69.93 48.95 
 UK                 
6 % Sig 
Pos 1.79 100.00 16.07 16.07 16.07 7.14 12.50 0.00 
7 % Sig 
Neg 1.79 0.00 10.71 1.79 0.00 0.00 0.00 30.36 
8 Total 
Sig 3.57 100.00 26.79 17.86 16.07 7.14 12.50 30.36 
9 % Pos 42.86 100.00 67.86 51.79 66.07 80.36 76.79 14.29 
10 % Neg 57.14 0.00 32.14 48.21 33.93 19.64 23.21 85.71 
 CAN                 
11 % Sig 
Pos 6.41 99.36 0.64 14.74 46.15 3.21 17.31 0.64 
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12 % Sig 
Neg 5.13 0.00 10.26 0.64 1.28 0.00 0.64 14.74 
13 Total 
Sig 11.54 99.36 10.90 15.38 47.44 3.21 17.95 15.38 
14 % Pos 37.18 100.00 7.05 75.64 89.10 80.13 79.49 16.67 
15 % Neg 62.82 0.00 92.95 24.36 10.90 19.87 20.51 83.33 
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Figure 3.4 – Comparisons 
 
Two main comparisons are examined on the basis of 1: Management Location and 2: 
Market 
 
 
U.S. manager     European Manager 
 1   
  
 
 
       2                                          2 
 
   
 1
U.S.  
Equities 
European 
Equities 
U.S.  
Equities 
European 
Equities 
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Figure 3.5 – The Average beta per asset class 
The bar chart shows the average beta per factor, which represents the proportion of a 
fund invested in each asset class. US/US stands for U.S. managed funds investing in 
U.S. equity, EU/US stands for European managed funds investing in U.S. equity,  
EU/EU stands for European managed funds investing in European equity and US/EU 
stands for U.S. managed funds investing in European equity. 
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Figure 5.4 - Graph of difference between RBSA and actual asset allocation 
The graph shows the difference between the actual allocations distribution and the 
distribution of the simulated allocations from Returns based style analysis. 
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